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PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT 
by 
Stephen B. Burbank, Sean Farhang & Herbert M. Kritzer  
Our aim in this Article is to advance understanding of private 
enforcement of statutory and administrative law in the United States 
and to raise questions that will be useful to those who are concerned with 
regulatory design in other countries. To that end, we briefly discuss 
aspects of American culture, history, and political institutions that 
reasonably can be thought to have contributed to the growth and 
subsequent development of private enforcement. We also set forth key 
elements of the general legal landscape in which decisions about private 
enforcement are made, aspects of which should be central to the choice of 
an enforcement strategy and, in the case of private enforcement, are 
critical to the efficacy of a private enforcement regime. We then turn to 
the business of institutional architecture, describing the considerations—
both in favor of and against private enforcement—that should affect the 
choice of an enforcement strategy. We lay out choices to be made about 
elements of a private enforcement regime, attending to the general legal 
landscape in which the regime would operate, particularly court access, 
as well as how incentives for enforcement interact with the market for 
legal services, which has important implications for private enforcement 
activity. We situate these legislative choices about private enforcement in 
the context of institutions that shape them. Finally, we seek to 
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demonstrate how general considerations play out by examining private 
enforcement in two policy areas: legislation proscribing discrimination in 
employment, and laws protecting consumers from unfair and deceptive 
practices. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Our aim in this Article is to advance understanding of private 
enforcement of statutory and administrative law. Long part of American 
legal culture, private enforcement has in recent years attracted 
considerable interest and provoked considerable controversy abroad. For 
example, it appears that an impetus for the attention that some countries 
have recently given to representative litigation has been EU directives 
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requiring that member states provide “adequate and effective means” to 
protect consumers.1 For that reason, we also seek to raise questions that 
will be useful to those who are concerned with regulatory design in other 
legal systems.2 
There have been deep differences between the civil law and 
common law worlds about the feasibility and utility of attempting to 
define the attributes and proper roles of public or private actors in the 
legal system.3 For those who believe that “wrongs to individuals are 
properly within the domain of private liability, wrongs to the general 
public are properly brought only by public officials. . . . the phrase 
‘private attorney general’ is not just an oxymoron; it is virtually a logical 
impossibility.”4 Among those not troubled by such matters of first 
principle, including most Americans, the term nevertheless may have 
quite different connotations. Thus, one scholar objected to its use to 
describe plaintiffs in so-called citizen-suit litigation under federal 
environmental laws.5 Yet, at least under some of those laws the 
tenuousness of allegations of individualized injury would seem to make 
the term least problematic because “[g]reater deterrence was no longer a 
collateral benefit but became the primary benefit.”6 
Although we acknowledge some inevitable definitional issues, in this 
Article we focus on situations in which government responds to a 
perception of unremedied systemic problems by creating or modifying a 
 
1 See Christopher Hodges, The Reform of Class and Representative 
Actions in European Legal Systems: A New Framework for Collective Redress 
in Europe 103 (2008). See also Till Schreiber, Private Antitrust Litigation in the European 
Union, 44 Int’l Law. 1157, 1158 (2010) (describing EU Commission activity “clearly 
indicat[ing] that the legal and economic landscape of actions for damages resulting 
from the violation of E.U. antitrust law is currently changing to the benefit of victims 
of antitrust infringements”). 
2 We use the phrase “private enforcement” for both enforcement initiated by 
private parties but taken over by public officials as well as enforcement initiated and 
prosecuted by private parties. We use the phrase “private enforcement regime” to 
refer to the system of rules that a legislature includes in its statutory design after 
deciding to include a private right of action. These rules may address such diverse 
subjects as “who has standing to sue, which parties will bear the costs of litigation, 
what damages will be available to winning plaintiffs, whether a judge or jury will make 
factual determinations and assess damages, and rules of liability, evidence, and proof 
that together can have profound consequences for how much or little private 
enforcement litigation will actually be mobilized.” Sean Farhang, The Litigation 
State: Public Regulation and Private Lawsuits in the U.S. 3–4 (2010). 
3 See John Henry Merryman, The Public Law–Private Law Distinction in European 
and American Law, 17 J. Pub. L. 3, 3–4 (1968). 
4 Barry Boyer & Errol Meidinger, Privatizing Regulatory Enforcement: A Preliminary 
Assessment of Citizen Suits Under Federal Environmental Laws, 34 Buff. L. Rev. 833, 940 
(1985). 
5 See Stephen M. Johnson, Private Plaintiffs, Public Rights: Article II and Environmental 
Citizen Suits, 49 U. Kan. L. Rev. 383, 409, 421 (2001). 
6 Barton H. Thompson, Jr., The Continuing Innovation of Citizen Enforcement, 2000 
U. Ill. L. Rev. 185, 198 (2000). 
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regulatory regime and relying in whole or in part on private actors as 
enforcers. We are not concerned about alternative regulatory choices 
that a government sincere about seeking to solve unremedied systemic 
problems might have made,7 whether by manipulating incentives in 
order to shape decentralized individual decisions, as through the tax 
system, or by deploying a form of command-and-control regulation that 
did not include privately-initiated proceedings. 
We consider the typical origins of and processes characterizing 
private enforcement regimes,8 as well as aspects of the broader social, 
political, and legal landscapes that might be thought to influence those 
origins and processes. Believing that “abstract speculation on the 
functioning or desirability of [private enforcement] will get us 
nowhere,”9 we explore the social and political character of private 
enforcement, along with the doctrine that underlies it, disciplining 
normative analysis with the fruits of social science. 
The desire to avoid “abstract speculation” is one reason we take a 
sectoral approach, choosing two areas to study from a much longer list of 
legal domains in which private enforcement plays a role. In addition, 
the desirability of authorizing private actions involves difficult 
policy judgments and is likely to depend on a number of context-
specific factors [with the result that] [m]aking such determinations 
therefore requires familiarity with the nature of the particular 
policy problem, the substantive goals of the regulatory scheme, and 
the likely interaction of private lawsuits with other elements of the 
government’s enforcement strategy.10 
This helps to explain our view, discussed further below, that class action 
(or other representative litigation) mechanisms should not be designed 
 
7 Continued reliance on the market (ignoring market failure) or intentional 
creation of an impotent private enforcement regime would not be a viable option for 
a government “sincere about seeking to solve” such problems. Compare the history of 
federal employment discrimination legislation. Republican members of the Senate 
favored private enforcement of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 precisely because they 
believed that it would be less robust than administrative enforcement. See Farhang, 
supra note 2, at 94–128. 
8 See Morris P. Fiorina, Legislative Choice of Regulatory Forms: Legal Process or 
Administrative Process?, 39 Pub. Choice 33, 36 (1982). 
9 Boyer & Meidinger, supra note 4, at 964. 
10 Matthew C. Stephenson, Public Regulation of Private Enforcement: The Case for 
Expanding the Role of Administrative Agencies, 91 Va. L. Rev. 93, 106 (2005). Moreover, 
in order to assess private enforcement, “it is necessary to understand the social 
dynamics that surround a particular field of regulation, as well as the ways in which 
the entry of private enforcers is likely to alter those relationships.” Boyer & 
Meidinger, supra note 4, at 889. See also J. Maria Glover, The Structural Role of Private 
Enforcement Mechanisms in Public Law, 53 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1137, 1176 (2012) 
(“Rigorous analysis of the role private enforcement mechanisms play in a given 
regulatory regime has been obscured both in doctrine and in scholarship by the 
tendency to formulate acontextual, abstract metrics for the evaluation of such 
mechanisms. . . .”). 
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or deployed for that purpose on a general (trans-substantive) basis, an 
approach that necessarily neglects the different regulatory policies and 
goals of different bodies of substantive law.11 Although we concentrate on 
federal law, state law plays the dominant role in one of the two sectors we 
have chosen to study in detail. 
When private actors are given access to courts for enforcement, we 
think it important not to conceive of or describe the phenomenon as 
“judicial enforcement,”12 or “judicial intervention.”13 Like exclusive focus 
on formal legal rules, such a frame can obscure the locus of initiation—
clients and lawyers—and the impact of incentives on the prospects for 
initiation. As a result, it may be more difficult to discern what aspects of 
regulatory design affect the efficacy and durability of the policy sought to 
be implemented.14 Our interest in private enforcement is not confined to 
courts, however; it extends to administrative agencies and other 
tribunals. Many kinds of actions that are brought in civil courts in the 
United States are also brought in separate tribunals abroad.15 
Finally, although a government sincere about seeking to solve 
unremedied systemic problems would not intentionally create an 
impotent private enforcement regime, the experience of countries that 
have introduced class action litigation without attending to the incentive 
structure that drives litigation—creating “beautiful cars without 
engines”16—suggests that impotence need not be purposeful.17 It also 
 
11 See Stephen B. Burbank & Tobias Barrington Wolff, Redeeming the Missed 
Opportunities of Shady Grove, 159 U. PA. L. Rev. 17, 74–75 (2010); Glover, supra note 
10, at 1186. 
12 Robert Belton, A Comparative Review of Public and Private Enforcement of Title VII 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 31 Vand. L. Rev. 905, 922 (1978); Fiorina, supra note 8, 
at 43. 
13 Alexandra Kalev & Frank Dobbin, Enforcement of Civil Rights Law in Private 
Workplaces: The Effects of Compliance Reviews and Lawsuits Over Time, 31 Law & Soc. 
Inquiry 855, 891 (2006). But cf. Margaret H. Lemos, Special Incentives to Sue, 95 Minn. 
L. Rev. 782, 784 (2011) (discussing incentives and ability of judiciary to thwart private 
enforcement). See infra text accompanying note 247 (same). 
14 See Sean Farhang, Congressional Mobilization of Private Litigants: Evidence from the 
Civil Rights Act of 1991, 6 J. Empirical Legal Stud. 1, 1 (2009). This is not to deny 
that the locus of enforcement in courts rather than, for instance, administrative 
agencies may in some jurisdictions implicate a “fundamental debate about the role of 
the courts in policy making in a representative democracy.” Deborah R. Hensler, The 
Globalization of Class Actions: An Overview, 622 Annals Am. Acad. Pol. & Soc Sci. 7, 26 
(2009). Thus, as to class actions—Professor Hensler’s concern—one might feel 
differently depending on whether decisions concerning representative litigation were 
made on a sector-by-sector basis by the legislature or on a general (trans-substantive) 
basis by court rule. 
15 See, e.g., Richard Moorhead, An American Future? Contingency Fees, Claims 
Explosions and Evidence from Employment Tribunals, 73 Mod. L. Rev. 752, 752–54 (2010). 
16 Filippo Valguarnera, Legal Tradition as an Obstacle: Europe’s Difficult Journey to 
Class Action, 10 Global Jurist (Advances) 1, 42 (2010). Consider in that regard an 
assessment of the EU Commission’s 2008 White Paper on Damages Actions for 
Breach of the European Commission Antitrust Rules: “If European courts chase the 
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confirms that an evaluation of private enforcement, whether in theory or 
practice, will be useless unless it comprehends the general and specific 
legal institutions and rules that constitute a private enforcement regime 
and that, in combination with other social, economic, and cultural 
influences, determine whether a government sincere about seeking to 
solve unremedied systemic problems can be successful. 
We start with a brief discussion of aspects of American culture, 
American history, and American political institutions that may have 
contributed to the growth and subsequent development of private 
enforcement. We then turn to the general legal landscape in which 
decisions about private enforcement play out, aspects of which should be 
central to the choice of an enforcement strategy and, in the case of 
private enforcement, are critical to the efficacy of a private enforcement 
regime. Careful attention must be paid to rules on the allocation of costs 
and fees. Even seemingly technical rules on pleading or discovery may 
impede access or effective enforcement.18 
We then turn to the business of institutional architecture: designing 
an enforcement regime. Once a government that is sincere about seeking 
to solve an unremedied systemic problem has decided to do so through 
command-and-control regulation, what are the advantages and 
disadvantages of public and private enforcement that might affect 
choices between them (including the choice of a hybrid strategy)? On 
the assumption that government has selected private enforcement (or a 
 
harm downstream to the ultimately injured party, they will find themselves with 
thousands or even millions of parties to compensate in the ordinary antitrust case. 
Not only will those parties be widely dispersed with many small injuries, they will also 
be denied the two features of the U.S. system—generous claim aggregation and 
treble damages—that provide the best opportunity for a suit to be brought and 
monies recovered. Further, if the purchasers sue, they will face sharp limitations on 
discovery. Discovery stinginess is particularly problematic in a system that gives 
standing to downstream purchasers who are remote from the defendant.” Daniel A. 
Crane, Optimizing Private Antitrust Enforcement, 63 Vand. L. Rev. 675, 701–02 (2010). 
See also Reza Rajabiun, Private Enforcement and Judicial Discretion in the Evolution of 
Antitrust in the United States, 8 J. Competition L. & Econ. 187, 202 (2012) (“The early 
history of the U.S. antitrust system and the more recent experience in the European 
Union illustrate that formal rights of standing do not always translate into an effective 
litigation regime.”). 
17 See Hensler, supra note 14, at 22–25. 
18 See Stephen B. Burbank, Pleading and the Dilemmas of Modern American Procedure, 
93 Judicature 109, 120 (2009). Realists cringed when the Supreme Court treated the 
federal class action rule as just another joinder provision—like a rule that permits two 
passengers injured in the same automobile accident to bring one lawsuit against the 
driver—whose effect on substantive rights is “incidental.” See Burbank & Wolff, supra 
note 11, at 65. The case in question, Shady Grove Orthopedic Assoc. v. Allstate Ins. 
Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431 (2010), usefully reminds us, however, what a wild card the 
modern class action (dating to 1966) has been in the history of private enforcement. 
It also raises related questions about the wisdom of a general (trans-substantive) class 
action rule and the proper institution to decide whether the class action should serve 
as an enabler of private enforcement. 
2013] PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT 643 
hybrid strategy), we take up choices to be made about elements of a 
private enforcement regime. This part of creating an effective 
enforcement strategy is considerably more complex than may first 
appear, requiring careful attention to the general legal landscape in 
which the regime would operate, including existing formal rules 
concerning court access, and to the market for legal services. Questions 
of institutional structure loom over both the choice of an enforcement 
strategy and structuring a private enforcement regime. There is robust 
quantitative and qualitative evidence that the structure of American 
government and, in particular, the dynamics of a separation-of-powers 
system have strongly influenced resort to private enforcement regimes in 
connection with federal regulatory legislation.19 
In the penultimate part of this Article, we examine how general 
considerations play out—how they change shape and salience—because 
of the dynamics of particular legal contexts. For that purpose we have 
chosen two quite different examples of regulatory response to the 
perception of unremedied systemic problems. First, we take up modern 
legislation proscribing discrimination in employment. Here we have the 
benefit of extensive quantitative and qualitative social science research to 
help discipline normative thinking. Second, we examine modern 
regulatory responses to the problem of consumer protection against 
unfair and deceptive practices. Whereas federal law has played an 
important role in regulating employment discrimination—even if not as 
important as generally assumed20—state law unquestionably has been the 
dominant vehicle of private enforcement, if not the dominant regulatory 
force, in the consumer protection field. This makes our job more 
difficult. Yet, the growing importance of a quasi-federalist structure in 
Europe through the EU may make the effort worthwhile for those 
contemplating private enforcement in that rapidly evolving landscape. 
II. General Historical, Cultural, and Political Influences on 
Private Enforcement 
For most of its history, by reason of the circumstances of its 
founding, the United States has depended far more on state and local 
laws and institutions than it has on federal laws and institutions for 
solutions to systemic problems unremedied by judge-made common law 
rules applied in actions between private parties. States have historically 
 
19 See Thomas F. Burke, Lawyers, Lawsuits, and Legal Rights: The Battle 
over Litigation in American Society 13–14 (2002); Farhang, supra note 2, at 31–
34. In addition to discussing how these elements of structure have influenced design 
choices in the United States, in the Conclusion we raise questions about the 
implications of other government structures for private enforcement. 
20 See Gary Blasi & Joseph W. Doherty, California Employment Discrimination Law 
and its Enforcement: The Fair Employment and Housing Act at 50, Center for Law & 
Public Policy 62 (2010), available at http://ssrn.com/paper=1596906. 
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had primary or exclusive responsibility for the maintenance of order, the 
protection of public welfare, and the provision of government services. 
Moreover, although disagreements about the need for and permissible 
extent of national governmental institutions have existed since the 
founding, the federal Constitution reflects a preference for both limited 
government and decentralized government with regard to internal 
affairs. 
There have been at least four periods in U.S. history when federal 
laws and institutions made notable encroachments on a landscape 
previously either free of legal regulation by statutory or administrative 
law or dominated by state institutions: (1) during and immediately after 
the Civil War in the 1860s, (2) during the Progressive Era that bridged 
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, (3) during the Great Depression 
in the 1930s, and (4) during and following the Civil Rights and “Great 
Society” period in the 1960s. Despite enormous increases in federal 
regulation since the 1960s, the states of the United States continue to 
guard their prerogatives, even if inconsistently,21 and it remains true that 
most law governing citizen-to-citizen relationships is state law and much 
of that is judge-made common law. 
Each of these periods saw increases in both the amount of federal 
statutory and administrative law and in the federal government’s reliance 
on private enforcement. For cases brought by private plaintiffs, various 
federal statutes contained either (1) a fee-shifting provision or (2) 
authority to award multiple or punitive damages, or both. There were 
three such statutes from 1887 through 1899, eight from 1900 through 
1929, seven from 1930 through 1939, four from 1940 through 1949, six 
from 1950 through 1959, ten from 1960 (1964) through 1969, and sixty 
from 1970 through 1979.22 In some cases, a single statute might contain 
multiple private enforcement regimes.23 For some of this period, 
increasing resort to private enforcement regimes may have reflected, in 
part, the slow growth of federal administrative capacity. 
 
21 Those whose parents or grandparents were helped by Social Security or nursed 
back to health courtesy of Medicare manifest the same sort of inconsistency when 
protesting health care reform as do their elected representatives. “They want and 
expect guaranteed health care and financial aid when disability, disaster, or 
unemployment strikes their families. But getting those things from an institutionally 
fragmented, tax-averse, ‘anti-statist’ political system, as in the United States, presents a 
problem.” Robert A. Kagan, Adversarial Legalism: The American Way of Law 15 
(2001). The same “antistatist sentiments” underlie the tendency of many Americans 
to explain “business practices that are driven by public policy as driven by market 
forces. . . . [a tendency] to underestimate the importance of policy in part because 
the federal government appears to be weak.” Erin Kelly & Frank Dobbin, Civil Rights 
Law at Work: Sex Discrimination and the Rise of Maternity Leave Policies, 105 Am. J. Soc. 
455, 457 (1999). 
22 See generally Farhang, supra note 2, at 64–66. 
23 For example, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 has separate and distinct 
enforcement provisions for the public accommodations title and the employment 
title, both of which include private enforcement. See Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241. 
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Although federal administration is not as much a development of 
the twentieth century as has often been portrayed,24 
the absence of an autonomous federal bureaucracy in nineteenth-
century U.S. democracy allowed patronage-wielding political parties 
to colonize administrative arrangements in [this country], thereby 
determining that voters would be wooed with nonprogrammatic 
appeals, especially with patronage and other “distributive” allocations 
of publicly controlled resources.25 
As late as 1941, prominent scholars noted that “an administrative 
body does not normally act to remedy wrongs which have occurred. . . . 
[and that this] power of administrative bodies, to act affirmatively after 
the injury, is still in the tentative stage. . . .”26 These scholars also pointed 
out that “there are, of course, many fields in which administrative bodies 
have not made an appearance”27 and that “to impose upon public 
agencies the task of asserting civil sanctions on behalf of injured groups 
will require a substantial increase in size, personnel and expenditures.”28 
They were skeptical about the prospects of that happening because, 
“[d]espite the great improvements in federal agencies in recent years, it 
is still true that there is no tradition of public service and little 
development of a true civil servant attitude in America.”29 
Government institutions are a reflection of the preferences of those 
who fashion them. In this country certain attitudes have been quite 
tenacious over time. These attitudes include self-reliance, belief in the 
virtues of free market capitalism, impatience with the status quo, and 
distrust of government. Distrust of government and bureaucratic 
authority, manifested in part by antagonism towards taxes, is an 
important part of the phenomenon of “adversarial legalism” that Robert 
Kagan believes helps explain the prominent role that privately-initiated 
litigation plays in American enforcement of statutory and administrative 
law.30 He argues that “[o]rganizationally, adversarial legalism typically is 
associated with and is embedded in decisionmaking institutions in which 
authority is fragmented and in which hierarchical control is relatively 
weak.”31 Privately-initiated litigation satisfies the impulse in favor of 
decentralized regulation, and even though the federal and state 
governments substantially subsidize civil courts, the system is likely 
 
24 See Jerry L. Mashaw, Federal Administration and Administrative Law in the Gilded 
Age, 119 Yale L.J. 1362, 1365–66 (2010). 
25 Theda Skocpol, Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of Analysis in Current 
Research, in Bringing the State Back In 3, 24 (Peter B. Evans et al. eds., 1985). 
26 Harry Kalven, Jr. & Maurice Rosenfield, The Contemporary Function of the Class 
Suit, 8 U. Chi. L. Rev. 684, 687 (1941). 
27 Id. 
28 Id. at 720. 
29 Id. at 720–21. 
30 Kagan, supra note 21, at 15–16. 
31 Id. at 9 (emphasis omitted). 
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cheaper for the state, and hence for the taxpayers (at least those looking 
only at their tax bills) than exclusive reliance on centralized (state-
initiated) enforcement would be. 
Cultural explanations, often emphasizing a litigious populace, an 
imperial judiciary, and an entrepreneurial bar, dominate discussions of 
the role of litigation in American society. Kagan is correct, however, that 
“adversarial legalism in the United States does not arise from a deep-
rooted American propensity to bring lawsuits.”32 Notwithstanding a 
decades-long organized campaign by American business to demonize 
lawyers and litigation, there is robust empirical evidence supporting 
Kagan’s observation that “[m]any, perhaps most, Americans are reluctant 
to sue . . . .”33 Moreover, subsequent work in political science, discussed 
below, both confirms and extends his alternative explanation, namely 
that “American adversarial legalism arises from political traditions and 
legal arrangements that provide incentives to resort to adversarial legal 
weapons,”34 making clear the centrality of purposefully designed private 
enforcement regimes to the increase of adversarial legalism. This work 
demonstrates that cultural explanations of private enforcement 
drastically oversimplify and that institutional considerations have been 
consequential. 
In recently published work, Sean Farhang uses both statistical 
analysis of systematically collected data and qualitative empirical work 
focusing on federal civil rights legislation to show that the choice of 
private enforcement as opposed (or in addition) to administrative 
enforcement by the federal government tends to reflect concern in the 
dominant party in Congress about subversion of legislative preferences if 
enforcement were committed to an administrative agency under the 
control of an ideologically distant executive.35 In a complex system of 
separated but interdependent governmental powers, it is as difficult to 
repeal as to enact legislation. Where, therefore, the status quo is “sticky,” 
the choice of private over administrative enforcement may afford 
 
32 Id. at 34. 
33 Id. Although Kagan’s 2001 book emphasized the problematic aspects of 
adversarial legalism, he has also acknowledged its strengths, “I also indicate that if 
adversarial legalism were by some miracle to be drastically eliminated in the United 
States, without also instituting major changes in other aspects of American law and 
public administration, then injustice almost surely would grow. Adversarial legalism 
fills a void in American governance. In a structurally fragmented, deadlock-prone, 
and often underfunded governmental system, adversarial legalism provides an 
essential way of elaborating and enforcing important norms of due process, equal 
treatment, and protection from harm. The United States lacks the highly 
professional, hierarchically supervised national bureaucracies, social welfare systems, 
and corporatist arrangements that characterize western European governments.” 
Robert A. Kagan, On Surveying the Whole Legal Forest, 28 Law & Soc. Inquiry 833, 859 
(2003) (emphasis omitted). 
34 Kagan, supra note 21, at 34. 
35 See Farhang, supra note 2, at 76–78. 
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protection to congressional policy long after the governing majority has 
been replaced by legislators with different preferences. Moreover, 
because private enforcement regimes create incentives for lawyers and 
litigants—again, “judicial enforcement” is a misnomer—they also provide 
some protection against subversion by an ideologically distant judiciary 
(in a system in which judges are politically appointed). Thus, as Farhang 
predicted, federal statutory private enforcement regimes are associated 
with periods of divided government, and the great majority of them 
endure through periods of control by the party that was in the minority 
when they were enacted.36 
Although cultural explanations of adversarial legalism oversimplify, 
there is certainly a historic willingness of Americans, self-reliant and 
insistent on their rights, to take their grievances to court. Until the 
Progressive Era, however, there was virtually no federal statutory or 
administrative law available to solve unremedied systemic problems 
through private enforcement, and although the New Deal added to that 
store considerably, a variety of legal barriers hindered access to court. As 
we discuss below, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure eliminated or 
lowered a number of those barriers. Litigation of consequence requires 
lawyers and thus financing, however, and those who can afford to litigate 
may not be the people most intent on righting the wrongs of society. 
The vast increase in private enforcement actions under federal law 
that started in the late 1960s reflected in large part the congruence of 
three developments: (1) the enactment of many new federal statutes 
specifically authorizing (or interpreted to authorize) private rights of 
action, (2) the proliferation of means to finance private enforcement 
litigation, including Legal Services programs funded by the government, 
the growth of privately funded nonprofit advocacy organizations 
subvened through favorable tax treatment, particularly in the civil rights 
and environmental fields,37 damages provisions sufficient to attract 
lawyers relying on contingency fee agreements, statutory attorneys’ fee-
shifting provisions favorable to prevailing plaintiffs, and the modern class 
action (which, as we discuss below, dramatically enlarged the scope for 
contingent financing), and (3) changes in the legal profession, attracted 
by these new opportunities to do well, sometimes by doing good, and 
freed of some of the most seriously anti-competitive aspects of self-
regulation (i.e., a ban on advertising).38 Much of the impetus for these 
developments came from the political dominance of the Democratic 
Party during the 1960s. 
A great deal has changed since these developments promoted 
private enforcement in the United States. In a recent article about the 
demand for and supply of legal services, Gillian Hadfield observes that, 
 
36 See id. at 166. 
37 See Belton, supra note 12, at 922–31; Thompson, supra note 6, at 216–17. 
38 See Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 353, 384 (1977). 
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the vast majority of the legal problems faced by (particularly poor) 
Americans fall outside of the “rule of law,” with high proportions of 
people—many more than in the U.K., for example—simply 
accepting a result determined not by law but by the play of markets, 
power, organizations, wealth, politics, and other dynamics in our 
complex society.39 
To the extent that Hadfield’s findings apply to private enforcement, 
it may be important to consider how, notwithstanding the “stickiness of 
the status quo,” those with the power to determine the efficacy of private 
enforcement regimes in action may subvert the policy preferences of the 
enacting Congress. As we shall discuss, two related means are 
underfunding of the courts and judicial actions, often under cover of 
resource constraints, that compromise steps previously taken to afford 
effective access to court. 
III. The General Legal Landscape 
A society’s general legal landscape is relevant to the choice of an 
enforcement strategy and may be critical to the efficacy of a private 
enforcement regime. Rules about costs and funding for litigation, the 
procedures provided for the initiation and conduct of litigation, and the 
lawmaking powers of the judiciary—all should be considered by those 
responsible for regulatory policy. If the decision is made to pursue a 
private enforcement or a hybrid strategy, careful attention should be 
given to the question whether achievement of the regulatory goal 
requires changes in the generally applicable arrangements. 
A. Costs and Funding 
1. Court Costs 
Civil court systems are funded primarily by the political units of 
which they are a part, federal and state. Although filing fees are imposed, 
they tend to be small. In the federal courts, for example, the filing fee at 
the trial court (first instance) level is $350, and the filing fee for a first 
 
39 Gillian K. Hadfield, Higher Demand, Lower Supply? A Comparative Assessment of the 
Legal Resource Landscape for Ordinary Americans, 37 Fordham Urb. L.J. 129, 143 (2010) 
(footnote omitted). She goes on to note, “But is there a deeper threat to the structure 
of a democratic society—especially one that purports to organize its relationships on 
the basis of law and legality—suggested by the finding that Americans are far more 
likely than those in the U.K. and Slovakia to ‘do nothing’ in response to the legally 
cognizable difficulties they face? That they are far less likely to seek out others in their 
community capable of helping them to align their experiences with those 
contemplated by the laws and procedures that stack up in the voluminous legal 
materials of regulation, case law, statutes, and constitutions? Is there a paradox 
lurking here that in the system of adversarial legalism that Robert Kagan describes as 
distinctive of the ‘American way of law’ (to be contrasted with the greater reliance on 
bureaucratic means of policy making and implementation found in Europe) that law 
is in practice less a salient part of everyday life in the U.S. than elsewhere?” Id. 
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appeal is $450.40 Those who cannot afford to pay the filing fees may be 
entitled to relief under provisions for in forma pauperis filings.41 Different 
fee arrangements govern specialized courts, such as the bankruptcy 
courts in the federal system.42 
Determining whether public funding of courts is adequate for their 
needs is an extremely challenging enterprise. Although some scholars 
have voiced skepticism that the federal courts are underfunded,43 
reliance for that purpose on docket statistics can be misleading.44 First, 
caseloads vary across federal courts at both the trial and appellate levels, 
and they also vary over time. Over the last few decades in some parts of 
the country, docket pressures, particularly those caused by criminal 
(often drug) cases,45 and more recently immigration cases,46 have made it 
impossible for civil litigants to obtain a reasonably prompt trial date. 
Owen Fiss has argued that in such situations the settlement of civil cases 
may resemble plea bargaining in criminal cases and reflect not mutual 
accord but capitulation to economic necessity.47 
Second, docket pressures have encouraged federal courts to adopt 
measures that, although they may be celebrated on efficiency grounds, 
may not give due weight in that calculus to the quality of justice. There is 
reason to worry that the trends toward aggressive case management and 
use of procedural filtering devices such as summary judgment and 
dismissals on the pleadings have exacted a toll on democratic values.48 It 
is unrealistic to believe that the enforcement slack created by procedural 
belt-tightening measures that screen out meritorious and non-
meritorious cases alike will be taken up by better-funded public 
enforcement. 
Third, there is also reason to worry that, by creating an elaborate 
system of pre-trial procedure that has been fashioned to address the 
perceived problems of complex, high stakes, cases, and by insisting that 
the same rules govern all civil cases in federal court, the responsible 
 
40 United States Courts: Forms & Fees, http://www.uscourts.gov/ 
FormsAndFees/Fees.aspx (2011). 
41 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (2006). 
42 See United States Courts: Forms & Fees, supra note 40. 
43 See, e.g., Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related 
Matters in Federal and State Courts, 1 J. Empirical Legal Stud. 459, 500–01 (2004). 
44 See Stephen B. Burbank, Keeping Our Ambition Under Control: The Limits of Data 
and Inference in Searching for the Causes and Consequences of Vanishing Trials in Federal 
Court, 1 J. Empirical Legal Stud. 571, 585–86 (2004). 
45 Constitutional and statutory requirements providing for speedy trials may 
force courts to give criminal cases precedence over civil cases. 
46 See, e.g., Ingrid V. Eagly, Prosecuting Immigration, 104 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1281, 1281–
82 (2010). 
47 See Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 Yale L.J. 1073, 1075 (1984). 
48 See Stephen B. Burbank & Stephen N. Subrin, Litigation and Democracy: 
Restoring a Realistic Prospect of Trial, 46 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 399, 399–401 (2011); see 
also Hazel Genn, Judging Civil Justice 174 (2010). 
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lawmakers have made the federal courts unattractive to business and 
inaccessible to the middle class—a very effective way to control the civil 
docket.49 
Whatever one’s judgment about the adequacy of public funding of 
the federal courts, the instances in recent decades when state court 
systems have experienced funding emergencies are too numerous to 
permit doubt that, viewed as a whole, the country’s commitment to 
adequate funding of courts may reasonably be questioned.50 
2. Party Costs 
As is well known, but for historical reasons that remain somewhat 
obscure,51 it has long been the law in virtually every American court 
 
49 The extent to which corporations favor arbitration over (federal) litigation for 
the resolution of inter-corporate disputes is less clear than often asserted. See 
Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Flight from Arbitration: An Empirical Study 
of Ex Ante Arbitration Clauses in the Contracts of Publicly Held Companies, 56 DePaul L. 
Rev. 335, 335–36 (2007). It is clear, however, that many corporations have sought to 
channel disputes with consumers into arbitration and to foreclose access to elements 
of the private enforcement regimes, such as attorney fee shifting and representative 
(class) proceedings, that would be available to them in civil courts. Government 
reliance on, and enforcement under the Federal Arbitration Act of, private ordering 
to create alternative dispute resolution processes to litigation, although characteristic 
of some of the general aspects of American society discussed above, recalls Genn’s 
reference to a “powerful meeting of minds [that] has developed between an 
emerging profession of private dispute resolvers and judicial opinion formers which 
perfectly suits the financial realities of a cash-strapped justice system struggling to 
process a growing number of criminal defendants.” Genn, supra note 48, at 25. 
Moreover, it may look less benign when considered in light of recent developments 
in public enforcement in England and Wales and elsewhere in Europe. See Hodges, 
supra note 1, at 103. This suggests again that distrust of bureaucratic authority may 
blight the prospects of public enforcement as an alternative. It also suggests that 
institutional architecture, tradition, and the interests of a self-regulating legal 
profession may blight the prospects of non-administrative tribunals. 
50 See ABA Coalition for Justice, Funding the Justice System: How Are the Courts 
Funded? 4 (2009), available at http://apps.americanbar.org/abastore/productpage/ 
3460003PDF; Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Saving Civil Justice: Judging Civil Justice, 85 
Tul. L. Rev. 247, 259 (2010) (reviewing Hazel Genn, Judging Civil Justice (2010)). 
Recently published comparative data, although incomplete and in some respects 
incommensurable, are pertinent to the question of adequate funding. In the study of 
legal resources referred to above, Gillian Hadfield compiled data for the United 
States and a selection of European countries that included both established and 
emerging market democracies. She found that “U.S. public expenditure per capita on 
courts, judges, prosecutors, and legal aid is the highest among this set of both 
advanced and transitioning European countries.” Hadfield, supra note 39, at 149.  
She also found, however, that “U.S. public expenditure per case . . .  is significantly 
lower than in other advanced democracies, when accounting for the apparently vastly 
higher numbers of cases [than] in those countries . . .  and comparable [to] or 
higher than that spent in emerging market democracies that are still seeking to build 
the rule of law in their countries.” Id. 
51 See generally John Leubsdorf, Toward a History of the American Rule on Attorney Fee 
Recovery, 47 Law & Contemp. Probs. 9 (1984). 
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system—Alaska is the exception52—that each party is responsible for that 
party’s attorneys’ fees—win or lose. In other words, the default rule53 for 
attorneys’ fees is different from the rule that governs other party costs; 
there is no presumptive shifting of (all or part of) the winner’s attorneys’ 
fees to the loser. This so-called “American Rule” has been the subject of 
sustained theoretical study and very limited empirical study, usually with 
the goal of seeking to adjudicate claims for superiority as between the 
American Rule and the so-called “English Rule,” under which the loser 
pays all or part of the winner’s attorneys’ fees and that, as has often been 
remarked, would more accurately be called the “Most-of-the-World 
Rule.”54 
The (law and) economics literature in this area, typically devoted to 
the creation of highly stylized, necessarily parsimonious models, is 
ambiguous on the comparative question.55 That said, since we seek to 
identify what wise public policymakers would consider when choosing a 
regulatory strategy and building a private enforcement regime, there may 
be value in noting some of the conclusions of a recent review and 
assessment of the theoretical and empirical literature: 
[T]he current state of economic knowledge does not enable us 
reliably to predict whether a move to fuller indemnification [i.e., in 
the direction of the English Rule] would raise or lower the total 
costs of litigation, let alone whether it would better align those costs 
with any social benefits they might generate. 
. . . .  
Fee shifting does appear to increase legal expenditures per case, in 
some cases significantly. It also encourages parties with poorly 
 
52 See Alaska Stat. § 09.60.010 (2012). In addition, Texas by statute has fee 
shifting for a range of private law matters, including contracts, certain kinds of 
property loss, claims for payment for services or labor, etc. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. 
Code Ann. § 38.001 (West 2005). 
53 Courts will generally honor an otherwise valid contract that calls for fee 
shifting in the event of a dispute that leads to litigation, making it appropriate to 
refer to the American Rule as a “default rule.” See John J. Donohue, III, The Effects of 
Fee Shifting on the Settlement Rate: Theoretical Observations on Costs, Conflicts, and 
Contingency Fees, 54 Law & Contemp. Probs. 195, 196, 201 (1991). In a recent study of 
2,350 material contracts contained in Form 8-K “current report” filings with the 
Securities and Exchange Commission, Theodore Eisenberg and Geoffrey Miller 
found “a substantial tendency to opt out of the American Rule and into some variant 
of the English Rule” but that “the American Rule also retains considerable 
popularity,” with the result that, in their view, “neither system for compensating 
attorneys enjoys an overwhelming efficiency advantage.” Theodore Eisenberg & 
Geoffrey P. Miller, The English vs. the American Rule on Attorneys Fees: An Empirical Study 
of Attorney Fee Clauses in Publicly-Held Companies’ Contracts 37–38 (N.Y.U. Law Sch. Law 
& Econ. Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 10-52, 2010), available at 
http://ssrn.com/paper=1706054. 
54 See Herbert M. Kritzer, The English Rule, 78 A.B.A. J. 54, 55 (Nov. 1992). 
55 See Herbert M. Kritzer, Lawyer Fees and Lawyer Behavior in Litigation: What Does 
the Empirical Literature Really Say?, 80 Tex. L. Rev. 1943, 1947–48 (2002). 
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grounded legal claims to settle or to avoid litigating them in the 
first place, and has a similar effect on litigants who are averse to 
risk, regardless of the merits of their cases. . . . It is unclear whether 
fee shifting increases the likelihood of settlement, whether it 
decreases total expenditures on litigation or total payouts by 
defendants, or whether on balance it improves incentives for 
primary behavior. It is even unclear whether fee shifting makes it 
easier for parties with small meritorious claims to obtain 
compensation, in light of the increased costs per case that it 
induces. 
. . . .  
Rules that encourage parties to raise relatively innovative claims and 
defenses help to break down precedent, while rules that penalize 
risk-taking and novel arguments help to preserve traditional formal 
categories. Given the pervasive influence of ostensibly procedural 
rules on substantive outcomes, it may not be possible to separate 
the policy of fee shifting from deeper questions of what the law 
should be.56 
The American Rule is subject to a number of exceptions, both judge-
made and statutory. In the former category is the rule that courts carved 
out in order to ensure that those who created a common fund could be 
reimbursed from that fund.57 With the advent of the modern class action 
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, as amended in 1966, the scope 
for application of this exception vastly expanded and so did the influence 
of the class action on private enforcement. 
The Supreme Court put a stop to additional court-created 
exceptions in Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society.58 Alyeska 
quickly elicited legislation prescribing fee shifting for federal civil rights 
cases, only some of which had previously been governed by statutory fee-
shifting provisions.59 Alyeska also may have contributed to the growing 
legislative resort to such provisions thereafter (once it was clear that 
Congress alone could authorize additional exceptions). Finally, both the 
1976 statute responding to Alyeska and its legislative history of 
congressional policy choices made it difficult for the judiciary to expand 
attorney fee shifting by court rule.60 
 
56 Avery Weiner Katz & Chris William Sanchirico, Fee Shifting, in Procedural Law 
& Economics 271, 272, 302–03 (Chris William Sanchirico, ed.  2012) (8 Encyclopedia 
of Law and Economics, 2d ed.). 
57 Here the departure consists not in the losing defendant(s) paying the winning 
plaintiff’s attorneys’ fees, but rather in shifting some of the responsibility for those 
fees from the named class representative(s) to the absent members of the class—all to 
come out of, thus reducing, the amount recovered from the defendant(s). 
58 421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975). 
59 See 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (2006). 
60 Katz and Sanchirico observe that, although the effect of fee shifting on 
settlement has been the issue on which the economic literature has focused “more 
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3. Funding 
Attorneys’ fees are a matter of contract between lawyer and client, 
subject to minimal control by courts in order to prevent abuse by lawyers 
of their roles as officers of the court and fiduciaries for their clients, and 
to greater control in circumstances that prevent a normal principal-agent 
relationship, whether as a result of a client’s age, mental condition, or 
status as an absent member of a certified class. Indeed, there is some 
evidence that nineteenth century efforts to regulate attorneys’ fees 
through price ceilings were important in the adoption of the American 
Rule.61 
Although publicly-funded legal aid once provided support for some 
civil litigation by those without financial means, there is not now a 
functioning federal civil legal aid system worthy of the name, and federal 
legal aid is prohibited for class actions.62 Non-profit groups played an 
important role in private enforcement of statutory and administrative law 
in the 1960s and 1970s, particularly in the civil rights and environmental 
fields,63 and their success spurred the creation and private funding of 
groups with radically different legal and political agendas.64 With the 
proliferation of interest groups who seek influence through litigation, 
competition for support from private funds has increased as has 
competition for talented lawyers willing to make personal financial 
sacrifices. 
In the absence of public legal aid or a private interest group 
champion, the poor and those of modest means who wish to initiate civil 
litigation require other forms of assistance in order to gain access to the 
market for legal services. Since the turn of the twentieth century, clients 
and lawyers have been free to contract for a no-win, no-fee 
representation with some specific exceptions (criminal cases and most 
divorce matters). Such arrangements are most common in, but not 
restricted to, tort litigation and they most commonly call for the lawyer to 
receive one-third of any monetary judgment.65 It is also typical of such 
arrangements that the lawyer will pay the costs of litigation, subject to full 
or partial reimbursement in the event of success. 
 
than any other. . . . at best the effects are ambiguous.” Katz & Sanchirico, supra note 
56, at 281–82. 
61 See Leubsdorf, supra note 51, at 13. 
62 45 C.F.R. § 1617.3 (2012) (“Recipients are prohibited from initiating or 
participating in any class action.”); see Hadfield, supra note 39, at 140. 
63 See Belton, supra note 12, at 922–23; Thompson, supra note 6, at 185–87. 
64 See Ann Southworth, Lawyers of the Right: Professionalizing the 
Conservative Coalition 10–13 (2008); Steven M. Teles, The Rise of the 
Conservative Legal Movement: The Battle for Control of the Law 60–61 
(2008). 
65 See Herbert M. Kritzer, Risks, Reputations, and Rewards: Contingency 
Fee Legal Practice in the United States 9, 38–39 (2004). 
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The opportunity to earn a contingent fee is unlikely to attract lawyers 
unless there is a reasonable prospect for a substantial monetary 
recovery—with “substantial” being defined with reference to the likely 
costs of the litigation, the amount of time the matter will require, and the 
nature of a particular lawyer’s practice.66 As the cost of litigation has 
increased, two phenomena may have enhanced the importance of 
litigation-funding mechanisms that permit clients and their attorneys to 
look elsewhere than the clients’ personal assets to fund legal 
representation. First, some of what was affordable litigation for fee-paying 
clients 40 or 50 years ago may no longer be, at least in federal court, with 
the result that those at risk of being denied access to the market for legal 
services are not just the poor and those of modest means but a larger 
segment of the middle class. Second, and relatedly, the universe of claims 
that a rational actor would not bring as an individual because the cost of 
prosecuting them would consume too great a percentage of any possible 
recovery—including so-called “negative value” claims67—may have 
increased apace. 
Focusing on the common fund exception to the American Rule 
helps to understand what it is about the modern American class action 
that renders it both such a powerful tool of enforcement and such a 
strong draw to those whose interest is less in a common benefit than it is 
in a common fund. A foundational assumption of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure is that they are trans-substantive and thus apply to all civil 
actions in federal court.68 The 1966 amendments to Rule 23 did not just 
create new types of class actions; particularly through the addition of 
Rule 23(b)(3) for cases seeking predominantly monetary relief, they 
greatly expanded the field in which the common fund exception to the 
American Rule could operate. Promulgated by the Supreme Court under 
a statute delegating federal legislative power and specifying that valid 
rules supersede previously enacted statutes with which they are in 
conflict, Rule 23 immediately overlaid pre-1966 private enforcement 
regimes and became part of the general landscape in which subsequent 
regimes were constructed. 
 
66 Empirical research supports economic theory in debunking the linked 
contentions that the United States suffers from a surfeit of frivolous litigation and 
that the contingent fee is a cause of the problem. Lawyers who practice on a 
contingent fee basis are no more interested in throwing their money away than other 
rational maximizers. Many practices dependent on such arrangements—for instance, 
practices that stress high volume, modest stakes over low volume, high stakes cases 
and individual over representative actions—are characterized by a portfolio of cases 
with different probabilities of success, the great majority of which present little risk of 
no recovery through judgment or settlement, although there may be substantial 
uncertainty regarding the amount that will be recovered or the investment of the 
lawyer’s time that will be required. See id. at 11, 13, 17. 
67 In re Monumental Life Ins. Co., 365 F. 3d 408, 411 n.1 (5th Cir. 2004). 
68 See Burbank, supra note 18, at 109–10. 
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When considering class actions under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 23(b)(3), and on the assumption that no fee-shifting statute 
applies, one should distinguish among: (1) truly large claims where 
individual representation on a fee-paying or contingency-fee basis would 
be perfectly plausible; (2) claims where the recovery, viewed in isolation, 
might very well be substantial but the costs of litigation would be such a 
large percentage of that recovery as to prevent individual representation 
on a fee-paying or contingency-fee basis, including negative-value claims; 
and (3) truly small claims, where the recovery would be a small fraction 
of the costs of litigation and as a result no one but a wealthy person on a 
mission would think of bringing them individually because no lawyer 
would handle such cases on anything but a fee-paying basis (unless the 
lawyer were on a mission related to some larger political or legal 
agenda). 
The predominant rationale for representative treatment in the first 
category relates to litigation efficiency and consistency. That rationale is 
not available for the second and third categories, since by definition the 
availability of the class action permits litigation that would not otherwise 
take place (unless it could be maintained through some form of non-
class aggregation). Rather, in the second category, class treatment might 
be justified for the purpose of compensation, or for the dual purposes of 
compensation and deterrence, with aggregate treatment lowering the 
unit cost of litigation sufficiently to make the effort worthwhile. In the 
third category, however, compensation joins litigation efficiency and 
consistency on the fiction shelf, and only deterrence would seem to 
justify priming the heavy artillery of a class suit.69 
From the perspective of private enforcement, and in the context of 
American political and legal institutions, the use of class actions for “truly 
small claims” is troublesome only to the extent that it advances an 
enforcement goal that is not part of the applicable regulatory policy or 
that, either alone or in combination with other modes of enforcement, it 
results in a level of enforcement that is substantially different from that 
contemplated by those responsible for regulatory policy. In the case of 
federal class actions, the primary sources of potential disconnect from 
federal or state regulatory policy result from the fact that the Supreme 
Court has very narrowly interpreted the prohibition against supervisory 
court rules that “abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right,”70 and 
that the Federal Rules apply trans-substantively.71 
 
69 See Myriam Gilles & Gary B. Friedman, Exploding the Class Action Agency Costs 
Myth: The Social Utility of Entrepeneurial Lawyers, 155 U. Pa. L. Rev. 103, 107 (2006). 
70 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2006). 
71 Readers may have noticed our failure to discuss either insurance for legal 
expenses or alternative litigation funding (ALF), so called because the contingent fee 
and liability insurance covering defense costs are themselves mechanisms of third-
party funding. See Steven Garber, Alternative Litigation Financing in the United States: 
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B. Procedure 
The 1938 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provided a system that 
could attract a great deal of private litigation, including litigation enforcing 
statutory and administrative law. In the years following 1938, a number of 
Supreme Court decisions, including Hickman v. Taylor72 and Conley v. 
Gibson,73 embraced the concepts of notice pleading and broad discovery. 
Eventually, however, notice pleading, broad discovery (unleashed further 
by amendments to the Federal Rules in 1970), and a restrictive view of 
summary judgment assumed a different complexion in light of statutory 
incentives to litigate (e.g., a host of new federal statutes with pro-plaintiff 
fee-shifting provisions), the modern class action, and a bar responsive to 
such incentives and assisted by decisions striking down anti-competitive 
regulations like the traditional ban on advertising.74 
As the volume of federal litigation increased, and as the federal 
judiciary became more conservative,75 the rulemakers responded by 
turning to one approach after another—from managerial judging, to 
sanctions, to summary judgment.76 Although different in many respects, 
these approaches share the quest for greater definition of claims and 
defenses and the ability it affords courts to make rational judgments as to 
 
Issues, Knowns, and Unknowns 1 (RAND, Occasional Paper, 2010), available at 
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/occasional_papers/2010/RAND_ 
OP306.pdf; see also Maya Steinitz, Whose Claim is this Anyway? Third-Party Litigation 
Funding, 95 Minn. L. Rev. 1268, 1275–76 (2011). From the perspective of access to 
court for private enforcement, insurance is not an important consideration for 
plaintiffs because of the combination of contingency fees and the American Rule; 
liability insurance that covers both indemnity and legal expenses is obviously 
important for defendants. Moreover, it is our impression that the incidence and 
coverage of pre-paid legal service plans is not consequential for these purposes. The 
same is true (at least for the present) of ALF. ALF has only recently made an 
appearance on the U.S. legal scene; it confronts significant barriers erected by the 
self-regulating legal profession. See Gillian K. Hadfield, The Price of Law: How the 
Market for Lawyers Distorts the Justice System, 98 Mich. L. Rev. 953, 979–82 (2000); 
Anthony J. Sebok, The Inauthentic Claim, 64 Vand. L. Rev. 61 (2011). In addition, to 
the extent that ALF is focused on investing in cases with the potential for substantial 
recoveries, it seeks entry into a market in which both the contingency fee and class 
actions are well-established. That may help to explain why a recent study found three 
segments of ALF business, two of which involved loans, one to (usually) personal-
injury plaintiffs and one to plaintiffs’ law firms, and one of which involved investment 
in commercial (inter-corporate) lawsuits. In their loan activities, ALF providers can 
be viewed as substituting for banks in a time of tight credit, charging (high) interest 
rather than taking a percentage of any recovery. See Garber, supra. 
72 329 U.S. 495 (1947). 
73 355 U.S. 41 (1957). 
74 See Stephen B. Burbank, Vanishing Trials and Summary Judgment in Federal Civil 
Cases: Drifting Toward Bethlehem or Gomorrah?, 1 J. Empirical Legal Stud. 591, 620 
(2004). 
75 See id. at 625. 
76 Id. at 624. 
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whether a case should be permitted to proceed.77 As discussed above, 
however, they make more difficult efforts to determine whether existing 
resources were inadequate to accommodate increasing caseloads. 
Assessing the cost of modern federal litigation as a basis for procedural 
reform is no easier, at least when the supposed cause of disproportionate 
cost is discovery. 
Increasingly over the last 30 years, probably the greatest source of 
complaint voiced by critics of litigation has been the cost of federal civil 
litigation, with the primary culprit said to be the cost of discovery, 
particularly document discovery (most is born by the party from whom 
discovery is sought and cannot be shifted ex post from the winner to the 
loser). At the same time, however, thoughtful scholars and judges have 
pointed out the potential costs of cutting back on discovery.78 
The rulemakers have responded to complaints about discovery with 
round after round of amendments designed to streamline the discovery 
process.79 Most recently, they fashioned amendments to address a 
phenomenon that even skeptical empiricists understand may have 
changed the landscape and the conclusions about costs and benefits that 
one should draw from it: discovery of electronic documents, or e-discovery. 
Yet, we do not know what the impact of e-discovery has been, because 
anecdotes about discovery continue to dominate methodologically sound 
 
77 See id.; Stephen B. Burbank, The Transformation of American Civil Procedure: The 
Example of Rule 11, 137 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1925, 1930–31 (1989). 
78 “We should keep clearly in mind that discovery is the American alternative to 
the administrative state. . . . Every day, hundreds of American lawyers caution their 
clients that an unlawful course of conduct will be accompanied by serious risk of 
exposure at the hands of some hundreds of thousands of lawyers, each armed with a 
subpoena power by which misdeeds can be uncovered. Unless corresponding new 
powers are conferred on public officers, constricting discovery would diminish the 
disincentives for lawless behavior across a wide spectrum of forbidden conduct.” Paul 
D. Carrington, Renovating Discovery, 49 Ala. L. Rev. 51, 54 (1997). Judge Patrick 
Higginbotham, former Chair of the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, also 
emphasized the relationship of discovery to the ability to enforce congressional 
statutes: “Congress has elected to use the private suit, private attorneys-general as an 
enforcing mechanism for the anti-trust laws, the securities laws, environmental laws, 
civil rights and more. In the main, the plaintiff in these suits must discover his 
evidence from the defendant. Calibration of discovery is calibration of the level of 
enforcement of the social policy set by Congress.” Patrick Higginbotham, Foreword, 49 
Ala. L. Rev. 1, 4–5 (1997). 
79 They introduced (but then restricted the ambit of) required disclosures (i.e., 
without waiting for a discovery demand), see Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a) (as amended in 
1993 and 2000), presumptive limits on the number of interrogatories, see Fed. R. Civ. 
P. 33(a) (as amended in 1993), and depositions, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(a)(2) (as 
amended in 1993) and the length of depositions, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(d)(2) (as 
amended in 2000), and even purported to reduce the universe of discoverable 
material (in the absence of a court order) from that which is relevant to the subject 
matter of the action to that which is relevant to a claim or defense. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 
26(b)(1) (as amended in 2000). 
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research—a phenomenon characteristic of discourse about all of American 
civil litigation.80 
When evaluating criticisms of American litigation, it is important to 
understand that, as Robert Gordon recently put it, “[c]areful studies 
demonstrate that the ‘litigation explosion’ and ‘liability crisis’ are largely 
myths and that most lawyers’ efforts go into representing businesses, not 
individuals; unfortunately, those studies have had no restraining effect on 
this epidemic of lawyers’ open expression of disdain for law.”81 With 
respect to discovery in particular, empirical research conducted over 40 
years has not demonstrated that it is a problem—disproportionately 
expensive—in more than a small slice of litigation.82 Instead, study after 
study has found that discovery is a problem in precisely the types of cases 
that one would expect—high stakes, complex cases.83 An October 2009 
Federal Judicial Center survey of attorneys in recently closed federal civil 
cases again failed to support the story of ubiquitous abuse or skyrocketing 
cost.84 
Notwithstanding the failure of empirical study to verify the oft-told 
tale of pervasive discovery abuse and pervasively crushing discovery 
expense, the Supreme Court invoked both, together with the supposed 
inability of federal judges to manage discovery, as reasons to change 
federal procedural law—but not the aspects of that law that govern 
discovery. Rather, in order that defendants in massive antitrust class 
actions might be spared putatively impositional discovery,85 the Supreme 
Court made it more difficult for the plaintiffs in such cases to survive a 
motion to dismiss. They did so chiefly by resuscitating the distinctions 
between “facts” and “conclusions” that the drafters of the Federal Rules 
had rejected and by transforming the motion to dismiss for failure to 
state a claim upon which relief can be granted from a vehicle for testing 
the plaintiff’s legal theory into a means to weed out complaints that, 
shorn of conclusions, do not set forth sufficient facts to make the 
plaintiff’s claim plausible.86 Thereafter, in another case where the Court 
 
80 For a refreshing exception, see Emery G. Lee III & Thomas E. Willging, Fed. 
Judicial Ctr., National, Case-Based Civil Rules Survey: Preliminary Report to 
the Judicial Conference Advisory Committee on Civil Rules (2009). 
81 Robert W. Gordon, The Citizen Lawyer—A Brief Informal History of a Myth with 
Some Basis in Reality, 50 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1169, 1199 (2009). 
82 See, e.g., Linda S. Mullenix, Discovery in Disarray: The Pervasive Myth of Pervasive 
Discovery Abuse and the Consequences for Unfounded Rulemaking, 46 Stan. L. Rev. 1393, 
1440–42 (1994). 
83 See, e.g., id. at 1437. 
84 See Lee & Willging, supra note 80, at 40 (finding that median estimates of 
discovery costs related to total litigation costs were lower than the median responses 
to the question of what the proper ratio was between the costs of discovery and 
litigation costs). 
85 See Frank H. Easterbrook, Discovery as Abuse, 69 B.U. L. Rev. 635, 646 (1989). 
86 See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555–56 (2007); Burbank, supra 
note 18, at 113. 
2013] PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT 659 
was concerned about the costs of discovery—but there, the costs of 
diverting the time and attention of high government officials—the Court 
made clear what should have been obvious, namely that the new pleading 
regime applies to all federal civil cases.87 
Notice pleading and broad discovery were created under the 
auspices of the Supreme Court acting pursuant to congressional 
delegation. Once firmly entrenched, they became part of the 
background against which Congress legislated, part of the foundation of 
congressional private enforcement regimes. They also became part of the 
status quo and thus were highly resistant to change through the 
lawmaking process that brought them forth—the Enabling Act88 process. 
From this perspective, desiring to effect change, the Court was equally 
hobbled by the inertial power of the status quo and the limitations 
created by foundational assumptions and operating principles associated 
with the Enabling Act process. The Court effectively amended the 
Federal Rules on pleading through judicial decision because the Justices 
knew that, even if amendments through the prescribed process could 
survive congressional review, they would embroil the process and the 
Court in political controversy. 
It is no surprise that the anecdotes one hears from the defenders of 
the Court’s recent pleading decisions have to do only with the costs of 
litigation, not its benefits, or that there is no mention of the money that 
would be required to replace private litigation as a means of securing 
compensation and enforcing important social norms. Imagine the 
reaction of the Chamber of Commerce if the proposal were to give the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission adequate resources, raised 
through increased taxes, to enforce federal anti-discrimination law.  
C. The Lawmaking Powers of the Judiciary 
There are four aspects of federal judicial power that appear to us 
particularly salient from the perspective of private enforcement of 
statutory and administrative law. First, unlike state courts, federal courts 
have very limited power to make substantive law. Second, like most state 
judiciaries, the federal judiciary has very substantial power to make 
procedural law, both in the context of deciding cases and prospectively 
through court rules. Third, the federal courts have some ability to 
regulate access to court through interpretations of the constitutional 
requirements (in Article III) that have been used to limit who has 
standing to sue. Fourth, having the power to interpret federal statutes, 
the federal courts can use that power either to infer or to refuse to infer 
private rights of action. We take up each of these points briefly below. 
 
87 See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1953 (2009); Burbank, supra note 18, at 
114–15. 
88 Rules Enabling Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-415, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as 
amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2072 et seq.). 
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Federal courts do not have common lawmaking powers remotely 
approximating those of state courts. As a result, when, for instance, 
existing tort law is thought to provide inadequate protection, and it is 
also thought that federal law is needed to solve the unremedied systemic 
problem, the law in question will almost always be federal statutory or 
administrative law.89 Interstate pollution was once one of the rare 
exceptions to this proposition, but after Congress acted, the federal 
courts receded (as lawmaker), noting that “when Congress addresses a 
question previously governed by a decision rested on federal common 
law the need for such an unusual exercise of lawmaking by federal courts 
disappears.”90 
Subject to the Constitution, Congress holds ultimate lawmaking 
power concerning procedure in the federal courts.91 As discussed above, 
however, since 1934 the Supreme Court has had the power to 
promulgate procedural law for all civil actions through court rules that 
are subject to congressional review before they become effective;92 the 
rules so promulgated are general (trans-substantive), and the Court has 
read statutory limitations on its rulemaking power very narrowly. The 
federal courts also have the power to fashion procedural law in their 
decisions so long as such procedural common law is consistent with 
federal statutes and Federal Rules. With respect to rulemaking, the result 
has been that Federal Rules, notably Rule 23, can take on a life of their 
own—act as a wild card—for purposes of private enforcement, divorced 
from the statutes and administrative regulations that are the authorized 
sources of regulatory policy.93 With respect to procedural common law, 
the Court’s recent pleading decisions suggest how the judiciary may be 
able to sap private enforcement regimes through change to the 
background rules under the guise of interpretation, evading 
 
89 See, e.g., City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 317–19 (1981). 
90 Id. at 314; see Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2537 (2011) 
(Clean Air Act and EPA actions it authorizes displace federal common law of 
nuisance). 
91 See Stephen B. Burbank, Procedure, Politics and Power: The Role of Congress, 79 
Notre Dame L. Rev. 1677, 1679–89 (2004). 
92 See 28 U.S.C. § 2074 (2006). 
93 For advocacy of generic (trans-substantive) and criticism of sectoral class 
action reform in England, see Rachael Mulheron, Recent Milestones in Class Actions 
Reform in England: A Critique and a Proposal, 127 Law Q. Rev. 288 (2011). “Hence, to 
summarise, the preference for generic, rather than sectoral, class actions reform was 
based upon four factors: the existence of evidence of widespread ‘gaps’ in redressing 
multiple grievances across a variety of sectors; the caveat that a generic action should 
sit alongside sectoral-specific regimes, as and where appropriate; a majority of those 
interested parties who provided views to the [Civil Justice Council of England and 
Wales] preferred the generic approach; and a generic approach would sit 
comfortably with existing English procedural regimes, and would accord with leading 
opt-out regimes elsewhere.” Id. at 296. 
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congressional review before the judiciary’s policy choices become 
effective.94 
Congress has very substantial power to recruit private citizens to 
enforce statutory and administrative law, but that power is limited by 
Article III of the United States Constitution. Having liberally construed 
Article III standing requirements during the 1960s and into the 1970s, a 
more conservative Supreme Court pulled back, thereby reducing the 
universe of eligible enforcers.95 Similarly, having liberally interpreted 
federal statutes and administrative regulations to imply private rights of 
action for a number of years, the Court changed course and made private 
enforcement more difficult in the absence of clear evidence of 
congressional intent.96 
IV. Choosing an Enforcement Regime 
In this Part we consider the choice of private enforcement from the 
standpoint of a legislature sincerely seeking to secure enforcement of its 
regulatory commands. In the domain of command and control 
regulation, the choice of private enforcement must be understood in 
relation to potential sources of public enforcement, either in the form of 
public prosecutions in court or through some administrative process. 
Public and private enforcement can be treated as substitutes for one 
another, or can be used in a complementary fashion. Although public 
and private enforcement are sometimes used independently of one 
another, they are also commonly used in combination, with some powers 
being delegated to administrative actors, while others are left to private 
litigants and courts within the same statute. In hybrid regimes, either 
public or private enforcement can be given the dominant role, with the 
other playing a more ancillary one. The two forms can be given 
important and distinctly separate roles in a regulatory scheme, such as by 
authorizing administrators to promulgate rules and allowing private 
parties to enforce them; or they can be given substantially overlapping 
roles, such as in an election of remedies arrangement where claimants 
can either proceed in court or submit their claim to an administrative 
tribunal. The range of possible combinations of public and private 
enforcement, and of administrative and legal process, is substantial and 
complex, and we do not attempt a comprehensive mapping here. 
The choice between public and private enforcement does not 
correspond in any straightforward way to the choice between strong and 
weak enforcement. Public, private, and hybrid regimes can each range 
from weak to strong. A private enforcement regime with limited 
opportunities and incentives can produce far weaker enforcement than 
 
94 See Burbank, supra note 18. 
95 See Boyer & Meidinger, supra note 4, at 936; Abram Chayes, Foreword: Public 
Law Litigation and the Burger Court, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 4, 10 (1982). 
96 See, e.g., Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 573–75 (1979). 
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an agency with strong formal powers, ample resources, and leadership 
dedicated to vigorous enforcement. Conversely, a robust private 
enforcement regime can produce stronger enforcement than an agency 
with modest powers, insufficient resources, or a leadership disinclined 
toward vigorous implementation. We will discuss differences between 
weak and strong private enforcement regimes later in this part.97 
A. The Potential Advantages of Private Enforcement 
In assessing the potential advantages and disadvantages of private 
enforcement regimes, we draw on the substantial literature debating 
their wisdom, which is always, explicitly or implicitly, evaluating them in 
relation to public enforcement. This literature is largely characterized by 
advocacy either for or against private enforcement. Aside from advocacy, 
we believe that the arguments on each side highlight dimensions of 
private enforcement that are useful to weigh when considering whether 
to deploy this enforcement strategy. As discussed in Part I, we also believe 
that many of the arguments are context-dependent, with their relative 
importance likely to vary across specific policy domains and political, 
legal, and institutional environments. 
On the positive side of the ledger, relative to administrative 
implementation, private enforcement regimes can: (1) multiply 
resources devoted to prosecuting enforcement actions; (2) shift the costs 
of regulation off of governmental budgets and onto the private sector; 
(3) take advantage of private information to detect violations; (4) 
encourage legal and policy innovation; (5) emit a clear and consistent 
signal that violations will be prosecuted, providing insurance against the 
risk that a system of administrative implementation will be subverted; (6) 
limit the need for direct and visible intervention by the bureaucracy in 
the economy and society; and (7) facilitate participatory and democratic 
governance.98 
Private enforcement regimes multiply prosecutorial resources. 
Regulation scholars have often observed that budgetary limitations are a 
core and recurring constraint on the administrative state’s enforcement 
capacity.99 Allowing and encouraging private litigation can bring vastly 
more resources to bear on enforcement, potentially mobilizing private 
 
97 See infra Part IV.A–C. 
98 In reviewing this literature we draw partly upon an excellent review by 
Stephenson, supra note 10. 
99 See Myriam E. Gilles, Reinventing Structural Reform Litigation: Deputizing Private 
Citizens in the Enforcement of Civil Rights, 100 Colum. L. Rev. 1384, 1410 (2000); 
Rajabiun, supra note 16, at 214 n.110 (“[I]n his testimony to Congress in 1951, 
Assistant Attorney General H. Graham Morrison argued that, in the absence of 
private suits, public enforcers would require four times as much funding.”); Susan 
Rose-Ackerman, Judicial Review and the Power of the Purse, 12 Int’l Rev. L. & Econ. 191 
(1992); Cass R. Sunstein, What’s Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, “Injuries,” and 
Article III, 91 Mich. L. Rev. 163, 221 (1992). 
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litigants and plaintiffs’ attorneys in numbers that dwarf agency capacity.100 
Moreover, private enforcement litigation can actually enhance the 
efficient use of scarce bureaucratic resources by allowing administrators 
to focus enforcement efforts on violations that do not provide adequate 
incentives for private enforcement, while resting assured that those that 
do will be prosecuted by private litigants.101 
Scarcity of government revenue also highlights the comparative 
political feasibility of enacting private enforcement regimes as compared 
to bureaucratic state-building. A number of scholars have argued that 
lack of adequate tax revenue, or the political costs of raising it, 
encourages Congress to achieve public policy goals through private legal 
process because it shifts the costs of regulation away from the state and 
on to private parties.102 Scarcity of public funds places obvious limits on 
administrative implementation. As distinguished from funding an 
executive agency to carry out enforcement activities, private enforcement 
regimes are, from Congress’s standpoint, more or less self-funding. 
Although increasing rates of litigation will cause some increase in the 
costs of maintaining the federal judiciary, these costs are not easily 
traceable by voters to legislators’ support for a piece of regulatory 
legislation with a private enforcement regime. Thus, with private 
enforcement regimes, legislators can provide for policy implementation 
at lesser cost than with administrative implementation, and can minimize 
blame for what costs are born by the government.103 
Private enforcement regimes have comparative informational 
advantages for detecting violations. Potential litigant-enforcers—who are 
directly affected by violations, whose proximity to violations gives them 
inside information, and whose connections to the relevant industry may 
give them expertise to judge violations—collectively have knowledge 
about violations that far exceeds what the administrative state could 
 
100 See John C. Coffee, Jr., Rescuing the Private Attorney General: Why the Model of the 
Lawyer as Bounty Hunter is Not Working, 42 Md. L. Rev. 215, 218 (1983); Gilles, supra 
note 99, at 1387; Kent Roach & Michael J. Trebilcock, Private Enforcement of Competition 
Laws, 34 Osgoode Hall L.J. 461, 479–81 (1996); Richard B. Stewart & Cass R. 
Sunstein, Public Programs and Private Rights, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 1193, 1214 (1982). 
101 See Coffee, supra note 100, at 224–25; Steven D. Shermer, The Efficiency of 
Private Participation in Regulating and Enforcing the Federal Pollution Control Laws: A Model 
for Citizen Involvement, 14 J. Envtl. L. & Litig. 461, 468–69 (1999); Thompson, supra 
note 6, at 200. 
102 See Farhang, supra note 2, at 129–71; Kagan, supra note 21, at 15–16; R. Shep 
Melnick, From Tax and Spend to Mandate and Sue: Liberalism after the Great Society, in The 
Great Society and the High Tide of Liberalism 387, 399–400 (Sidney M. Milkis & 
Jerome M. Mileur eds., 2005); Karen O’Connor & Lee Epstein, Bridging the Gap 
Between Congress and the Supreme Court: Interest Groups and the Erosion of the American Rule 
Governing Awards of Attorneys’ Fees, 38 W. Pol. Q. 238 (1985). 
103 An insincere legislature that wished for political reasons to appear to be 
serious about enforcement might regard the ability to constrain court capacity 
through funding allocations as a less obvious means of subverting enforcement than 
comparable underfunding of a public enforcement regime. 
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achieve through monitoring, even under the most optimistic budget 
scenarios.104 As one scholar put it, “the massive governmental 
expenditures required to detect and investigate misconduct are no match 
for the millions of ‘eyes on the ground’ that bear witness 
to . . . violations.”105 
Private enforcement regimes encourage legal innovation. Private 
litigants stand in sharp contrast with a centralized and hierarchical 
bureaucracy, which frequently engenders what Richard Stewart and Cass 
Sunstein characterize as comparative “diseconomies of scale, given 
multiple layers of decision and review and the temptation to adopt overly 
rigid norms in order to reduce administrative costs.”106 As compared with 
conservative tendencies that bureaucracy fosters, private litigants and 
attorneys are more likely to press for innovations in legal theories and 
strategies that could expand the parameters of liability and the methods 
for establishing it, innovations that may be adopted by public enforcers.107 
Freedom from bureaucratic constraint also allows private litigants to 
mobilize and reallocate their enforcement resources more flexibly and 
expeditiously than bureaucrats.108 
The decentralized nature of private enforcement litigation, as 
contrasted with centralized bureaucracy, can also encourage policy 
innovation for reasons similar to those associated with federalist 
governing arrangements.109 As distinguished from the imposition of a 
policy solution at the top of a centralized and hierarchical bureaucracy, 
litigation of an issue among many parties and interests, and across many 
judicial jurisdictions, can lead to experimentation with a multiplicity of 
policy responses to a problem, and successful policy solutions will gain 
traction and spread.110 
Private enforcement regimes with adequate incentives for 
enforcement will produce durable and consistent enforcement pressure, 
avoiding influences that may lead an agency to stray from legislators’ 
enforcement preferences. In contrast, regulators may choose to under-
enforce for a number of reasons. Given that intense preferences for 
under-enforcement exist in the regulated population, while preferences 
 
104 Pamela H. Bucy, Private Justice, 76 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1, 5, 8 (2002); Gilles, supra 
note 99, at 1387; Roach & Trebilcock, supra note 100, at 480–81; Shermer, supra note 
101, at 472. 
105 Gilles, supra note 99, at 1413. 
106 Stewart & Sunstein, supra note 100, at 1298; see also Boyer & Meidinger, supra 
note 4, at 913. 
107 See Harry First, Antitrust Enforcement in Japan, 64 Antitrust L.J. 137, 179–80 
(1995); Michael Selmi, Public vs. Private Enforcement of Civil Rights: The Case of Housing 
and Employment, 45 UCLA L. Rev. 1401, 1403–04, 1426 (1998); Thompson, supra note 
6, at 206–07. 
108 Coffee, supra note 100, at 226. 
109 See Christopher B. Busch et al., Taming Adversarial Legalism: The Port of 
Oakland’s Dredging Saga Revisited, 2 N.Y.U. J. Legis. & Pub. Pol’y 179, 208–11 (1999). 
110 See id. at 209–10. 
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for enforcement are far more diffuse, the regulated population has 
incentives and opportunities to use lobbying, campaign contributions, 
and other means to seek to influence or capture an agency so as to 
discourage enforcement.111 Regulators themselves may have preferences 
for under-enforcement for many reasons, including ideological 
preferences, career goals, to protect or enhance budget allocations, to 
avoid political controversy, or simple laziness.112 Finally, administrators 
may face pressure to under-enforce from executives or legislatures who 
may be motivated by ideological preferences, electoral imperatives in 
general, or the desire to protect specific constituents in particular.113 
Although this literature has focused on private enforcement regimes 
created because of concern about under-enforcement by administrators, 
legislators may believe that private enforcement regimes likewise can 
guard against over-enforcement by the bureaucracy.114 
Private enforcement can counterbalance uncertainty about agency 
enforcement in two ways. Most obviously and importantly, it can operate 
as a simple substitute for or adjunct to public enforcement. Further, it 
can bring attention to violations going unaddressed by public agencies 
charged with enforcement responsibilities and thereby shame or prod 
them into action.115 Given the tendency of the sources of under-
enforcement identified above to vacillate over time, private litigation 
performs what one regulation scholar called a “failsafe function,” by 
“ensuring that legal norms are not wholly dependent on the current 
attitudes of public enforcers . . . and that the legal system emits clear and 
consistent signals to those who might be tempted to offend.”116 
Private enforcement regimes may provide a compromise alternative 
to bureaucratic state-building in political environments in which anti-
bureaucracy sentiments are salient and influential.117 Private litigation, 
 
111 See Sanford C. Gordon & Catherine Hafer, Flexing Muscle: Corporate Political 
Expenditures as Signals to the Bureaucracy, 99 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 245, 245 (2005); 
Thomas W. Merrill, Capture Theory and the Courts: 1967-1983, 72 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 
1039, 1039–40 (1997); Stewart & Sunstein, supra note 100, at 1294. 
112 See J.R. DeShazo & Jody Freeman, The Congressional Competition to Control 
Delegated Power, 81 Tex. L. Rev. 1443, 1454–55 (2003); Mathew D. McCubbins et al., 
Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control, 3 J.L. Econ. & Org. 243, 247 
(1987); Roach & Trebilcock, supra note 100, at 482. 
113 See Burke, supra note 19, at 14; DeShazo & Freeman, supra note 112, at 1454; 
Roger L. Faith et al., Antitrust Pork Barrel, 25 J.L. & Econ. 329, 329, 338 (1982). 
114 See Farhang, supra note 2, at 94–128. 
115 See Frank B. Cross, Rethinking Environmental Citizen Suits, 8 Temp. Envtl. L. & 
Tech. J. 55, 56 (1989); Michael S. Greve, The Private Enforcement of Environmental Law, 
65 Tul. L. Rev. 339, 350 (1990); Matthew D. Zinn, Policing Environmental Regulatory 
Enforcement: Cooperation, Capture, and Citizen Suits, 21 Stan. Envtl. L.J. 81, 133–37 
(2002). 
116 Coffee, supra note 100, at 227. 
117 See Burke, supra note 19, at 13–14, 172–73; Tom Ginsburg & Robert A. Kagan, 
Introduction: Institutionalist Approaches to Courts as Political Actors, in Institutions and 
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with its air of private dispute resolution, is less visible and more 
ambiguous as a form of state intervention. Therefore, it may be preferred 
to bureaucratic state-building by legislators with antistatist preferences, a 
significant strand of the American political tradition, particularly as 
applied to the central state in the United States’ federalist system. 
Indeed, private enforcement regimes may be embraced by such 
legislators as a way of thwarting the growth of bureaucracy.118 Legislators 
and the public tend to regard private enforcement regimes, as Kagan 
puts it, as “nonstatist mechanisms” of policy implementation.119 As 
compared to constructing and financing bureaucratic regulatory 
enforcement machinery and endowing it with coercive powers, for 
example, to investigate, prosecute, adjudicate, and issue cease-and-desist 
orders, an enforcement regime that is founded instead on allowing 
aggrieved persons to prosecute their own complaints in court may be 
likely to attract broader support. If there are pivotal lawmakers prepared 
to obstruct enactment of regulatory policy that entails bureaucratic state-
building, utilizing private enforcement regimes may facilitate overcoming 
such obstructions. 
Finally, private enforcement regimes contribute to participatory and 
democratic self-government.120 Meaningful access to opportunities to 
defend and advance rights through litigation can amount to a form of 
active and direct citizen participation in the enterprise of self-
government, constituting a valuable and important facet of democratic 
life. This form of participation may incorporate interests into the 
governing process that would be rendered impotent by simple 
majoritarianism. Although majoritarian institutions are often thought 
emblematic of democracy, such institutions do not exhaust forms of 
democratic governance. As Feeley and Rubin put it, “perhaps a 
democracy must respect the rights of individuals or be governed by 
organic law or provide opportunities for expression and participation or 
establish conditions for rational discourse,” and courts may be 
distinctively suited to contributing these elements to a broader 
democratic regime.121 
 
Public Law: Comparative Approaches 1, 8 (Tom Ginsburg & Robert A. Kagan, 
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B. The Potential Disadvantages of Private Enforcement 
The foregoing account of private enforcement regimes as an 
effective form of policy intervention is heatedly contested. A contending 
line of arguments not only doubts whether private litigation can advance 
statutory policy goals, but, in its strongest form, suspects that private 
litigation may actually discourage compliance efforts. This perspective is 
characterized by the following core arguments: private enforcement 
regimes (1) empower judges, who lack policy expertise, to make policy; 
(2) tend to produce inconsistent and contradictory doctrine from courts; 
(3) weaken the administrative state’s capacity to articulate a coherent 
regulatory scheme by preempting administrative rulemaking; (4) usurp 
prosecutorial discretion; (5) discourage cooperation with regulators and 
voluntary compliance; (6) weaken oversight of policy implementation by 
the legislative and executive branches; and (7) lack democratic 
legitimacy and accountability. 
A primary justification for delegation of policy implementation 
authority to bureaucracy is to leverage the expertise—informational 
resources, analytical competence, etc.—of policymakers within an 
administrative body.122 Critics of private enforcement emphasize that 
most judges are generalists by training, lacking the specialized training 
necessary to deal with complex policy problems.123 In the course of 
judging they deal with a multitude of policy areas one after another, 
developing a depth of knowledge in none. This makes judges, on 
balance, far less informed and expert than administrators at 
policymaking.124 
Private enforcement regimes produce fragmented and incoherent 
policy. As compared to a more centralized, unified, and integrated 
administrative scheme, orchestrated by an administrator at the top of a 
hierarchical agency with powers of national scope, when a large role is 
given to private litigation in implementation, resulting policy will tend to 
be confused, inconsistent, and even straightforwardly contradictory. This 
is so for reasons having to do with the party-driven nature of litigation 
and the decentralized structure of the judiciary. When courts make 
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policy in response to private litigation, judges are only able to rule on 
issues presented to them by private litigants. These private litigants select 
and frame issues, thus setting the judicial policy agenda, in the course of 
pursuing highly particularized interests. These interests, and the 
associated policy positions being advocated, inevitably will be divergent 
across private plaintiffs and private attorneys, and they may not 
correspond with, and in fact may be in competition with, the public 
interest.125 In response to issues presented in this fashion to a 
decentralized court system, non-expert judges make piecemeal policy, 
one case at a time, often without adequate consideration or 
understanding of the larger regulatory scheme. Given the inevitable 
heterogeneity of policy preferences among judges, the multitude of 
judges authoring regulatory policy often work at cross-purposes, seeking 
to advance conflicting and even contradictory regulatory agendas. This 
renders regulatory policy, according to critic Richard Pierce, via “judicial 
opinions [that] are massively inconsistent and incoherent.”126 
Private enforcement regimes weaken bureaucratic lawmaking in 
hybrid regimes that, in addition to providing for private enforcement, 
also empower administrators to articulate substantive law or to prosecute 
enforcement actions. Inevitably, private litigation will force courts to 
delineate the meaning of broadly worded regulatory statutes on 
important issues before administrators have the opportunity to address 
them, narrowing the scope of administrators’ opportunity to do so 
through rulemaking.127 Private enforcement also diminishes the 
effectiveness of the traditional administrative strategy of regulating 
complex and uncertain policy areas by promulgating broad rules, which 
may in some instances be infeasible to comply with, and relying on 
prosecutorial discretion to temper the effects of the rule.128 With wide 
opportunities for private enforcement litigation, prosecutorial discretion 
ceases to operate as a safety valve and this regulatory strategy is 
undermined.129 Private enforcement further subverts an administrator’s 
ability to mount litigation campaigns strategically calculated to advance 
certain policy goals, such as by selecting cases best suited to facilitate a 
desired change in the law, forum shopping, and tactically ordering 
presentation of issues to appellate courts so as to gradually build 
 
125 See Bucy, supra note 104, at 66–67; Cross, supra note 115, at 68–69; Joseph A. 
Grundfest, Disimplying Private Rights of Action Under the Federal Securities Laws: The 
Commission’s Authority, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 961, 969–71 (1994). 
126 Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Agency Authority to Define the Scope of Private Rights of 
Action, 48 Admin. L. Rev. 1, 8–9 (1996); see generally Cross, supra note 115, at 69; 
Stewart & Sunstein, supra note 100, at 1292–93. 
127 See Jeannette L. Austin, The Rise of Citizen-Suit Enforcement in Environmental Law: 
Reconciling Private and Public Attorneys General, 81 Nw. U. L. Rev. 220, 223 (1987); 
Pierce, supra note 126, at 2; Stewart & Sunstein, supra note 100, at 1292. 
128 See, e.g., Pierce, supra note 126, at 8. 
129 See Bucy, supra note 104, at 64; Cross, supra note 115, at 69; Kalven & 
Rosenfield, supra note 26. 
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precedent toward a desired outcome. With individual private lawyers 
representing the interests of individual private clients, an administrator’s 
capacity to orchestrate such strategic litigation campaigns is severely 
curtailed. To the extent that private litigants make precedent at cross-
purposes with an administrator’s goals, it will frequently be binding on 
her. Thus, while courts are producing inconsistent and contradictory 
regulatory policy, the administrative state’s capacity to send its own clear 
and audible signals about what the law requires is simultaneously 
weakened.130 
Private enforcement regimes subvert cooperation and voluntary 
compliance. Given how adversarial the litigation process is, wide scope for 
private enforcement litigation will erode and disrupt efforts at cooperation, 
coordination, and negotiation between regulators and those they regulate. 
Regulation scholars who voice this concern urge that a significant measure 
of voluntary compliance is vital to obtaining enforcement objectives, given 
the limited resources available to administrators and courts to coerce 
compliance.131 If cooperatively negotiated informal bargains with regulators, 
aimed at enhancing compliance, will not protect organizations from private 
suits on the same issues, then the prospect of facing private suits will make 
voluntary agreements far harder to achieve.132 The contentiousness of 
implementation through private litigation is further exacerbated by the fact 
that—as compared to administrative enforcement—private litigants will be 
more likely to file non-meritorious suits that are brought for strategic or 
extortionate purposes against innocent defendants in the hope that they 
will find it cheaper to settle than to litigate.133 This further erodes a 
cooperative environment conducive to fostering trust and voluntary 
compliance. 
The legislative and executive branches have less continuing control 
over policy when private enforcement is relied on for implementation, as 
contrasted with administrative implementation. After a statute is enacted, 
private enforcement activity and associated judicial interpretation of 
statutes are far harder for legislatures and executives to control and 
influence than post-enactment implementation by bureaucrats. Most 
significant among forms of continuing legislative control over 
bureaucracy, even if future legislatures lack the political capacity or will 
to pass a new law, they can exercise some leverage over agency 
 
130 See Bucy, supra note 104, at 66–67; Cross, supra note 115, at 69. 
131 See, e.g., Austin, supra note 127, at 223; Cross, supra note 115, at 67; John T. 
Scholz, Voluntary Compliance and Regulatory Enforcement, 6 J.Law & Pol’y 385, 394 
(1984). 
132 See Robert F. Blomquist, Rethinking the Citizen as Prosecutor Model of 
Environmental Enforcement Under the Clean Water Act: Some Overlooked Problems of Outcome-
Independent Values, 22 Ga. L. Rev. 337, 409 (1988); Stewart & Sunstein, supra note 100, 
at 1292–93; Zinn, supra note 115, at 84. 
133 See Grundfest, supra note 125, at 970–71; Robert A. Kagan, Adversarial Legalism: 
Tamed or Still Wild?, 2 N.Y.U. J. Legis. & Pub. Pol’y 217, 227 (1999); Stephenson, 
supra note 10, at 116. 
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implementation of statutes through such tools as investigation, oversight 
hearings, earmarking funds, formal reporting requirements, refusing to 
confirm appointees, and, of course, by threatening to reduce or actually 
reducing an agency’s budget.134 Executives also possess considerable 
capacity to influence agency behavior, particularly through appointment 
(and removal) of agency leadership.135 In contrast, if an enacting 
legislature delegates to private enforcers and institutionally independent 
courts, there is little if anything that the legislature or the executive can 
do to exert supervisory oversight powers, other than passing a new law. 
Passing a new law is far more difficult to accomplish, and even when 
feasible, has much higher opportunity costs, than traditional tools of 
bureaucratic oversight.136 Greater capacity for continuing control of 
bureaucracy by the elected branches has led some to regard agencies as a 
far more democratically legitimate, accountable, and responsive 
delegatee than private litigants and courts.137 
Critics of private enforcement litigation complain that it can be 
deeply undemocratic, unsuited to a political community committed to 
representative democracy, electoral accountability, and legislative 
supremacy.138 Private enforcement regimes give plaintiffs, their lawyers, 
and judges excessive power, fostering “judicial imperialism” by “activist” 
judges who interpret statutes, in response to the claims of greedy 
plaintiffs and their irresponsible lawyers, in ways that would never 
succeed in a politically accountable institution. Plaintiffs, their lawyers, 
 
134 See Joel D. Aberbach, Keeping a Watchful Eye: The Politics of 
Congressional Oversight 130 (1990); William N. Eskridge, Jr. et al., Cases and 
Materials On Legislation: Statutes and the Creation of Public Policy 1129–
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Rulemaking, 85 Va. L. Rev. 1243, 1295–96 (1999). 
135 See Terry M. Moe, Regulatory Performance and Presidential Administration, 26 Am. 
J. Pol. Sci. 197, 197 (1982); Terry M. Moe & Michael Caldwell, The Institutional 
Foundations of Democratic Government: A Comparison of Presidential and Parliamentary 
Systems, 150 J. Inst’l & Theoret. Econ. 171, 176 (1994). 
136 See Charles R. Shipan, Designing Judicial Review: Interest Groups, 
Congress, and Communications Policy 10 (1997); Cross, supra note 134, at 1303–
05; Mathew D. McCubbins et al., Structure and Process, Politics and Policy: Administrative 
Arrangements and Political Control of Agencies, 75 Va. L. Rev. 431, 444–45 (1989); 
Charles R. Shipan, Interest Groups, Judicial Review, and the Origins of Broadcast Regulation, 
49 Admin. L. Rev. 549, 555–56 (1997). 
137 See Cross, supra note 134, at 1290–1306; McCubbins et al., supra note 136 at 
444–45; Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 Yale L.J. 969, 
978–79, 999, 1002 (1992); Pierce, supra note 124, at 1251; Laurence H. Silberman, 
Chevron—The Intersection of Law & Policy, 58 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 821, 823 (1990). 
138 See Patrick M. Garry, A Nation of Adversaries: How the Litigation 
Explosion Is Reshaping America 6–8 (1997); Walter K. Olson, The Litigation 
Explosion: What Happened When America Unleashed The Lawsuit 300–01 
(1991); Jeremy Rabkin, Judicial Compulsions: How Public Law Distorts Public 
Policy 247–49 (1989); Ross Sandler & David Schoenbrod, Democracy by 
Decree: What Happens When Courts Run Government 6–9 (2003); Nathan 
Glazer, Towards an Imperial Judiciary?, 41 Pub. Int. 104, 105, 119–20 (1975). 
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and judges are not electorally accountable, and they will stray from the 
democratic will precisely because they cannot be disciplined by it.139 
In concluding this discussion of the potential disadvantages of 
private enforcement, we stress that critics of private enforcement regard 
private litigation as importantly different from litigation prosecuted by 
the administrative state. While administrators do not have personal 
economic stakes in litigation and can pursue public goals, privately 
prosecuted litigation is guided by private (often economic) interests that 
may be in conflict with the public interest. While administrators can use 
litigation to pursue a desired regulatory regime, private litigation is 
fragmented and uncoordinated. Private litigants will bring strategic and 
extortionate suits that public administrators would never bring. To the 
extent that administrators’ use of litigation departs from these 
expectations, it can be disciplined and reined in by the democratic 
process, whereas private litigation, by comparison, is largely unfettered. A 
lawsuit is not a lawsuit. It matters who is prosecuting it. When it comes to 
lawsuits, public and private prosecution should not be confused or 
conflated. 
C. Structuring a Private Enforcement Regime 
If legislators elect to rely on private enforcement litigation for 
statutory implementation, they face a host of additional choices of 
statutory design concerning such matters as who will have access to the 
role of private enforcer, rules of claim aggregation, who will bear 
litigation costs and attorneys’ fees, and what remedies will be available. 
The cumulative effects of such choices can have profound consequences 
for how much or how little private enforcement is actually mobilized. In 
discussing these rules below we view them from the standpoint of a 
legislature making choices about the nature and extent of private 
enforcement desired, highlighting the economic calculus involved in 
litigation. We by no means intend to deny or diminish non-economic 
influences on the choice to litigate by potential plaintiffs and attorneys.140 
However, from the perspective of statutory design, we believe that the 
economic value of claims is an element influencing the choice to litigate 
that, unlike other factors, can be readily and substantially influenced by 
statutory drafters. 
 
139 Of course, many state judges are elected in the U.S., but the democratic 
critique of private enforcement regimes, as far as we are aware, does not take up this 
wrinkle. 
140 For example, scholars have suggested that the choice to sue may also be 
influenced by utility derived from telling one’s side of the story in a conflict, utility 
derived from litigation as a form of political participation, or disutility resulting from 
feelings of embarrassment or victimization. See Kristin Bumiller, The Civil Rights 
Society: The Social Construction Of Victims 98–103 (1988); Lawrence, supra 
note 120, at 467; Robert J. MacCoun, Voice, Control, and Belonging: The Double-Edged 
Sword of Procedural Fairness, 1 Ann. Rev. L. & Soc. Sci. 171, 172–73 (2005). 
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The economic motive to litigate is, moreover, a distinctively 
important one in the sense of being a threshold condition in the majority 
of cases. This is because, whatever other motives may also be at play, very 
few plaintiffs will be willing or able to proceed with litigation under an 
expectation of suffering financial loss.141 This is not to claim that plaintiffs 
are motivated by greed, but rather that an expectation of a positive, 
rather than a negative, economic outcome will typically be a 
precondition to the choice to sue, even if there are other political or 
psychological reasons for proceeding. As one scholar studying litigation 
from a social psychological perspective put it in reference to the effect of 
monetary damages on the choice to litigate, “even a boundedly rational 
psychological model will assume that expectations play a central role in 
choice.”142 Further, the decision to sue will not be made by the plaintiff 
alone, but will typically also require the agreement of a lawyer. In legal 
systems in which plaintiffs’ lawyers are regularly dependent on proceeds 
from the successful prosecution of a case for some or all of their 
compensation, unless a plaintiff is willing and able to carry the large 
burden of litigation costs on her own, before filing suit her attorney will 
have to assess whether investment of limited resources in a case is 
warranted based on an evaluation of its risks and potential returns.143 
1. Structuring Formal Access Rules 
The initial choice that legislators face is whether to allow private 
enforcement at all. Given the creation of a substantive legal rule—for 
example, prohibitions against job discrimination, or against deceptive 
consumer practices—the legislature must decide whether private lawsuits 
should be permitted, and if so, who should be permitted to seek 
remedies via private lawsuits.144 In considering the latter question, the 
legislature must decide whether the universe of private enforcers should 
be limited to persons injured by violations of statutory provisions or 
administrative regulations, and if so, whether and how to define the 
nature of the injury that will suffice to entitle a person to serve as a 
private enforcer. We noted in Part III that Article III of the U.S. 
Constitution, as interpreted by the Supreme Court, sets limits on the 
 
141 See Herbert M. Kritzer, The Justice Broker: Lawyers and Ordinary 
Litigation 28–34 (1990). But see Sally Engle Merry & Susan S. Silbey, What Do 
Plaintiffs Want? Reexamining the Concept of Dispute, 9 Just. Sys. J. 151, 172 (1984). 
142 Robert J. MacCoun, Media Reporting of Jury Verdicts: Is the Tail (of the Distribution) 
Wagging the Dog?, 55 DePaul L. Rev. 539, 539 (2006). 
143 See Kritzer, supra note 65, at 11; Marc Galanter & David Luban, Poetic Justice: 
Punitive Damages and Legal Pluralism, 42 Am. U. L. Rev. 1393, 1426 (1992); Earl 
Johnson, Jr., Lawyers’ Choice: A Theoretical Appraisal of Litigation Investment Decisions, 15 
Law & Soc’y Rev. 567, 567–68 (1981); Herbert M. Kritzer, Seven Dogged Myths 
Concerning Contingency Fees, 80 Wash. U. L.Q. 739, 748–49 (2002). 
144 As we discuss in Part III, although the Supreme Court once quite liberally 
found implied rights of action in federal statutes, since the late 1970s it has refused to 
do so absent a sufficiently clear indication of legislative intent to confer rights of 
private enforcement. 
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power of Congress to confer standing. We have also noted, however, that 
although those limits have been interpreted more strictly in recent 
decades, they still leave substantial room for private enforcement, 
perhaps best illustrated by the so-called citizen-suit provisions of federal 
environmental statutes.145 As we discuss in Part V with respect to job 
discrimination, the U.S. Congress elected to make private enforcement 
central, allowing suits by any “person claiming to be aggrieved.” With 
respect to most types of deceptive consumer practices, in contrast, it 
elected not to allow private lawsuits at all, instead vesting all enforcement 
authority with an administrative agency (with states free to establish their 
own enforcement regimes, most of which do authorize private 
enforcement).146 
When the legislature structures a private enforcement regime, in 
addition to creating a private right of action and identifying the set of 
persons with standing, it should also consider whether plaintiffs will be 
permitted to proceed on a representative basis.147 That is not the situation 
in most of the United States, however. In the U.S., class actions have 
proven significant sources of private enforcement across numerous 
important spheres of statutory regulation, including anti-trust, securities, 
environmental, consumer, and civil rights litigation.148 As discussed in 
Part III, class actions are authorized on a general (trans-substantive) basis 
for litigation in the federal courts by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, 
as amended in 1966, and most states modeled their class action statutes 
or rules on the federal rule.149 That is why we have referred to the class 
action as a “wild card” in the context of private enforcement in the 
 
145 See Thompson, supra note 6, at 185. Qui tam (“whistleblower”) statutes that 
seek to protect the interests of the United States through private enforcement 
present a special challenge for purposes of Article III because the private plaintiff 
(“relator”) typically cannot allege personal injury. The Supreme Court solved this 
problem by treating the relator as a statutory assignee of the rights of the United 
States with representational standing to assert the injury in fact suffered by the 
assignor. See Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 
771–73 (2000). 
146 Between the poles of broad standing for any aggrieved private party and no 
private right of action at all, there are many opportunities for a legislature to specify 
with particularity the pool of potential enforcers. For example, if a legislature sought 
to mobilize private enforcers against those who fraudulently label commodities, it 
could confer standing on one, all, or some combination of the following potential 
plaintiffs: the defrauding party’s (1) competitors, (2) customers, (3) competitors of 
customers, (4) any subsequent purchaser of a commodity in the stream of commerce, 
and (5) trade associations. In 1970 amendments to the National Gold and Silver 
Stamping Act of 1906, which previously lacked a private right of action, Congress 
elected to expressly confer standing on all five groups for the express purpose of 
increasing private enforcement. See H.R. Rep. No. 91-928, at 1–2 (1970). 
147 We do not address other, non-representative, forms of aggregation that may 
also enable private enforcement. 
148 Jack H. Friedenthal et al., Civil Procedure 758 (4th ed. 2005). 
149 Stephen B. Burbank, The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 in Historical Context: A 
Preliminary View, 156 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1439, 1500 (2008). 
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United States.150 Since 1966, whenever Congress has fashioned a private 
enforcement regime, it should have considered the potential impact of 
class action litigation on the attainment of its regulatory goals. In 
particular, it should have considered whether (1) given the enforcement 
incentives provided by the common fund doctrine that we have 
described—authorizing payment of attorneys’ fees and expenses out of 
the fund created by the class litigation—other such incentives were 
necessary or appropriate, and (2) additional private enforcement 
incentives aside, class litigation might yield inefficient over-enforcement. 
Congress has not consistently done so, but it is deemed to legislate 
against the background of the Federal Rules.151 As a result, there have 
been some obvious instances of potential over-enforcement, notably 
under the Truth-in-Lending Act,152 prompting some federal courts to balk 
at the idea of certifying a class to collect statutory damages and Congress 
to amend the statute in order to cap the potential recovery in class 
suits.153 Attempts by states to achieve similar protection against inefficient 
over-enforcement of state law or otherwise to pursue a different vision of 
the class action than that captured in federal law have recently suffered 
dual setbacks, first with the enactment of the Class Action Fairness Act of 
2005,154 which sweeps most consequential class litigation on matters of 
state law into federal court,155 and more recently by a Supreme Court 
decision that appears to prevent federal courts from honoring state law 
limitations on class actions.156 
As we discussed in Part III, the policies that can reasonably be said to 
support representative litigation vary depending on claim type. In the 
scenario in which statutory violations produce a large number of small 
injuries, compensation may not be a plausible goal, but the absence of 
representative litigation can render the violator, as a practical matter, 
immune from suit by private parties. Class actions thus can deter 
unlawful conduct of would-be violators by eliminating a structural 
economic impediment to private enforcement.157 At the same time as it 
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156 Shady Grove Orthopedic Assoc. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431 (2010); see 
also Burbank & Wolff, supra note 11. 
157 See Stephen C. Yeazell, Civil Procedure 963 (5th ed. 2000); Clayton P. 
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reduces the per claim cost of counsel, the class device can also elevate the 
quality of representation by markedly increasing the stakes (and 
potential rewards) of a case by aggregating damages, thereby justifying 
greater investment of lawyer time and resources into effective private 
enforcement.158 
The haphazard way in which legislatures, federal and state, have 
structured private enforcement regimes against the background of 
general (trans-substantive) class action provisions is of greatest concern 
with respect to negative value claims and within that category the subset 
of truly small claims.159 As to the latter, because compensation is usually 
not a plausible objective (depending on how small the claims are), 
whether or not class litigation should be permitted for the purpose of 
deterrence should depend, first, on the animating goals of the 
substantive law, and second on the desired level of enforcement, both of 
which the Supreme Court has chosen to ignore.160 Indeed, because 
Congress has been relatively uninvolved in federal class action policy, it 
may not consistently consider the potential of representative litigation to 
skew regulatory objectives when structuring a private enforcement 
regime.161 
2. The Provision of Incentives for Enforcement 
Effectively mobilizing private enforcement requires provision of 
adequate incentives. Simply allowing private enforcement, without 
attending to incentives, may result in under-enforcement in substantive 
areas of law in which those injured lack the resources to serve as private 
enforcers even if they have a substantial claim, or in which the costs of 
prosecuting claims exceeds their value. As we have discussed, the class 
action device can provide at least a partial answer to this problem with 
respect to some kinds of regulatory issues, but a great many violations of 
statutory law and administrative regulations are too individualized for 
class treatment under American law. Similarly, in situations where a claim 
under a statute or administrative regulation can yield a substantial 
 
158 See Eric D. Green, Advancing Individual Rights Through Group Justice, 30 U.C. 
Davis L. Rev. 791, 797–98, 802–03 (1997); David L Shapiro, Class Actions: The Class as 
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159 See Henry N. Butler & Jason S. Johnston, Reforming State Consumer Protection 
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Settlement Procedures Act, Expedited Fund Availability Act, Homeowners Protection 
Act, Truth in Lending Act, Equal Credit Opportunity Act, Fair Debt Collection 
Practices Act, Electronic Fund Transfer Act, and Migrant and Seasonal Worker 
Protection Act. Brief for Respondent at App. A, Shady Grove Orthopedic Assoc. v. 
Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431 (2010) (No. 08-1008), 2009 WL 2777648, at *1A. 
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individual recovery, the acceptability of percentage-based fees in the 
United States, which we discussed in Part III, may obviate the need to 
provide additional incentives. But many such claims hold no prospect of 
a recovery adequate to attract a lawyer practicing on a percentage-fee 
basis. The two primary types of statutory rules that can be used to 
incentivize private enforcement are those allocating responsibility for 
costs and attorneys’ fees and those governing available remedies. 
We focus here on allocation of responsibility for attorneys’ fees, 
although the same logic applies to other litigation costs. In Part III we 
discussed the “American Rule,” pursuant to which each party pays its own 
attorneys’ fees and the “English Rule,” pursuant to which the loser pays 
most of the winner’s attorneys’ fees. As compared to the two-way fee 
shifting of the English Rule, it is also possible to provide one-way fee 
shifting in favor of plaintiffs or in favor of defendants. One-way fee 
shifting in favor of plaintiffs has grown considerably in statutory 
regulation since the late 1960s, including in the areas of civil rights and 
consumer law.162 One-way fee shifting in favor of defendants is extremely 
rare in practice.163 The Supreme Court has referred to plaintiffs’ fee shifts 
as “congressional utilization of the private-attorney-general concept,” 
while noting that “under some, if not most, of the statutes providing for 
the allowance of reasonable fees, Congress has opted to rely heavily on 
private enforcement to implement public policy and to allow counsel fees 
so as to encourage private litigation.”164 
We quoted excerpts from a review of the current state of theoretical 
and empirical knowledge about fee shifting in Part III, noting that, with 
rare exceptions, the effects and hence the comparative advantages and 
disadvantages of the American Rule and the English Rule are unclear.165 
The problem, according to Avery Katz, is that “[l]egal costs influence all 
aspects of the litigation process, from the decision to file suit to the 
choice between settlement and trial to the question whether to take 
precautions against a dispute in the first place,” which can affect the 
 
162 See Farhang, supra note 2, at 94–128. Although the language of some of these 
provisions in federal legislation provides for fee awards to the “prevailing party,” 
literally reflecting the English Rule, based upon their assessment of legislative intent, 
courts have read most such provisions as effectively creating one-way fee shifting for 
plaintiffs, allowing prevailing plaintiffs to recover fees as a matter of course, and 
allowing prevailing defendants to recover fees only upon a showing that the plaintiff’s 
claim was frivolous or brought in bad faith. Id. at 82. The federal Copyright Act is a 
rare exception. See Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 519 (1994). For Texas 
departures from the American Rule, see supra note 52. 
163 Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Predicting the Effects of Attorney Fee Shifting, 47 Law & 
Contemp. Probs. 139, 141 & n.8 (1984). 
164 Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 263 (1975). 
165 See supra text accompanying note 56. 
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number of underlying opportunities for litigation.166 Changing the rules 
governing legal fees thus “remedies some externalities while failing to 
address and even exacerbating others.”167 
Scholars disagree about the comparative merits of the American and 
English Rules. However, from the standpoint of the incentives facing 
plaintiffs and their attorneys, it is clear that, as compared to either rule, 
no matter who wins under a one-way plaintiff’s shift, expected costs of 
suit will be equal or less, causing the expected value of the case to be 
equal or greater.168 Thus, among the alternative arrangements for 
allocating responsibility for paying attorneys’ fees, the one-way plaintiff’s 
shift creates the greatest incentives for private enforcement.169 
Available remedies for legal violations can also provide important 
incentives for enforcement, and this is clearest with respect to economic 
remedies, although non-economic remedies can provide important 
incentives as well. Available economic remedies for statutory violations 
are, to an important extent, the function of a statute’s express provisions. 
Legislators have wide latitude to determine whether statutory cases, if 
won by plaintiffs, will be worth no money, a little money, or a lot of 
money. They can enact express statutory provisions that confer monetary 
damages greater than a plaintiff’s actual damages, such as double, triple, 
or punitive damages. Double or triple damages operate as multiples of 
the actual monetary damages suffered by the plaintiff, and punitive 
damages can be awarded separately in an amount that need not be tied 
to actual monetary harm at all, and can far exceed it.170 Legislators can 
also provide “statutory damages,” which are a specific sum awarded either 
in lieu of or in addition to actual damages, an approach typically taken to 
 
166 Avery Wiener Katz, Indemnity of Legal Fees, in 5 Encyclopedia of Law and 
Economics: The Economics of Crime and Litigation 63, 64 (Boudewijn Bouckaert 
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have to pay her fees, and will be her own expected fees, plus the defendant’s 
expected fees, if she loses. Under a one-way plaintiff’s shift, the plaintiff knows that 
her expected fees will be her own expected fees if she loses, and will be zero if she 
wins. Thus, if the plaintiff loses, she is in the same position as if she loses under the 
American Rule (she pays her own fees), and better off than under the English Rule. 
If the plaintiff wins, she is in the same position as if she won under the English Rule 
(the defendant pays her fees), and better off than under the American Rule. 
169 See Steven Shavell, Suit, Settlement, and Trial: A Theoretical Analysis Under 
Alternative Methods for the Allocation of Legal Costs, 11 J. Legal Stud. 55, 60–61 (1982); 
Frances Kahn Zemans, Fee Shifting and the Implementation of Public Policy, 47 Law & 
Contemp. Probs. 187, 190 (1984). 
170 See G. Robert Blakey, Of Characterization and Other Matters: Thoughts about 
Multiple Damages, 60 Law & Contemp. Probs. 97, 110–11, 123 (1997); Galanter & 
Luban, supra note 143, at 1426. 
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incentivize private enforcement where actual damages are small or 
difficult to establish, and one used most often by Congress in the context 
of consumer protection and intellectual property regulation.171 Courts 
have recognized that damages enhancements “are justified as a ‘bounty’ 
that encourages private lawsuits seeking to assert legal rights.”172 Like 
plaintiffs’ fee shifts, using damages enhancements as a “bounty” operates 
to “reward individuals who serve as ‘private attorneys general’ in bringing 
wrongdoers to account,”173 and provides an “incentive to litigate” that is 
“designed to fill prosecutorial gaps.”174 
We note that Congress has sometimes incentivized private 
enforcement by using damages enhancements in conjunction with fee 
shifting. In some policy contexts, fee shifting alone will not be sufficient 
to generate private enforcement of meritorious claims.175 This is so 
because of delay lawyers experience in receiving payment of fees, 
uncertainty of case outcome (both in terms of success and amount of 
recovery), and, sometimes, difficulty in recovering fees by winning 
plaintiffs.176 Since litigation regularly entails both delay and uncertainty of 
outcome, attorneys discount anticipated fee awards accordingly. A for-
profit sector attorney weighing only economic considerations will not 
represent plaintiffs on the expectation of a fee award if she also has the 
opportunity to be paid at a comparable rate, in a timely fashion, and not 
contingent on prevailing. Further, courts have at times interpreted 
prevailing plaintiff fee shifts—on such issues as what attorney work is 
covered, what constitutes “prevailing,” appropriate hourly rates, and the 
 
171 See Sheila B. Scheuerman, Due Process Forgotten: The Problem of Statutory Damages 
and Class Actions, 74 Mo. L. Rev. 103, 103–04, 110–11 (2009); Victor E. Schwartz & 
Cary Silverman, Common-Sense Construction of Consumer Protection Acts, 54 U. Kan. L. 
Rev. 1, 61 (2005). In combination with class actions, statutory damages can create 
massive liability, inefficiently high levels of private enforcement pressure, and over-
deterrence. See Burbank & Wolff, supra note 11, at 65 n.200; Scheuerman, supra, at 
111. However, a recent Ninth Circuit decision rejected the “enormity” of damages in 
a class action under a consumer protection statute with a statutory damages provision 
as a reason to deny class certification. Bateman v. Am. Multi-Cinema, Inc., 623 F.3d 
708, 710–11 (9th Cir. 2010). The court maintained that, while there was no evidence 
of congressional intent in the case at hand, under the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Califano, see supra text accompanying note 151, Congress is deemed to legislate 
against the background of the Federal Rules (including Rule 23) absent clear 
expression to the contrary. Id. at 716. 
172 Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 58 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see also 
United States v. Snepp, 595 F.2d 926, 937 (4th Cir. 1979); TVT Records v. Island Def 
Jam Music Grp., 279 F. Supp. 2d 413, 423 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
173 Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 781 F.2d 394, 403 (5th Cir. 1986); see 
also Perrone v. Gen. Motors Accep. Corp., 232 F.3d 433, 440 (5th Cir. 2000). 
174 Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 493 (1985). 
175 See Farhang, supra note 2, at 190–91; Thompson, supra note 6, at 216. 
176 See Federal Courts Study Committee, Judicial Conference of the 
United States, Tentative Recommendations For Public Comment 50 (1989); see 
generally Federal Courts Study Committee, Judicial Conference of the United 
States, Report of The Federal Courts Study Committee 25, 104–05 (1990). 
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relevance of the proportionality of the fee to the outcome achieved—in 
ways that produce awards below market rates.177 Deploying damages 
enhancements in conjunction with fee shifting can allow contingency 
arrangements to counteract the discounting of fees that results from 
delay and uncertainty of outcome regarding both the case and, if 
successful, the fee award. 
In our discussion of structuring private enforcement regimes, we 
have focused on formal access to private enforcement and direct 
economic incentives for it. Of course, many other aspects of a regulatory 
statute, and of the legal system in which it is implemented, can affect the 
probability that a plaintiff will succeed in litigation, which has 
straightforward influence on the expected value of claims. For example, a 
plaintiff’s probability of successful litigation—and therefore the extent of 
private enforcement—can be powerfully influenced by rules governing 
liability,178 evidence,179 burdens and standards of proof,180 and, as 
discussed in Part III, pleading181 and discovery.182 Thus, the operation of 
private enforcement regimes hinges on the interplay of a complex array 
of rules at the levels of both the individual statute and the civil justice 
system, and we have just highlighted what we take to be the most 
important ones. 
D. The Influence of Political Institutions on the Choice of Private Enforcement 
As noted in Part II, in recent years, scholars studying the role of 
litigation in American policy implementation have argued that American 
separation-of-powers structures create incentives for Congress to rely on 
private enforcement litigation for policy implementation. This literature 
argues that in the American institutional environment Congress has 
incentives to rely on private enforcement regimes to carry out its will in 
the face of potential resistance by (1) Presidents, (2) future legislative 
majorities, and (3) bureaucrats whose interests or preferences are not 
aligned with the goals of the enacting Congress. This institutional 
environment also frequently gives rise to the need for broad 
supermajoritarian coalitions to pass a law, and privatization of 
enforcement costs in a regulatory law is one strategy to achieve this goal. 
 
177 See Federal Courts Study Committee, Report of the Federal Courts 
Study Committee, supra note 176, at 25, 104–05; Ray Terry, Eliminating the Plaintiff’s 
Attorney in Equal Employment Litigation: A Shakespearean Tragedy, 5 Lab. Law. 63, 66–67 
(1989). 
178 See Lewis A. Kornhauser & Richard L. Revesz, Multidefendant Settlements: The 
Impact of Joint and Several Liability, 23 J. Legal Stud. 41, 42 (1994). 
179 See Farhang, supra note 2, at 27–28. 
180 See Robert Cooter & Thomas Ulen, Law and Economics 431–33 (4th ed. 
2004). 
181 See Burbank, supra note 18. 
182 See Robert D. Cooter & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, An Economic Model of Legal 
Discovery, 23 J. Legal Stud. 435, 435–36 (1994). 
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Before elaborating on these institutional explanations, we briefly 
return to more widespread cultural explanations for “litigiousness” in the 
U.S., also noted in Part II, intending to highlight how they contrast 
with—although they are not necessarily in conflict with—the institutional 
factors. One dimension of the cultural argument is about Americans in 
general, and a second dimension is about a transformation in American 
political culture since the late 1960s. The argument about Americans in 
general is tied to the perspective of “American exceptionalism”—which 
holds that American political culture differs fundamentally from other 
developed nations.183 One strand of this view maintains that in the U.S. 
individualist and antistatist orientations give rise to “a society profoundly 
rooted in law,” with a “potent orientation toward individual rights,” 
fostering “the American eagerness for legal settlements to disputes . . . 
[and] excessive litigiousness.”184 Against this general backdrop, scholars 
have argued that a cultural transformation occurred beginning around 
the late 1960s that resulted in a greater propensity among Americans to 
assert legal rights.185 This account is marked, alternately, by tropes of 
degeneration and tropes of triumph. 
The degenerative story of transformation is one of cultural decline 
from a rights-respecting people to a rights-abusing one. According to this 
view, Americans became afflicted with a “national disease” that prevented 
them from “tolerat[ing] more than five minutes of frustration without 
submitting to the temptation to sue.”186 During this period, Americans’ 
traditional (and healthy) respect for individualism, with long roots in the 
American political tradition, transmuted into the hyper-individualism of 
rabid “rights talk,” legalism, and litigiousness.187 As we note in Part II, 
however, “Notwithstanding a decades-long organized campaign by 
American business to demonize lawyers and litigation, there is robust 
empirical evidence supporting Kagan’s observation that ‘[m]any, 
perhaps most Americans are reluctant to sue.’”188 Further, serious 
empirical scholars have not been able to confirm a “litigation explosion” 
across American court systems as a whole during this period, though, as 
discussed below, there was a sharp increase in the rate of private 
enforcement of federal statutes in the late 1960s.189 
 
183 E.g., Seymour Martin Lipset, American Exceptionalism: A Double-Edged 
Sword 17–18 (1996). 
184 Id. at 270; see also Anthony King, Ideas, Institutions and the Policies of 
Governments: A Comparative Analysis: Part III, 3 Brit. J. Pol. Sci. 409, 418 (1973). 
185 See, e.g., Eric Foner, The Story of American Freedom 299–305 (1998). 
186 Jerold S. Auerbach, A Plague of Lawyers, Harper’s, Oct. 1976, at 37, 42; see also 
Bayless Manning, Hyperlexis: Our National Disease, 71 Nw. U. L. Rev. 767, 767 (1977). 
187 See Garry, supra note 138, at 7–8; Mary Ann Glendon, Rights Talk: The 
Impoverishment of Political Discourse x–xi (1991). 
188 Supra text accompanying note 33 (quoting Kagan, supra note 21, at 34). 
189 See Marc Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don’t 
Know (and Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 
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The triumphal story of transformation—rather than disease—
apprehends the emergence of an assertive polity advocating an expansive 
understanding of individual rights and demanding that powerful 
institutions respect them. Shaped by both the civil rights movement—
beginning with race, but expanding well beyond it—and a Supreme 
Court that elaborated expansive understandings of rights, the American 
people developed a heightened state of “rights consciousness,” and 
increasingly turned to courts to vindicate them.190 
In contrast with these cultural explanations for the extent of 
litigation in American policy implementation, more recent institutional 
scholarship emphasizes the importance of separation-of-powers 
structures. A core and perennial feature of American separation of power 
structures—conflict between Congress and the President over control of 
the administrative state—encourages Congress’s purposeful and 
extensive reliance on private enforcement regimes to implement its 
policy enactments. Recognizing that command-and-control regulation 
entails a choice between bureaucracy and litigation, or some 
combination of the two, scholars making this argument build, 
theoretically, on scholarship seeking to understand the conditions that 
motivate Congress to limit and curtail administrative power. In a series of 
noted articles, Terry Moe argues that when delegating to agencies, 
American legislators make choices about agency structure, procedure, 
and power meant to insulate their preferences from other governmental 
actors who threaten, or might threaten in the future, to subvert them, 
most importantly the President, who possesses a variety of means to 
influence agency behavior.191 Empirical research has demonstrated that, 
in fact, under conditions of divided party government (different parties 
controlling Congress and the presidency) legislators enact more detailed 
laws, thus limiting agency discretion in implementation, and place more 
structural constraints on the exercise of bureaucratic implementation 
authority.192 
This institutional logic—for delegating less authority to the 
bureaucracy and structurally constraining its exercise of the powers 
delegated—can also motivate Congress to enact private enforcement 
 
UCLA L. Rev. 4, 69 (1983); Marc Galanter, The Day After the Litigation Explosion, 46 
Md. L. Rev. 3, 37 (1986). 
190 See Michael Schudson, The Good Citizen: A History of American Civic 
Life 291 (1998); see generally Foner, supra note 185, at 299–305. 
191 See Terry M. Moe, The Politics of Bureaucratic Structure, in Can the Government 
Govern? 267, 277–79 (John E. Chubb & Paul E. Peterson eds., 1989) [hereinafter 
Moe, Bureaucratic Structure]; Terry M. Moe, Political Institutions: The Neglected Side of the 
Story, 6 J.L. Econ. & Org. 213 (1990) [hereinafter Moe, Political Institutions]; Moe & 
Caldwell, supra note 135, at 176. 
192 See Epstein & O’Halloran, supra note 122, at 131; Huber & Shipan, supra 
note 122, at 37. 
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regimes.193 To the degree that an enacting Congress is concerned about 
whether the President will enforce statutes according to legislative goals, 
due to the distinct imperatives of his office, or due to his own ideological 
preferences, Congress has reason to enact incentives for private enforcers 
to do so. Adequately incentivized, private lawsuits can operate as an 
enforcement mechanism with an autopilot character, substantially 
beyond executive control. 
Consistent with this theory, Congress has been more likely to enact 
incentives for private enforcement when the opposing political party 
controls the executive branch.194 This fact is important in explaining the 
steep increase in private lawsuits in the implementation of federal 
statutes since the late 1960s. Between President Nixon assuming office in 
1969 and the end of the twentieth century, the U.S. experienced divided 
government 81% of the time, as contrasted with 21% in the period 
between 1901 and 1968.195 At the same time, the ideological distance 
between the two dominant political parties steadily increased.196 The 
surge in both divided government and party polarization during this 
period led to growing legislative-executive conflict; Congress turned 
increasingly to private litigants to enforce its regulatory policies, and the 
rate of private federal statutory lawsuits exploded by about 800% between 
President Nixon assuming office and the end of the twentieth century.197 
From the standpoint of an enacting Congress, other threats to 
bureaucratic enforcement of statutes arise from future Congresses with 
potentially different preferences (legislative coalition drift), and from 
bureaucrats themselves (bureaucratic drift). Future congressional 
coalitions may exercise bureaucratic oversight powers—via oversight 
hearings, investigations, and budget control—to subvert bureaucratic 
enforcement of the enacting Congress’s policy goals.198 The alternative of 
private enforcement regimes provides a form of autopilot enforcement, 
via market incentives, that will be substantially insulated from 
interference by future legislative majorities.199 This strategy of insulation 
assumes, of course, that such future legislative majorities will not simply 
pass a new law to achieve their goals. 
 
193 See Burke, supra note 19, at 14–16; Melnick, supra note 102, at 400; Ginsburg 
& Kagan, supra note 117, at 6–7. 
194 See Farhang, supra note 2, at 216. 
195 Id. at 222. 
196 See Nolan McCarty et al., Polarized America: The Dance of Ideology 
and Unequal Riches 1 (2006); Gary C. Jacobson, Partisan Polarization in Presidential 
Support: The Electoral Connection, 30 Cong. & Presidency 1, 1–2 (2003). 
197 See Farhang, supra note 2, at 66, 221–23. 
198 See Eskridge, supra note 134, at 1129–73; Moe, Bureaucratic Structure, supra 
note 191, at 277–79; Moe, Political Institutions, supra note 191, at 223; Moe & Caldwell, 
supra note 135, at 176. 
199 See Burke, supra note 19, at 173–74; Kagan, supra note 21, at 49; Farhang, 
supra note 2, at 79–81, 166, 225, 233. 
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The strategy is made effective by the stickiness of the status quo that 
is characteristic of the American lawmaking system, which arises from the 
multitude of actors that the system empowers to kill legislation—
Presidents, courts, two legislative chambers, an elaborate committee 
system within each chamber that disproportionately empowers 
committee members and chairs, and the filibuster in the Senate.200 In a 
lawmaking system with so many gatekeepers, as Moe states, “Whatever is 
formalized will tend to endure.”201 Under this constraint, private 
enforcement regimes are considerably more insulated from future 
legislative coalitions than bureaucratic enforcement regimes. Empirical 
research shows that, in fact, when the majority party in Congress faces an 
impending loss of seats in the next election, it is more likely to enact 
private enforcement regimes.202 
The threat of bureaucratic drift arises from the prospect that 
bureaucrats may pursue their own interests at the expense of the 
enacting Congress’s preferences, leading to bureaucratic shirking of 
delegated work, capture of the bureaucracy by the regulated population, 
careerism, and bureaucrats’ pursuit of their own policy preferences 
rather than those of the elected officials who empowered them.203 The 
stickiness of the status quo exacerbates this problem because it creates 
significant latitude for bureaucrats to move policy (cause it to drift) away 
from the preferences of the elected branches, before all necessary players 
in the lawmaking process will have the incentive and ability to coordinate 
their actions in a legislative reversal.204 In contrast, the autopilot character 
of private enforcement, sufficiently incentivized, insulates the 
enforcement function from the problem of bureaucratic drift.205 As 
discussed in Part V.B, concerns about bureaucratic drift have contributed 
to reliance on private enforcement in civil rights regulation in the U.S. 
The many veto points that characterize America’s fragmented 
lawmaking institutions encourage enactment of private enforcement 
regimes for an additional reason. Research focusing on institutional 
fragmentation in the American lawmaking process has emphasized the 
ways in which the multitude of veto points truncate, limit, and curtail 
 
200 See David W. Brady & Craig Volden, Revolving Gridlock: Politics and 
Policy from Jimmy Carter to George W. Bush 20 (2d ed. 2006); Sven H. Steinmo, 
American Exceptionalism Reconsidered: Culture or Institutions?, in The Dynamics of 
American Politics: Approaches and Interpretations 106, 127 (Lawrence C. Dodd 
& Calvin Jillson eds., 1994); R. Kent Weaver & Bert A. Rockman, Assessing the Effects of 
Institutions, in Do Institutions Matter?: Government Capabilities in the United 
States and Abroad 1, 3 (R. Kent Weaver & Bert A Rockman eds., 1993). 
201 Moe, Political Institutions, supra note 191, at 240. 
202 See Farhang, supra note 2, at 76–81. 
203 See McCubbins et al., supra note 112, at 246–47. 
204 See Cross, supra note 134, at 1303–04; McCubbins et al., supra note 112, at 246–47. 
205 See Burke, supra note 19, at 173–74; Kagan, supra note 21, at 49; Farhang, 
supra note 2, at 225. 
684 LEWIS & CLARK LAW REVIEW [Vol. 17:3 
ambitious policy initiatives.206 Summarizing this literature, Sven Steinmo 
concludes that an American lawmaking system “replete with veto 
points . . . gives huge power to interests wishing to stop, alter, or modify 
governmental action,” and consequently by the time controversial or 
ambitious policy initiatives “wheedle their way through the labyrinth and 
past so many veto points,” they often will have been scaled back to satisfy 
multiple gatekeepers.207 
This institutional environment has consequences for legislative 
choices concerning the mobilization of public versus private power in 
pursuit of legislative goals, and for the expenditure of public money. A 
number of studies of the American welfare state have argued persuasively 
that, as compared to direct governmental expenditures on publicly 
funded welfare state programs, laws privatizing the delivery of social 
benefits—such as through tax incentives for private employment-based 
benefit plans—are more likely to attract the broad cross-party support 
necessary to clear the labyrinth of veto points in the lawmaking process.208 
One reason for this is that raising tax revenue for new spending is 
frequently, and certainly increasingly, controversial. Like the legislative 
creation of incentives for the private provision of benefits to achieve 
welfare state goals, the legislative creation of incentives for private 
litigation to achieve regulatory state goals, by reducing or eliminating the 
need to raise tax revenue, can facilitate the broad coalition-building 
necessary to enact a new regulatory law.209 
V. Examples of Enforcement Regimes 
A. Why the Sectoral Approach? 
As we discussed in Part I, the desire to avoid “abstract speculation” and 
the need to make our account of private enforcement manageable are 
important reasons why, early on, we decided to take a sectoral approach, 
choosing a few areas to study from a much longer list (which itself is not 
exhaustive) of legal domains in which private enforcement plays a role. 
Equally important, however, is our conviction, also discussed in Part I, that 
 
206 See, e.g., Sean Farhang & Ira Katznelson, The Southern Imposition: Congress and 
Labor in the New Deal and Fair Deal, 19 Stud. Am. Pol. Dev. 1, 1 (2005); Victoria C. 
Hattam, Labor Visions and State Power: The Origins of Business Unionism in 
the United States (1993); Robert C. Lieberman, Shifting the Color Line: Race 
and the American Welfare State (1998). 
207 Steinmo, supra note 200, at 126. 
208 See Jacob S. Hacker, The Divided Welfare State: The Battle over Public 
and Private Social Benefits in the United States 43–44 (2002); Christopher 
Howard, The Hidden Welfare State: Tax Expenditures and Social Policy in 
the United States 9–10 (1997). 
209 See Burke, supra note 19, at 15–16; Farhang, supra note 2, at 154–55; Melnick, 
supra note 102, at 399–400. 
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regulatory design has to be tailored to the particular social and legal contexts 
in which unremedied systemic problems arise. 
Private enforcement of government-initiated or sanctioned policy 
potentially covers a virtually limitless array of policy areas, from areas such as 
anti-discrimination law (employment, housing, education, access to public 
facilities, etc.) through banking regulation, consumer protection, 
environmental protection, labor relations, occupational safety, and public 
health. We have identified almost 400 distinct enforcement regimes specified 
in federal legislation between 1947 and 2002.210 Table 1 summarizes 
information on the nature of those enforcement regimes. As the table shows, 
24% of the enforcement regimes include private enforcement mechanisms, 
although only about one-tenth of those rely exclusively on private 
enforcement.211 
As suggested by Table 1, many areas of regulation could involve private 
enforcement in one way or another. The specifics of regulation and 
regulatory enforcement (the enforcement regime) vary from area to area. 
There is no reasonable way to provide a comprehensive overview of the 
specifics of regulation in all, or even many, of the areas in which private 
enforcement is used. Consequently, we have chosen to focus on two specific 
areas: employment discrimination and consumer protection vis-à-vis unfair or 
deceptive acts and practices (UDAP). In the former, federal law provides a 
primary role for private enforcement while in the latter, private enforcement 
is largely through state law, at least with regard to general UDAP statutes.212 
Our selection of these two areas was somewhat arbitrary, although our hope 
was that we would find useful bodies of empirical research to inform our 
discussion. Although this hope was fulfilled to a significant degree for 
employment discrimination (at least for enforcement under federal statutes), 
we were disappointed by the limited empirical research we found regarding 
UDAP statutes. As we will discuss, although there is a healthy empirical 
literature on the experience of consumer problems and the actions taken 
with regard to those problems, there is little research focused specifically on 
UDAP enforcement (or that even allows one to separate out UDAP issues 
from ordinary consumer problems with malfunctioning or unsatisfactory 
products). Although a substantial number of the problems consumers 
experience might be due to deceptive or unfair practices by sellers, most of 
the research is framed simply in terms of consumer dissatisfaction with 
products or services, and what consumers do to redress those dissatisfactions. 
 
210 Sean Farhang identified these enforcement regimes in 333 laws passed by 
Congress between 1947 and 2002 that David Mayhew has labeled as “important” 
legislation. David R. Mayhew, Divided We Govern: Party Control, Lawmaking, 
and Investigations, 1946–2002, 52–73 (2d ed. 2005). 
211 See infra Table 1. 
212 There are many specialized statutes at the federal level dealing with areas such 
as banking, credit, and debt collection, that do provide for private enforcement, but 
our decision was to focus on enforcement of the general UDAP statutes rather than 
the specialized statutes. 
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TABLE 1. Federal Regulatory Enforcement Regimes; 1947–2002 
Private 
Suits 
(PS) 
PS with 
Fee 
Shifts* 
PS with 
Damages 
Enhance*
PS with 
Fee Shift 
and 
Enhance*
Govt 
Suits 
Admin 
Sanctions
Pure 
Private 
Suits 
Pure Govt 
Enfor. (suits 
or admin) 
Hybrid 
(priv & 
pub) 
Number 
of 
Regimes 
All Regimes 24 73 33 26 65 68 3 76 21 623 
SOCIAL v. ECON N=623 
Economic 
Regulation  20 61 50 36 63 71 4 80 16 142 
Social 
Regulation 27 76 29 24 65 67 3 73 23 467 
BY POLICY AREA N=609** 
Labor 41 60 75 5 59 36 92 
Communications 39 86 54 4 61 36 28 
Civil Rights 34 70 52 0 66 35 58 
Environmental 34 68 78 4 66 30 50 
Consumer 
Protection 30 76 67 3 70 27 33 
Banking  28 60 81 7 72 21 43 
Energy 18    82 65 0 82 18 17 
Transportation 19    38 69 6 81 13 16 
Public Health & 
Safety 17    60 79 0 83 17 42 
Elections 9    68 55 0 91 9 22 
National 
Security 8    100 62 0 92 8 13 
Food and Drug 0    54 89 0 100 0 37 
Aviation 0    83 78 0 100 0 12 
Securities/ 
Commodities  0    54 71 0 100 0 35 
Other 22    61 56 6 78 17 125 
 N=623 
* The denominator for these percentages is the number of regimes with private civil actions, not total regimes. 
**14 observations could not be characterized as social or economic regulation.  
 
Notes to Table 1 
Laws coded are from the Mayhew “important legislation,” which 
totaled 333 laws from 1947–2002. These laws are deemed by Mayhew to 
be the most significant pieces of legislation in the postwar period 
according to criteria discussed in Divided We Govern (Mayhew, supra note 
210). Of the 333 laws, 189 were found to have regulatory provisions 
(defined broadly to mean mandatory commands/prohibitions). These 
189 laws contained 795 enforcement regimes—distinct sets of regulatory 
commands within the law governed by distinct enforcement provisions. 
The unit of analysis in the table is the enforcement regime. Excluded 
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from the 795 regimes are 172 observations for which administrative 
rulemaking was the only implementation provided, or for which the law 
did not provide any enforcement for the prohibitions. This yielded 
623 regimes with enforcement provisions, which is the data reflected 
in the table. 
 
Below are the definitions of the column headings: 
 
 Private Suits: Percentage of regimes that provide for private civil suits, 
including ones that also provide for government enforcement. 
 
 Fee Shifts: The percentage of Private Suits with fee-shifting provisions, 
including awards to prevailing plaintiff, prevailing party, or any party. 
 
 Damages Enhancements: The percentage of Private Suits with damages 
enhancements, defined as double, triple, statutory, punitive, or 
exemplary damages. 
 
 Fee Shifts AND Damages Enhancements: The percentage of Private Suits 
with fee shifts AND damages enhancements. 
 
 NOTE: The above four percentages are not provided in the table 
broken down by specific policy areas because the number of observations 
with private rights of action at the level of individual policy areas is 
insufficient for the proportions with fees and damages to be meaningful. 
 
 Government Suits: Percentage of regimes in which the Attorney 
General or an administrative agency may bring a lawsuit (whether for 
civil or criminal penalties). 
 
 Administrative Sanctions: Percentage of regimes with administrative 
sanctions, including civil penalties, inspections, recalls, license 
revocation, citations, seizure, cease and desist, injunctions, and equitable 
relief. A large majority, but not all, of these contained express 
authorizations for administrative hearings. 
 
 Pure Private Enforcement: Percentage of regimes with Private Suits but 
NO government enforcement (no Government Suits or Administrative 
Sanctions). 
 
 Pure Government Enforcement: Percentage of regimes with Government 
Suits and/or Administrative Sanctions, but NO Private Suits. 
 
 Hybrid: Percentage of regimes with Private Suits, alongside Government 
Suits and/or Administrative Sanctions. 
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In the section of the table broken down by social and economic 
regulation, the two types are defined as follows: Social regulation 
typically cuts across different industries and sectors, and is generally 
aimed at problems of externalities and public goods, the promotion of 
public health and safety, consumer protection, environmental 
protection, equal opportunity, and quality of life. Economic 
regulation typically targets the regulation of markets and industries, 
working to promote market stability, efficiency, and competition. 
Excluded from this table were 14 observations that could not be 
classified as either social or economic regulation (they mainly 
addressed national security). 
B. Employment Discrimination 
1. The Statutory Framework 
The foundational decisions about implementation of federal job 
discrimination laws were made in the landmark Civil Rights Act (CRA) 
of 1964. CRA’s Title VII bars job discrimination based on race, 
gender, national origin, or religion, and relies on a hybrid 
enforcement framework including both private and public 
enforcement, and both administrative and judicial process.213 It is, 
however, primarily dependent on private lawsuits for enforcement. We 
first lay out the current rules governing Title VII enforcement, and in 
a subsequent section we discuss what motivated legislators to construct 
this statutory enforcement framework, as well as how the framework 
has evolved over time. 
A person wishing to pursue a job discrimination claim under Title 
VII must first file a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (EEOC).214 The EEOC provides notice to the accused 
employer and conducts a preliminary investigation to ascertain 
whether there is “reasonable cause” to believe the statute has been 
violated. If it reaches a finding that no reasonable cause exists, the 
agency notifies the parties and issues the complainant a “right to sue” 
letter, and he or she is free to bring a civil action in federal court.215 If 
the agency does find reasonable cause to believe that the statute was 
violated, it attempts to facilitate a voluntary settlement of the dispute 
through an informal process of conciliation.216 The EEOC lacks the 
authority to issue enforceable orders based on its findings. If the agency is 
unsuccessful in bringing about a settlement, it is authorized to act as  
 
213 Pub. L. No. 88-352, tit. VII, 78 Stat. 253-66 (1964) (codified as amended at 42 
U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e-17) (2006). 
214 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (2006). 
215 Filing a Lawsuit, U.S. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n, http://www.eeoc.gov/ 
employees/lawsuit.cfm. 
216 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (2006). 
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prosecutor in a federal civil action on behalf of the employee, or, in 
the alternative, the agency will issue the complaining party a right to 
sue letter. If the claimant elects to file a private suit in federal court, 
proceedings are “de novo,” and available remedies under the current 
version of Title VII include injunctive relief, back pay, compensatory 
and punitive damages, and attorneys’ fees, and plaintiffs seeking 
compensatory or punitive damages are entitled to trial by jury.217 
A number of other federal statutes provide additional protections 
against and remedies for job discrimination. The Rehabilitation Act of 
1973, prohibiting employment discrimination based on disability by 
the federal government and federal contractors, and the Americans 
with Disabilities Act of 1990, prohibiting employment discrimination 
based on disability in the private sector and by states, simply 
incorporated Title VII’s enforcement and remedial provisions by 
reference.218 Such claims are thus governed by the enforcement 
framework set forth above. The Equal Pay Act of 1963 (barring pay 
discrimination against women) and the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act of 1967 (barring job discrimination against persons 
age 40 or older) also follow a largely private enforcement model, with 
a similar administrative process as described above.219 Two federal civil 
rights laws passed during the Reconstruction period also provide some 
protections from job discrimination. The Civil Rights Act of 1866220 
guaranteed newly freed slaves the right that “is enjoyed by white 
citizens” to make and enforce contracts, which was interpreted by 
courts beginning around 1970 to prohibit race (and only race) 
discrimination in private employment.221 The Civil Rights Act of 1871, 
providing a cause of action against state actors for the violation of any 
federal rights, encompasses within its vast scope suits by state 
employees against state governments for violation of constitutional 
rights, including discrimination in the terms and conditions of 
employment in violation of the equal protection clause.222 With respect 
to enforcement of these statutory provisions, the Civil Rights Act of 1871 
contains an express private right of action, while the Supreme Court 
 
217 Remedies for Employment Discrimination, U.S. Equal Emp’t Opportunity 
Comm’n, http://www.eeoc.gov/employees/remedies.cfm. 
218 Rehabilitation Act, Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355 (1973) (codified as 
amended at 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2006)); Americans with Disabilities Act, Pub. L. No. 
101-336, § 107, 104 Stat. 327, 336 (1990). 
219 Equal Pay Act, Pub. L. No. 88-38, 77 Stat. 56 (1963) (codified as amended at 
29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (2006)); Age Discrimination in Employment Act, Pub. L. 90-202, 
81 Stat. 602 (1967) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–634 (2006)). 
220 Ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27  (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2006)). 
221 See Sanders v. Dobbs Houses, Inc., 431 F.2d 1097 (5th Cir. 1970); Waters v. 
Wis. Steel Works of Int’l Harvester Co., 427 F.2d 476, 483 (7th Cir. 1970). 
222 Ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006)); see 
Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Serv., 436 U.S. 658, 690–92 (1978). 
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implied a private right of action under the Civil Rights Act of 1866.223 
Neither statute authorizes the federal government to prosecute 
enforcement actions in court, nor has either statute been amended to 
provide for administrative evaluation of claims. These Reconstruction 
civil rights laws can provide a number of significant benefits in 
addition to those conferred by the other federal employment 
discrimination statutes, including more extensive economic damages, 
longer statutes of limitations, and coverage of a broader range of 
employment relationships.224 
The federal statutes governing job discrimination are overlaid by 
a set of state statutes of varying substantive reach and heterogeneous 
enforcement provisions. Every U.S. state but Alabama has statutory 
prohibitions against job discrimination on the grounds regulated by 
Title VII (race, national origin, gender, and religion).225 Some 
important differences between state and federal law arise where state 
statutes go beyond federal statutes and provide additional protections 
and remedies.226 
There are also significant differences in enforcement provisions. 
Of 28 states with fair employment practice laws in 1964 (i.e., pre-
existing Title VII), 21 used the administrative cease-and-desist model, 
4 used only criminal and no civil sanctions, and 3 lacked enforcement 
provisions and were strictly voluntary.227 None contained a private 
right of action.228 As state job discrimination statutes spread across the 
nation after 1964, they continued to rely heavily on administrative 
authority, but they shifted toward a hybrid approach in which private 
lawsuits would also play a significant role, and this shift included 
amending many pre-1964 state statutes to add private rights of 
action.229 All state laws provide that an agency or department will 
handle complaints of discrimination.230 Most states have fair 
 
223 Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 459–60 (1975). 
224 See Harold S. Lewis, Jr. & Elizabeth J. Norman, Civil Rights Law and 
Practice 11–19 (2d ed. 2004). 
225 See ELT, 50-State Survey of Discrimination Laws, http://www.elt.com/resources/ 
integrity-suite/discrimination-laws/. 
226 See John F. Buckley & Ronald M. Green, 1998 State by State Guide to 
Human Resources Law (1998); George Rutherglen, Employment Discrimination 
Law: Visions Of Equality In Theory And Doctrine 244–47 (3d ed. 2010). 
227 See Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n, Legislative History of Titles VII 
and XI of Civil Rights Act of 1964 5–6 (1968) [hereinafter EEOC]; Bureau of 
Nat’l Affairs, State Fair Employment Laws and Their Administration: Texts, 
Federal State Cooperation, Prohibited Acts 4 (1964). 
228 Farhang, supra note 2, at 85. 
229 Sean Farhang, Private Lawsuits, General Deterrence, and State Capacity: Evidence 
from Job Discrimination Litigation 2–3 (U.C. Berkeley, Goldman School of Public Policy 
Working Paper No. GSPP10-009, 2010) (on file with author). 
230 See General Accounting Office, Office of the General Counsel, Sexual-
Orientation-Based Employment Discrimination: States’ Experience With 
Statutory Prohibitions 6 (1997), http://www.gao.gov/assets/90/87121.pdf. 
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employment practice commissions with far greater administrative 
power than the EEOC, typically including the authority to adjudicate 
claims, issue cease-and-desist orders, and provide a broad range of 
remedies, including injunctive relief, monetary damages, and 
attorneys’ fees.231 A large majority of states have incorporated private 
enforcement into their job discrimination statutes.232 
2. Legislative Motivations for Creating the Title VII Framework 
Recent scholarship has investigated the motivation behind 
Congress’s massive reliance on private litigation, with very modest 
administrative powers, in the implementation of federal job 
discrimination laws, starting with Title VII of the CRA of 1964, and 
escalating in the CRA of 1991 when Title VII was last importantly 
amended.233 We draw on this work for the summary account provided 
below. Consistent with the discussion of separation-of-powers 
institutions in Part IV.D, the evidence shows that ideological and 
institutional conflict between Congress and the President has 
repeatedly—over time, in many different areas of civil rights, and 
across multiple configurations of party control of Congress and the 
presidency—been a central cause of Congress’s self-conscious 
mobilization of private lawsuits at the expense of administrative 
power.234 It also shows that the combination of fear of bureaucratic 
drift and concern about the public expense of administrative 
implementation has encouraged reliance on private enforcement. 
In 1964, liberal civil rights advocates wanted a job discrimination 
enforcement regime centered on strong administrative adjudicatory 
powers, modeled on the National Labor Relations Board, with no 
private lawsuits. This preference was reflected in the job 
discrimination bill initially introduced by liberal Democrats.235 At the 
time, the Democratic party, which held a majority in both chambers, 
was sharply divided over civil rights, with its southern wing deeply 
committed to killing any job discrimination (or other civil rights) bill. 
In light of these insurmountable intraparty divisions, passage of the 
 
231 See Buckley & Green, supra note 226, at 4–138; Rutherglen, supra note 226, 
at 246. 
232 See Andrea Catania, State Employment Discrimination Remedies and Pendent 
Jurisdiction Under Title VII: Access to Federal Courts, 32 Am. U. L. Rev. 777, 819–32 
(1983); Deborah Thompson Eisenberg, Opening the Doors to the Local Courthouse: 
Maryland’s New Private Right of Action for Employment Discrimination, 9 U. Md. L.J. Race 
Religion Gender & Class 7, 7–8 (2009); General Accounting Office, supra note 
230, at 6–7. 
233 See Farhang, supra note 2, at 94–128. 
234 Id. at 78. 
235 A Bill to Prohibit Discrimination in Employment in Certain Cases Because of 
Race, Religion, Color, National Origin, Ancestry or Age, H.R. 405, 88th Cong. (1963). 
See Developments in the Law: Employment Discrimination and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964, III. Procedure Under Title VII, 84 Harv. L. Rev. 1195, 1196 n.7, 1250–75 (1971). 
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CRA of 1964 depended on conservative Republicans joining non-
southern Democrats in support of the bill.236 
Wielding the powers of a pivotal voting bloc, conservative 
Republicans stripped the EEOC of the strong administrative powers 
initially proposed by advocates of the job discrimination title, and 
provided instead for private lawsuits with economic incentives for 
enforcement, including attorney fee awards for prevailing plaintiffs.237 
Generally opposed to bureaucratic regulation of business, 
Republicans also feared that they would not be able to control an 
NLRB-style civil rights agency in the hands of their ideological 
adversaries in the executive branch.238 However, in a political 
environment marked by intense public demand for significant civil 
rights legislation, some meaningful enforcement provisions were 
necessary, and to conservative Republicans private litigation was 
preferable to public bureaucracy, especially in the hands of the 
Kennedy and Johnson administrations, which they thought would be 
overzealous enforcers and would pursue an excessively liberal 
implementation program. Thus, conservative Republican support for 
Title VII was conditioned on a legislative deal that traded private 
lawsuits for public bureaucracy.239 Plaintiffs’ economic recoveries 
would be limited to back pay and attorneys’ fees, and cases would be 
tried to judges rather than juries. 
This choice, grounded in fear among pivotal legislators that the 
President would commandeer a powerful agency to pursue his own 
policy agenda, had long-run transformative effects on the 
enforcement preferences of civil rights advocates. They had initially 
been sanguine about agency implementation and dubious about the 
effectiveness of private enforcement of Title VII, even with attorney 
fee awards for prevailing plaintiffs. Their skepticism about private 
enforcement was based in considerable measure on the long-
recognized gross under-enforcement of Reconstruction era civil rights 
laws, which relied exclusively on private enforcement (although they 
did not allow for recovery of attorneys’ fees). However, developments 
regarding enforcement in the decade following passage of the CRA of 
1964 did not match civil rights advocates’ expectations. In the late 
1960s, they observed a severely underfunded agency lacking the basic 
material resources necessary to carry out its mission. They also 
witnessed a bureaucratic enforcement apparatus apparently not 
committed to using its administrative capacity, however limited, for 
aggressive enforcement.240 Even aside from resource issues, the federal 
 
236 See Farhang, supra note 2, at 94. 
237 Id. at 95. 
238 Id. at 101. 
239 Id. at 118. 
240 See David L. Rose, Twenty-Five Years Later: Where do We Stand on Equal 
Employment Opportunity Law Enforcement?, 42 Vand. L. Rev. 1121, 1133–39 (1989). 
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bureaucracy appeared to them lethargic, establishment-oriented, 
politically timid, and vulnerable to capture. The situation grew 
markedly worse when President Nixon assumed office in 1969. The 
executive branch became more conservative, and civil rights liberals 
began to attack it openly, claiming that it was willfully sabotaging civil 
rights enforcement by the federal bureaucracy. 
Alongside this waning faith in the administrative state, civil rights 
liberals observed levels of private enforcement that far exceeded their 
expectations, as well as courts inclined toward broadly pro-plaintiff 
interpretations of Title VII. The 1964 CRA’s attorney fee provisions 
had the effect of contributing funds to civil rights groups that 
prosecuted lawsuits, bolstering their litigation programs and 
enforcement capacity. Critically, it also brought into being a private, 
for-profit bar to litigate civil rights claims in general, and job 
discrimination claims in particular. Civil rights groups came to view 
the private civil rights bar as a valuable enforcement infrastructure to 
be cultivated and leveraged through fee-shifting rules. 
These developments drove an inversion of civil rights groups’ 
assessment of the relative merits of private litigation versus public 
enforcement, strengthening the former and weakening the latter. 
They mobilized to extend the fee-shifting provisions of Title VII across 
the entire field of civil rights as a way to bolster enforcement and 
obviate dependence on the (then Nixon-Ford) federal bureaucracy, 
which they regarded as not just feeble, but hostile. They secured from 
allies in a Democratically-controlled Congress the extension of 
statutory fee shifting to school desegregation cases in 1972,241 to voting 
rights cases in 1975,242 and then to all other civil rights laws still 
lacking a fee shift in the omnibus Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards 
Act of 1976.243 The latter law added fee-shifting provisions to the Civil 
Rights Acts of 1866 and 1871, both of which, as discussed above, have 
been construed to provide causes of action for job discrimination.244 In 
the early 1970s interest group advocacy to extend the private 
enforcement model of Title VII (introduced by conservative 
Republicans) went beyond civil rights to embrace environmental, 
consumer protection, and “public interest” regulation in general. 
Thus, over roughly a decade following the passage of the 1964 
CRA, fee shifting was expanded and became an entrenched part of 
job discrimination and other civil rights laws. The resulting 
privatization of implementation costs contributed significantly to the 
broad support these laws attracted from legislators in both political 
parties. By the early 1970s budget deficits emerged as a politically 
 
241 Emergency School Aid Act, Pub. L. No. 92-318 § 718, 86 Stat. 354, 369 (1972). 
242 Voting Rights Act of 1975, Pub. L. No 94-73 § 402, 89 Stat. 400, 404 (1975). 
243 Pub. L. No 94-559 § 2, 90 Stat. 2641 (1976). 
244 See supra text accompanying notes 221–22. 
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salient issue, strengthening the hand of conservatives wanting to 
oppose new governmental interventions that would entail spending 
on bureaucracy, and increasing incentives for all legislators to 
privatize the costs of regulatory enforcement by relying on private 
enforcement regimes.245 In debates over civil rights implementation in 
the early to mid 1970s, the budgetary efficiency of private rights of 
action coupled with fee shifting emerged as a key justification on 
which Democrats and Republicans could agree. This efficiency 
justification dovetailed naturally with an anti-bureaucracy theme: fee 
shifting does not add to the federal budget, and it does not grow the 
federal bureaucracy, legislators in both parties argued in unison. 
A major moment of development in Title VII’s enforcement 
regime occurred with the CRA of 1991,246 when Congress built on Title 
VII’s private enforcement framework by adding compensatory and 
punitive damages, and the right to trial by jury, thereby substantially 
increasing the volume of private enforcement. The CRA of 1991 was 
ultimately the result of growing ideological polarization between the 
President and Congress on civil rights policy (among many other 
policy issues). The legislative choice was encouraged by policy conflict 
in the sphere of civil rights throughout the 1980s between a 
predominantly Democratic Congress and the Reagan administration, 
including an acrimonious struggle over control of the EEOC in 
particular and the civil rights bureaucracy in general. It was fueled, 
correspondingly, by ideological conflict between Congress and a 
federal judiciary that grew, with the appointment of many judges by 
President Reagan, increasingly to reflect the administration’s position 
on civil rights. 
In the summer of 1989, a newly ascendant conservative Supreme 
Court majority rendered a series of decisions curtailing Title VII’s 
private enforcement regime that would clearly have the effect of 
reducing private enforcement.247 Civil rights groups and their allies in 
Congress responded decisively by enacting the CRA of 1991, not only 
overriding most of the offending court decisions, but also adding new 
monetary damages and jury trial provisions with the express goal of 
increasing private enforcement. Explicitly pointing to subversion of 
government enforcement by EEOC leadership and the President, and 
the failure of congressional oversight to remedy the situation, civil 
rights advocates elected to mobilize private litigants and their 
attorneys, using economic incentives, to do what the administrative 
state would not.248 
 
245 See Melnick, supra note 102, at 399–400. 
246 Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166 § 102, 105 Stat. 1071, 1072–73 
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a)). 
247 See, e.g., Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Antonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989). 
248 See Note, The Civil Rights Act of 1991: The Business Necessity Standard, 106 Harv. 
L. Rev. 896 (1993). 
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Thus, the claim that legislative-executive competition for control 
of the bureaucracy within the American separation-of-powers system  
causes Congress to rely on private litigation for statutory enforcement, 
as an alternative or adjunct to public enforcement, is strongly borne 
out by the story of federal job discrimination legislation (and civil 
rights legislation more broadly). The evidence further suggests that 
concerns about bureaucratic drift—resulting from such factors as 
bureaucratic laziness, timidity, or capture—also contributed to the 
choice to rely on private enforcement. At times budgetary concerns 
also encouraged private enforcement as an alternative to raising 
revenue to underwrite administrative capacity. Finally, the events 
leading to passage of the CRA of 1991 powerfully illustrate the way in 
which growing ideological polarization between the political parties 
(and therefore between Congress and the President during periods of 
divided government) has contributed to the remarkable growth in 
private enforcement litigation since the late 1960s, noted in Part IV.C. 
That polarization cannot be better encapsulated than by President 
Reagan’s battle with congressional Democrats over civil rights policy 
in the 1980s. As discussed below, the resulting CRA of 1991 helped to 
catapult job discrimination suits to their current position among the 
most common types of litigation in federal court. 
3. Empirical Research on Private Enforcement of Job Discrimination 
Statutes 
In this subsection we discuss what is known about job 
discrimination litigation from empirical research focusing on (1) the 
extent of job discrimination litigation, (2) whether job discrimination 
litigation is an effective regulatory tool, and (3) whether it is an 
effective vehicle to provide relief to victims of discrimination. 
Private actions enforcing federal civil rights in employment 
statutes are one of the largest categories of suit reflected in statistics 
compiled by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts. In the 
decade from 2001 to 2010, there were an average of 17,253 such suits 
per year, 98% of which were privately prosecuted, with 2% prosecuted 
by the EEOC or the Department of Justice.249 There are no data 
available on the volume of litigation under state employment 
discrimination laws that permit a nationwide assessment of how much 
private enforcement exists at the state level. However, one very recent 
and quite extensive study of the implementation of job discrimination 
statutes in California does permit such an assessment.250 It is possible 
to estimate, extrapolating from data in the study, that roughly 42,800 
private job discrimination suits were filed in California state courts in 
 
249 Judicial Business of the U.S. Courts, 2001–2010, United States Courts, 
http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/FederalJudicialCaseloadStatistics/ 
FederalJudicialCaseloadStatistics_Archive.aspx. 
250 See Blasi & Doherty, supra note 20, at 50. 
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the 11 years from 1997 to 2007.251 Data compiled by the Administrative 
Office of the United States Courts indicates that during the same 
period there were 12,128 job discrimination suits filed in California’s 
four federal district courts.252 Thus, during this period about 78% of 
job discrimination suits in California were filed in state courts.253 A 
work sharing agreement between the EEOC and the California agency 
that handles job discrimination claims, whereby a charge can be cross-
filed with both agencies while only one processes the claim, makes it 
difficult to generalize from California about the balance between 
federal and state job discrimination lawsuits. 
This suggests that, in at least some parts of the country, state 
courts are an important locus of private enforcement of job 
discrimination laws. However, we think that it would be a mistake to 
generalize from the case of California, for it is likely among the states 
where the federal-state balance on private enforcement of job 
discrimination laws is most skewed toward state court litigation. 
California is among the states with much more extensive job 
discrimination prohibitions than exist under federal law—including 
discrimination based on association, marital status, and sexual 
orientation—and its job discrimination laws reach employers that 
have too few employees to trigger coverage by federal statutes.254 
Further, it is widely believed in the U.S. that plaintiffs’ lawyers tend to 
regard state courts as more ideologically hospitable to their claims 
than federal courts, and given California’s liberal political 
environment, this is likely to be more true in California than in most 
other states. Finally, it must be remembered that some states’ laws 
provide no private right of action at all. 
 
251 Our rounded estimate is based upon the following. Under California law, it is 
necessary to file a complaint with the state administrative agency prior to filing a 
lawsuit, but claimants are free to request a right to sue letter immediately upon filing. 
There were 212,144 administrative charges of discrimination filed with the state 
agency in California in the 12 years from 1997 to 2008. Blasi & Doherty, supra note 
20, at 26. In order to match the period for which we have data on federal job 
discrimination filings in California, discussed later in this paragraph of the text, we 
subtract the mean value of one year’s filings during this period (17,679) to estimate 
that 194,465 charges were filed from 1997 to 2007. Based upon sampling, Blasi and 
Doherty estimate that at least 22% of these charges were followed by a private lawsuit 
in state court. Id. at 11. Thus, our rough estimate is that for the period 1997 to 2007, 
22% of 194,465 charges led to 42,782 state court job discrimination suits filed by 
private plaintiffs. 
252 Federal Court Cases: Integrated Data Base, maintained by the Inter-University 
Consortium for Political and Social Research, http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/ 
icpsrweb/landing.jsp. 
253 Id. 
254 See Marjorie Gelb & JoAnne Frankfurt, California’s Fair Employment and Housing 
Act: A Viable State Remedy For Employment Discrimination, 34 Hastings L.J. 1055, 1055–
56 (1983). 
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Figure 1 plots (1) the annual number of administrative charges 
filed with the EEOC under all statutes that it administers, (2) 
administrative charges filed under Title VII, (3) privately prosecuted  
job discrimination lawsuits in federal court, and (4) such lawsuits 
prosecuted by the EEOC or the Department of Justice.255 Note that the 
scales for lawsuits and administrative charges are different, with the 
number of suits reflected on the left y-axis, and the number of EEOC 
charges reflected on the right y-axis. Prior to 1978, Title VII was the 
only statute administered by the EEOC. In 1978, as noted above, 
Congress shifted administration of the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act from the Department of Labor to the EEOC, and 
thus prior to 1978 the plots of Title VII charges and of all EEOC 
charges are coextensive. After 1978 the plot of all charges begins to 
exceed the plot of Title VII charges as age claims flowed into the 
EEOC’s administrative system. The Americans with Disabilities Act’s 
job discrimination provisions became effective in July 1992, and thus 
after 1992 the plot of all EEOC charges begins to exceed the plot of 
Title VII charges by a wider margin as disability claims flowed into the 
EEOC’s administrative system. 
The statutory bases for the lawsuits in the figure include all the 
statutes mentioned in the last paragraph, and also suits brought under 
the Civil Rights Acts of 1866 and 1871, which have no EEOC filing 
requirement. The number of job discrimination suits mainly sloped 
upward from 1970 to 1983, with a plateau in the middle of that 
period; gradually declined from 1983 to 1991; shot up sharply from 
1991 to 1997; and has declined since then, possibly plateauing in the 
last few years. Regarding the post-1991 rise, as we discuss below, the 
CRA of 1991’s addition of new damages and jury trials to Title VII is 
clearly part of the cause. The 1992 effective date for the Americans 
with Disability Act’s employment provisions also contributed, bringing 
a new type of claim into the legal system. The post-1997 decline is 
notable, but we hazard no explanation for it here; it is susceptible to 
many theoretically plausible accounts among which we cannot 
adjudicate. 
 
 
 
255 Data for the EEOC charge figures for 1970 to 2002 were provided to us by the 
EEOC’s Office of Research, Information and Planning, and for 2003 to 2010 they 
were obtained from the EEOC’s website. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 Charges, 
U.S. Equal Emp’t  Opportunity Comm’n, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/ 
enforcement/index.cfm. Data on job discrimination lawsuits for the years 1970 to 
2000 were drawn from the Federal Court Cases: Integrated Data Base, supra note 252, and 
for the years 2001–2010 they were drawn from Judicial Business of the U.S. Courts, 2001–
2010, produced by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts. 
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FIGURE 1: Trends in Job Discrimination Litigation 
 
 
Several studies have evaluated the effects of the CRA of 1991’s 
amendments to Title VII—which added compensatory and punitive 
damages, and jury trials—on private enforcement activity. Farhang 
examined the influence of the CRA of 1991 on the volume of private Title 
VII charges filed with the EEOC from 1980 to 2002.256 As previously 
discussed, such administrative filings are a legal precondition to filing an 
action in federal court, although they do not reveal whether a court action 
was subsequently filed: 
A substantial proportion of federal employment discrimination 
claims are settled after an EEOC charge is filed because of the threat 
of litigation, but without formal litigation being instituted.257 Indeed, 
it is well-recognized that potential liability ‘in the shadow of the law,’ 
without formal legal action, profoundly shapes whether and how 
cases settle without litigation.258 
 
256 See Farhang, supra note 14, at 16–18. 
257 Id. at 16. No data exist that would allow an estimate of the percentage of 
EEOC charges that are dropped by claimants after the administrative proceeding in 
the absence of any redress offered by the respondent rather than as part of a 
settlement. 
258 Id.; see Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the 
Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 Yale L. J. 950, 950–53 (1979). 
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Because EEOC filings reflect the fulfillment of a formal legal 
precondition to litigation, they capture both cases that ultimately enter 
litigation and those that settle after the threat of litigation is invoked. The 
study reports that passage of the CRA of 1991 brought about a statistically 
and substantively significant increase in Title VII charges filed in all four 
protected categories (gender, race, national origin, and religion). In 
aggregate, it increased total Title VII complaints by 58%.259 Farhang and 
Spencer evaluate the impact of the CRA of 1991 on the probability that 
Title VII plaintiffs are represented by counsel in litigation.260 Analyzing 
cases filed in the Northern and Eastern Districts of California between 
1980 and 2000, they find that the CRA of 1991 substantially increased the 
probability that Title VII plaintiffs would be represented by counsel. 
Consistent with the framework we set out in Part IV.C, together these 
studies show that provisions in private enforcement regimes affecting the 
value of claims can significantly influence both the volume of private 
enforcement activity, and the ability of claimants to obtain counsel. 
There is also a body of work investigating the effects of job 
discrimination litigation on the organizations sued, primarily with an eye 
to assessing whether litigation is an effective regulatory tool (we discussed 
the theoretical debate surrounding this issue in Parts IV.A and B). There is 
substantial literature in organizational sociology evaluating the ways in 
which organizations have responded to civil rights laws prohibiting 
employment discrimination. It has produced considerable evidence that 
passage of Title VII of the CRA of 1964, and subsequent job discrimination 
laws modeled on it, caused the development and diffusion of formal rules, 
policies, and positions that were ostensibly calculated to reshape personnel 
decision-making in organizations to improve compliance with equal 
employment opportunity laws, or at least the appearance of it.261 Such 
policies include, for example: efforts aimed at increasing objectivity in 
evaluating employee performance, setting pay, and awarding promotions; 
policies providing for formal internal review of complaints of employment 
discrimination, among other grievances; programs for training managers 
and staff about compliance with civil rights laws; and policies formally 
establishing responsibility for improving opportunities for women and 
racial minorities in the workplace. This literature acknowledges and 
grapples with the question of whether such formalized employment 
 
259 Farhang, supra note 14, at 26–27. 
260 See Sean Farhang & Douglas Spencer, Univ. of Cal., Berkeley, Economic 
Recovery Rules and Attorney Representation in Job Discrimination Litigation, 
Presentation at American Law & Econ. Assoc. (May 19, 2012), available at 
http://www.dougspencer.org/workingpapers/FarhangSpencer-ALEA.pdf. 
261 See, e.g., Lauren B. Edelman, Legal Ambiguity and Symbolic Structures: 
Organizational Mediation of Civil Rights Law, 97 Am. J. Soc. 1531, 1537 (1992); 
Alexandra Kalev et al., Best Practices or Best Guesses? Assessing the Efficacy of Corporate 
Affirmative Action and Diversity Policies, 71 Am. Soc. Rev. 589, 590, 595 (2006); John R. 
Sutton & Frank Dobbin, The Two Faces of Governance: Responses to Legal Uncertainty in 
U.S. Firms, 1955 to 1985, 61 Am. Soc. Rev. 794, 798–99 (1996). 
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policies actually improve employment opportunities for protected groups, 
or are just symbolic gestures calculated to make employers appear fair and 
provide them a defense in the event of litigation. 
In characterizing the body of research on the regulatory efficacy of job 
discrimination lawsuits, it is useful to distinguish between specific 
deterrence and general deterrence effects of enforcement activity. Specific 
deterrence refers to the effects on the future conduct of the target of 
enforcement, while general deterrence refers to the effects of aggregate 
levels of enforcement activity on the future conduct of members of the 
regulated population, whether or not they have actually been the target of 
enforcement. 
Studies of the specific deterrence effects of job discrimination 
litigation have not distinguished private actions from those prosecuted by 
government officials, nor have they distinguished federal from state court 
lawsuits. Rather, their primary research design has been to compare 
organizations that had been subject to any job discrimination lawsuit with 
those not previously subject to suit, in order to assess whether being sued 
caused organizations to adopt policies calculated to improve compliance 
with job discrimination laws, or whether they actually increased the 
proportion of women and racial minorities in managerial positions 
subsequent to suit. The earliest such studies evaluated whether 
organizations that had been sued were more likely to have policies 
ostensibly aimed at compliance with job discrimination laws than 
organizations that had not been sued. The studies found no specific 
deterrence effects.262 However, as Edelman points out, comparisons across 
organizations subject to suit and those not subject to suit are problematic 
because, although those subject to suit may be prodded into undertaking 
compliance efforts, the worst violators may be more likely to be sued, 
making it difficult to disentangle the countervailing effects.263 
More recent studies of specific deterrence have avoided this problem 
by deploying research designs and methods that evaluate the effects of job 
discrimination suits within organizations over time, and they have also used 
the actual proportion of women and racial minorities in managerial 
positions, rather than the adoption of formal compliance policies, as their 
dependent variable.264 These studies do find specific deterrence effects. 
Examining a large sample of private organizations spanning many 
industries, Dobbin and Kalev find that organizations that have been targets 
of job discrimination lawsuits subsequently increased the proportion of 
 
262 See, e.g., Edelman, supra note 261, at 1563–64; Allison M. Konrad & Frank 
Linnehan, Formalized HRM Structures: Coordinating Equal Employment Opportunity or 
Concealing Organizational Practices?, 38 Acad. Mgmt. J. 787, 807 (1995). 
263 See Edelman, supra note 261, at 1550. 
264 E.g., Kalev & Dobbin, supra note 13, at 857; Sheryl Skaggs, Producing Change or 
Bagging Opportunity? The Effects of Discrimination Litigation on Women in Supermarket 
Management, 113 Am. J. Soc. 1148, 1160–61 (2008). 
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women and racial minorities in management.265 In a study focusing on the 
supermarket industry, Skaggs finds that corporations targeted by sex 
discrimination lawsuits subsequently increased representation of women in 
managerial positions in stores operated by the corporation.266 
Other studies have investigated the general deterrence effects of job 
discrimination lawsuits. In the earliest study of this sort that we found, 
Leonard analyzed changes in employment demographics between 1966 
and 1978, and found that the number of class action Title VII suits 
(aggregating public and private prosecutions) within a state and against a 
defendant in a particular industry was significantly associated with 
employment market gains for African Americans within that state and 
industry.267 Leonard’s findings point to the general deterrence effects of 
class action cases, but they do not speak to the effects of (vastly more 
prevalent) individual suits, or to the issue of the efficacy of private 
litigation as distinct from prosecutions by governmental actors. 
Two recent studies attempt to investigate the issue of general 
deterrence and job discrimination litigation with attention to geographic 
variation, and both find general deterrence effects. Charles Epp, studying a 
large sample of local governmental employers, finds that litigation 
“support structures” in the local community—measured as the size of the 
bar in the locality specializing in suits against government—were 
significantly and positively associated with state governmental employers’ 
propensity to adopt serious measures directed at compliance with 
prohibitions against workplace sexual harassment.268 The U.S. Supreme 
Court has recognized workplace sexual harassment as a form of gender 
discrimination that violates Title VII,269 and it is a substantial source of Title 
VII claims. The compliance measures that Epp analyzed included policies 
requiring the investment of resources, such as grievance procedures, 
employee training, and oversight by legal staff.270 It seems reasonable to 
assume that lawyers specializing in suits against the government will be 
composed entirely, or almost entirely, of private sector lawyers. This 
finding held in an empirical model that controlled for whether an 
employer had actually been sued.271 Although Epp does not include in his 
model a direct measure of aggregate litigation activity in the relevant 
geographic area, his measure of lawyer specialization in the relevant 
 
265 Kalev & Dobbin, supra note 13, at 883. 
266 Skaggs, supra note 264, at 1174. 
267 See Jonathan S. Leonard, Antidiscrimination or Reverse Discrimination: The Impact 
of Changing Demographics, Title VII, and Affirmative Action on Productivity, 19 J. Hum. 
Resources 145, 150–51 (1984). 
268 See Charles R. Epp, Making Rights Real: Activists, Bureaucrats, and the 
Creation of the Legalistic State 193 (2009). 
269 Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66 (1986). 
270 Epp, supra note 268, at 181. 
271 Id. at 239–40. 
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practice area interestingly captures the potential for litigation to be 
mobilized against violators. 
Farhang analyzes a sample of primarily private organizations and 
assesses explanations for their adoption of employment policies that are 
both ostensibly designed to increase employment opportunities for women 
and racial minorities, and that also have been demonstrated, in another 
study, to actually increase the proportion of women and racial minorities 
in managerial positions.272 The policies are affirmative action plans with 
concrete goals and timetables, the creation of at least one full-time position 
responsible for equal employment opportunity compliance within the 
organization; and the establishment of committees and task forces with 
responsibility for improving opportunities for women and racial minorities 
within the organization.273 The study parses privately prosecuted from 
governmentally prosecuted federal lawsuits, and tests the general 
deterrence hypothesis by evaluating the influence of rates of private 
federal job discrimination litigation at the level of the federal judicial 
district.274 It finds, controlling for whether an organization has actually 
been sued, that higher rates of policy adoption by organizations are 
associated with higher rates of private federal job discrimination litigation 
in the districts in which they have offices.275 Together, the Leonard, Epp, 
and Farhang studies arrive at similar conclusions using a variety of 
different research designs and measurement strategies. All three studies 
find general deterrence effects associated with higher levels of private 
enforcement. 
Finally, two empirical studies have attempted to assess how well job 
discrimination plaintiffs fare in the litigation process. Both examined 
federal job discrimination litigation, and both reached the conclusion that 
job discrimination plaintiffs fare badly.276 Clermont and Schwab’s strategy 
of evaluation is to compare job discrimination suits to the rest of the civil 
docket in aggregate.277 They find that job discrimination suits, as compared 
to the mean rates for all other civil cases aggregated together, are less likely 
to settle early, to win on summary judgment, to win at trial, or to win on 
appeal.278 
 
272 See Farhang, supra note 229, at 2–3, 12–13, 29; Kalev et al., supra note 261, at 590. 
273 Kalev et al., supra note 261, at 590. 
274 There are 94 federal districts. 
275 See Farhang, supra note 229, at 26–27. 
276 See Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, How Employment Discrimination 
Plaintiffs Fare in Federal Court, 1 J. Empirical Legal Stud. 429, 429 (2004); Laura 
Beth Nielsen et al., Individual Justice or Collective Legal Mobilization? Employment 
Discrimination Litigation in the Post Civil Rights United States, 7 J. Empirical Legal 
Stud. 175, 176, 188 (2010). 
277 See Clermont & Schwab, supra note 276, at 429–30. 
278 Id. at 440–41. It bears noting here that all civil litigation other than job 
discrimination is quite a broad category (which includes contracts disputes, securities, 
antitrust, banking, consumer, labor, and environmental litigation, among many other 
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Nielsen, Nelson, and Lancaster analyze a large nationwide sample of 
Title VII cases filed in federal district courts between 1988 and 2003, and 
they provide a detailed portrait of litigation outcomes.279 They report that: 
19% of cases are dismissed; 
of cases that continue (81% of overall filings), 50% are settled 
prior to the filing of a summary judgment motion; 
of cases that reach summary judgment (31% of overall filings), 
plaintiffs lose 57% of the time; 
of cases that survive summary judgment (14% of overall filings), 
57% settle prior to trial; and 
of cases that continue to trial (6% of overall filings), plaintiffs 
prevail 33% of the time.280 
The study authors sought to identify settlement amounts, but they were 
able to do so in only 75 of 945 cases in their sample that had settled; the 
median settlement amount for those 75 cases was $30,000.281 We note that 
the mean settlement value reported is based on only 8% of the settled 
cases in the sample, and it seems quite possible that there is selection bias 
at play in whatever process led to disclosure of the settlement figures for 
that 8%.282 
C. Protecting Consumers from Unfair or Deceptive Acts and Practices 
1. Legal Structure 
Dissatisfied consumers may be able to seek redress on a number of 
grounds. These include common law express and implied warranties, 
common law fraud, and actions under statutes specifically designed to 
protect consumers from unfair or deceptive acts and practices (including 
deceptive advertising), either broadly or targeted to specific types of 
products or services. Our focus here is on the enforcement of general 
unfair and deceptive acts or practices statutes (UDAP). 
The “granddaddy” of these statutes is the Federal Trade Commission 
(FTC) Act, originally passed in 1914, which declared unlawful “unfair or 
deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce.”283 The FTC Act 
created procedures to be followed by the Commission along with penalties 
 
types). It is not entirely clear why lower rates of success on the dimensions they 
measure in the area of job discrimination amount to a “sad story,” as they put it. 
279 See Nielsen et al., supra note 276, at 176. 
280 Id. at 184–87. 
281 Id. at 187. 
282 For example, if larger settlements are more likely to be governed by 
confidentiality stipulations—because employers don’t want publicity of large payouts 
to encourage litigation against them, or to signal guilt of the charges of 
discrimination—then the $30,000 figure could be downward-biased to a significant 
extent. 
283 Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914, Pub. L. No. 63-203, § 5, 37 Stat. 717 
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 41–58 (2006)). 
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the Commission could impose if it found persons, partnerships, or 
corporations in violation of the Act. Importantly, although the 
Commission could act on the receipt of complaints of possible violation of 
the FTC Act, that statute did not, and still does not, generally authorize 
private rights of action; that is, beyond complaining to the Commission, 
there is no provision for private enforcement under the FTC Act. There 
are other, more targeted federal statutes that do authorize private rights of 
action; a good example is the Fair Debt Collections Practices Act which 
specifically authorizes private action and provides for actual damages plus 
up to $1,000 additional damages (for an individual bringing an action284) 
and reasonable attorneys’ fees and expenses.285 
Because of the limited nature of the enforcement procedures 
authorized by the FTC Act and the inclination of the FTC to focus on 
issues with broad, national import, the general enforcement of measures to 
protect consumers from unfair and deceptive acts or practices not dealt 
with in a federal statute targeted to a particular set of products or services 
is left primarily to state law. This is illustrated by the widely reported filing 
of a lawsuit against McDonald’s by a mother in California and the Center 
for Science in the Public Interest in December 2010;286 the suit alleged that 
McDonald’s practice of including toys in its “Happy Meals” constituted a 
deceptive practice intended to circumvent parental control and teach 
children unhealthy eating habits.287 The action was filed in California state 
court under several California statutes including California’s False 
 
284 15 U.S.C. § 1692 (2006). In class actions, the statutory penalty can be up to 
the lesser of $500,000 or 1% of the net worth of the debt collector. 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1692k(a)(2)(B) (2006). 
285 Other federal statutes authorizing private rights of action include the Truth in 
Lending Act (15 U.S.C. §§ 1601–1616 (2006)), Consumer Leasing Act (15 U.S.C. 
§ 1667 (2006)), Fair Credit Reporting Act (15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2006)), Equal Credit 
Opportunity Act (15 U.S.C. § 1691 (2006)), Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act 12 
U.S.C. §§ 2601–2617 (2006)), Homeowner’s Protection Act (12 U.S.C. §§ 4901–4910 
(2006)), and the Truth in Savings Act (12 U.S.C. §§ 4301–4313 (2006)). Many of 
these statutes also include public enforcement provisions, often delegating that 
authority to the FTC. 
286 The filing of the suit was reported on several national broadcast outlets 
including National Public Radio, April Fulton, Consumer Group Sues McDonald’s Over 
Happy Meal Toys, NPR (Dec. 15, 2010), http://www.npr.org/blogs/health/2010/ 
12/15/132078519/consumer-group-sues-mcdonalds-over-happy-meal-toys, as well as 
in newspapers both in the U.S. and in other countries. For example The Guardian’s 
Sunday partner, The Observer, covered the case. Dominic Rushe, McDonald’s Sued for 
Tempting Californian Mum’s Daughter with Happy Meals Toys (Dec. 18, 2010), The 
Observer, http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2010/dec/19/mcdonalds-happy-meals-
sued-california; the Financial Times also ran a story on the case, Greg Farrell, 
McDonald’s Sued over Happy Meals (Dec. 15, 2010), Financial Times, http://www. 
ft.com/cms/s/0/36c6170a-0875-11e0-80d9-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2Loky5gER. 
287 Farrell, supra note 286; Rushe, supra note 286. 
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Advertising Law, all of which, unlike federal statutes, authorize private 
rights of action.288 
All of the 50 states have some form of general statute dealing with 
UDAP issues, often referred to as “little FTC Acts.”289 These acts vary from 
state to state, with regard both to scope and to enforcement provisions.290 A 
2009 report prepared for the National Consumer Law Center (NCLC) 
describes these variations and provides a chart summarizing some of the 
key differences among the states which we include as an Appendix.291 As of 
July 1, 2009, all states provided for some measure of private enforcement, 
although several states limit when private enforcement may be undertaken 
(e.g., only when certain vulnerable groups are affected, or only when there 
is some evidence of “public” impact).292 The NCLC report makes clear that 
the nature of the enforcement regime varies from state to state. All states 
(except for Iowa, where there was no private enforcement at the time the 
report was prepared293) allow consumers to recover compensatory 
damages.294 Many states provide for multiple or punitive damages and/or 
statutory damages (i.e., set amounts unrelated to actual damages),295 and 
 
288 Amended Class Action Complaint for Violations of the Unfair Competition 
Law, The Consumers Legal Remedies Act and Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 1, 
Parham v. McDonald’s Corp., No. CGC-10-506178 (Cal. Super. Ct. 2012), 2011 WL 
162213; see Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17204 (West 2008); Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1750–
1780 (West 2009). 
289 See Henry N. Butler & Joshua D. Wright, Are State Consumer Protection Acts Really 
Little-FTC Acts?, 63 Fla. L. Rev. 163, 169–73 (2011) (describing the development of 
state consumer protection laws and their variation); Carolyn L. Carter, Consumer 
Protection in the States: A 50-State Report on Unfair and Deceptive Acts and Practices Statutes, 5 
(2009) National Consumer Law Center, http://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/car_sales/ 
UDAP_Report_Feb09.pdf. 
290 See Butler & Wright, supra note 289, at 169–73. 
291 Carter, supra note 289, at 7–10. For a more detailed analysis of the individual 
state statutes, see Consumer Protection in the States, Appendix B: State-by-State Summaries of 
State UDAP Statutes, Nat’l Consumer Law Ctr. (2009), http://www.nclc.org/images/ 
pdf/udap/analysis-state-summaries.pdf. For an earlier effort to compile comparative 
information on the strength of enforcement regimes under state deceptive trade 
practices legislation, see Anthony Paul Dunbar, Comment, Consumer Protection: The 
Practical Effectiveness of State Deceptive Trade Practices Legislation, 59 Tul. L. Rev. 427 
(1984). 
292 Iowa was the last state to provide for private rights of action, with that state’s 
law (Iowa Code § 714H (2012)) taking effect on July 1, 2009. 2009 Iowa Acts ch. 167, 
H.F. 712, §§ 1-8. 
293 The Iowa statute referenced in the previous footnote provides for an award of 
attorneys’ fees to a prevailing consumer and, if the finder of fact “finds by a 
preponderance of clear, convincing, and satisfactory evidence that a prohibited 
practice or act in violation of this chapter constitutes willful and wanton disregard for 
the rights or safety of another, in addition to an award of actual damages, statutory 
damages up to three times the amount of actual damages.” Iowa Code § 714H.5(4) 
(2012). 
294 Carter, supra note 289, at 7–10. 
295 For a description and analysis employing this data set, see Joshua D. Wright, 
Searle Civil Justice Institute, State Consumer Protection Acts: An Empirical 
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many also provide for attorneys’ fees for consumers who prevail in their 
claims.296 Many states specifically allow class actions under their statutes,297 
and many allow consumers to seek compensation or damages without 
having to prove that they have in some way relied on the deceptive 
information the seller provided. Because of the state-by-state variation, it is 
difficult to make meaningful generalizations about UDAP private 
enforcement regimes beyond the point that they vary. 
 Based on the information from the NCLC report (shown in our 
Appendix), we can say something about variation in the strength of 
enforcement regimes by focusing on the strength of the remedies for 
consumers in each state (shown in the bottom panel of our Appendix). We 
have counted the number of “strong” remedies in each state, counting 
“mixed or undecided” elements as .5, producing a score that ranges from 0 
to 7. Figure 2 shows the distribution of these scores, with one dot 
representing each state. What is evident is that using the National 
Consumer Law Center’s ratings, most states have relatively strong private 
enforcement regimes. We also looked to see if the variation among the 
states correlated with some key political indicators. We found modest 
correlations with a measure of citizen liberalism (0.20) and with a measure 
of states’ tendency to adopt innovative policies (0.38).298 
 
Investigation of Private Litigation: Preliminary Report (2009) 
http://ssrn.com/paper=1708175. 
296 About half the states allow a prevailing defendant to recover its attorneys’ fees, 
but for 22 states this is restricted to cases in which the plaintiff’s claim is determined 
to be frivolous or malicious; 5 states allow two-way fee shifting in consumer cases 
without limiting shifts to the defendants to cases where the plaintiff had in some 
sense behaved badly (this information is from the Searle Center data set, 
supplemented by the authors). Alaska, which is the only American state with a 
general fee-shifting system, allows for recovery of a fraction of a prevailing party’s 
fees; where the plaintiff’s claim is determined to be frivolous or the plaintiff brought 
the action to “obtain a competitive business advantage,” the court can award “full 
reasonable attorney fees at the prevailing reasonable rate.” Alaska Stat. 
§ 45.50.537(c) (2012). Regarding Alaska’s fee-shifting system, see Susanne Di Pietro 
& Teresa W. Carns, Alaska’s English Rule: Attorney’s Fee Shifting in Civil Cases, 13 Alaska 
L. Rev. 33 (1996) (describing the history and application of fee shifting in Alaska). 
297 Presumably class actions would be permitted in other states under general 
procedural rules providing for class actions unless a statute specifically provided 
otherwise. 
298 The citizen liberalism measure is from William D. Berry et al., Measuring 
Citizen and Government Ideology in the American States, 1960–93, 42 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 327, 
327–31 (1998); the measure of innovation is from Jack L. Walker, The Diffusion of 
Innovations Among the American States, 63 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 880, 882–83 (1969). One 
might object that a rating created by the National Consumer Law Center reflects a 
“pro-consumer bias.” Yet, scores we created have a substantial correlation (.477) with 
an index created by researchers at the Searle Center on Law, Regulation, and 
Economic Growth at the Northwestern University School of Law (an organization 
that appears to be more on the pro-business side) that measures aspects of state 
consumer protection laws that reflect both “benefits” and “restrictions” from the 
viewpoint of plaintiffs in consumer actions. See Wright, supra note 295. The Searle 
Center measure, which coded state consumer protection laws in effect in 2004, 
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FIGURE 2: Private Enforcement Strength of State UDAP Laws 
 
Given the variation among the states, one would think that they 
presented a natural laboratory for assessing the impact of enforcement 
regimes with varying characteristics. Unfortunately, to our knowledge there is 
no such research. The core problem is measuring the impact of the 
enforcement regimes because states do not collect in any kind of comparable 
fashion information on enforcement activities, either in the form of 
complaints to consumer protection agencies or lawsuits brought under 
UDAP statutes.299 
 
2. Empirical Research on Private Enforcement Regarding Consumer Problems300 
The empirical literature on consumer protection issues does not single 
out unfair and deceptive practices for specific attention. Rather, that research 
focuses generally on consumer problems and dissatisfaction. There is some 
 
correlated 0.30 with the measure of citizen liberalism and 0.28 with state orientation 
toward policy innovation. 
299 For a discussion of an earlier effort to collect such information, and the 
problems of using the information that was obtained to make systematic comparisons 
among the states, see Dunbar, supra note 291, at 438. 
300 This section borrows generously from a recent review of empirical research 
related to consumer protection. See Stephen Meili, Consumer Protection, in The 
Oxford Handbook of Empirical Legal Research 176 (Peter Cane & Herbert M. 
Kritzer eds., 2010). 
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scattered research related to specific problems that could be labeled unfair or 
deceptive practices, such as disputes with securities dealers301 or arising from 
used-car purchases.302 
The largest body of empirical research dealing with enforcement of 
consumer protection laws focuses on the actions taken by consumers 
themselves in response to problems with products and services. Little of this 
research deals directly with the role of UDAP statutes; it deals instead with 
what consumers do when they are dissatisfied. The broad category of 
research is typically described as dealing with “consumer complaining,” and 
involves work both by scholars interested specifically in consumer behavior303 
and by scholars approaching the question from more of a law-in-action 
perspective.304 Meili summarizes the findings of research on consumer 
complaining: 
[One study found] the most consistent factor in determining the 
likelihood of consumer complaints is problem context; [the] research 
revealed a descending order of complaint probability, beginning with 
non-professional services (the most likely source of complaints), 
followed by products and, lastly, professional services (the least likely 
source of complaints among [these] three categories). Other factors 
identified in various studies include the socio-economic status of the 
consumer, the significance and cost of the purchase (complaints are 
likelier with respect to more expensive products and those perceived by 
the consumer as more significant), the frequency with which the item is 
purchased (i.e., complaints are more likely to be lodged over a less 
regularly purchased item such as an automobile, rather than a 
consistently purchased household item like a cleaning product), the 
longevity of the problem (complaints are more likely the longer a 
problem lingers), the simplicity (or perceived simplicity) of the 
complaint process (the simpler the process, the more likely the 
consumer is to utilize it), and whether the product was purchased on 
credit or with cash (credit users are more likely to lodge complaints).305 
 
301 See, e.g., Jill I. Gross & Barbara Black, When Perception Changes Reality: An 
Empirical Study of Investors’ Views of the Fairness of Securities Arbitration, 2008 J. Disp. 
Resol. 349 (2008). 
302 See, e.g., Kenneth McNeil et al., Market Discrimination Against the Poor and the 
Impact of Consumer Disclosure Laws: The Used Car Industry, 13 Law & Soc’y Rev. 695 
(1978–79). 
303 See, e.g., Ralph L. Day, Modeling Choices Among Alternative Responses to 
Dissatisfaction, 11 Advances Consumer Res. 496 (1984); Joseph Barry Mason & 
Samuel H. Himes, Jr., An Exploratory Behavioral and Socio-Economic Profile of Consumer 
Action About Dissatisfaction with Selected Household Appliances, 7 J. Consumer Aff. 121 
(1973). 
304 See, e.g., Arthur Best, When Consumers Complain (1981); Jack Ladinsky & 
Charles Susmilch, Major Findings of the Milwaukee Consumer Dispute Survey, in 
Consumer Dispute Resolution: Exploring the Alternatives 145 (Larry Ray & 
Deborah Smolover eds., 1983); Arthur Best & Alan R. Andreasen, Consumer Response to 
Unsatisfactory Purchases: A Survey of Perceiving Defects, Voicing Complaints, and Obtaining 
Redress, 11 Law & Soc’y Rev. 701 (1977). 
305 Meili, supra note 300, at 179–80 (citations omitted). 
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Meili goes on to note: 
[T]he extensive empirical research on complaining behavior has 
revealed that third-party dispute mechanisms are more likely to be 
utilized by consumers who are wealthier, white, better educated, better 
informed, younger, more inclined to view complaining in a favorable 
light, not fearful of antagonizing sellers or other providers of goods and 
services, more politically active, and more experienced in the particular 
purchasing category . . . And . . . such mechanisms tend to . . . favor this 
very group of consumers, i.e., consumers who fit into one or more of 
these categories are more likely to prevail after complaining.306 
Although there is nothing specific here about actions in response to 
unfair or deceptive practices, there is no reason to suspect that patterns for 
those types of consumer problems would differ substantially. 
A second general area of empirical research on consumer problems 
deals with the dispute resolution mechanisms consumers employ when a 
complaint to a seller or service provider fails to produce a satisfactory 
resolution. Almost all of that research deals with administrative or private 
dispute resolution mechanisms;307 little of the empirical research deals with 
consumer problems, UDAP or otherwise, that reach the stage of a lawsuit. 
A related point is the growth of contractually-mandated arbitration in 
many of the service agreements (and some purchase contracts) that 
consumers sign.308 Under the Federal Arbitration Act, contractual agreements 
to take disputes to arbitration can trump rights of action in state UDAP 
laws.309 Whether that is true for any specific issue depends on whether the 
claim falls within the scope of the contract’s arbitration clause, a question of 
law that tends to be decided on a case-by-case basis, and that has produced 
decisions cutting in both directions.310 Although there is a body of empirical 
research on consumer arbitration,311 none of that research focuses specifically 
on issues that would be covered under UDAP laws. 
 
306 Id. Meili also notes that there has been research on consumer complaining in 
numerous countries including Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom. Id. at 
181. 
307 See id. at 183. 
308 See id. at 194. 
309 For example, the Supreme Court has ruled that the FAA preempts state law 
holding arbitration clauses that proscribe class arbitration unenforceable. See AT&T 
Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S.Ct. 1740 (2011). 
310 See F. Paul Bland, Jr. et al., Consumer Arbitration Agreements: 
Enforceability and Other Topics 218 (6th ed. 2011). 
311 For a brief review of some recent studies of consumer arbitration, see Sarah 
Rudolph Cole & Theodore H. Frank, The Current State of Consumer Arbitration, 15 Disp. 
Resol. Mag. 30 (Fall 2008). The most recent study, which involved very detailed 
coding of about 300 American Arbitration Association consumer cases (about three 
quarters of which were brought by consumers) did not describe the kinds of issues 
(although it did report the types of businesses involved). See Christopher R. Drahozal 
& Samantha Zyontz, An Empirical Study of AAA Consumer Arbitrations, 25 Ohio St. J. on 
Disp. Resol. 843, 845–46 (2010). 
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One important issue regarding private enforcement in any area is 
whether the enforcement regime produces an appropriate level of 
enforcement, as opposed to either under- or over-enforcement. In a recent 
article, Butler and Johnston argue that current state UDAP laws produce 
over-enforcement, which has negative consequences for consumer welfare.312 
These negative consequences, the authors argue, include higher prices (due 
to costly precautions merchants take to avoid liability) and decreased 
information available to consumers (because merchants and manufacturers 
will limit their advertising to insure they do not make claims that might be 
deemed deceptive and hence subject them to liability under UDAP laws).313 
In work that seeks to join theory with anecdotes, Butler and Johnston point to 
some fairly notorious examples of what many would view as abusive uses of 
UDAP laws, including the case of a government lawyer who sued a 
neighborhood dry cleaner for $54 million under the District of Columbia 
consumer protection law after the cleaner lost a pair of pants.314 Although 
there appears to have been an increase in reported decisions dealing with 
state consumer protection laws in both state and federal courts during the 
2000s, it is well known that statistics based on reported cases are unreliable 
indicators of patterns of litigation.315 Moreover, the report on which the 
authors rely finds that there is substantial variation from state to state,316 with 
almost half the states showing either no increase or a decline in reported 
cases between 2000 and 2007.317 
Another article reports a study that sought to systematically assess 
whether state consumer protection statutes extended protection beyond what 
was provided for in the FTC Act.318 In this study Butler and Wright focused on 
the substance of what was covered by the state acts rather than the 
enforcement regimes created by the acts. Butler and Wright recruited a panel 
of experts that they describe as representing a range of political perspectives; 
they describe their panel as a “shadow Federal Trade Commission” because 
several had experience at or with the FTC.319 The members of this shadow 
FTC reviewed one-page case scenarios of representative cases that would 
constitute potential violations of at least some state consumer statutes.320 The 
panel members reviewed 110 case scenarios (10 of which were based on 
actual FTC enforcement actions) and then indicated (1) whether the 
 
312 See Butler & Johnston, supra note 159, at 35–52. 
313 Id. at 47–51. 
314 Id. at 6. 
315 This point is acknowledged by the author of the report upon which Butler 
and Johnston draw. See Wright, supra note 295, at 16–17. A further problem in 
assessing the meaning of a trend showing increased reporting of cases involving a 
particular issue is that there may be a more general growth in cases being reported by 
Lexis (the source used in the study). 
316 See id. at 21–24. 
317 Id. at 24. 
318 See Butler & Wright, supra note 289, at 178. 
319 Id. at 178–79. 
320 Id. at 178. 
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practice was “unfair or deceptive according to FTC standards,” and (2) 
“whether he or she believed the FTC would initiate an enforcement 
action.”321 The results showed that of the 100 scenarios based on state cases, 
the shadow FTC members found that 42 involved possible illegal conduct 
under the FTC Act; they also found that all 10 of the actual FTC scenarios 
constituted violations.322 Interestingly, the shadow FTC members thought that 
only 16 of the 42 state cases would have led to possible FTC action.323 
From Butler and Wright’s perspective, the fact that state consumer 
protection actions often sanction activities that would not be deemed illegal 
under the Federal Trade Commission Act is indicative of over-enforcement at 
the state level.324 Of course, one could just as easily argue that the provisions 
of the FTC Act provide for inadequate enforcement. Moreover, the fact that 
less than 40% of the possible illegal activities under the FTC Act would lead 
to “possible FTC enforcement” suggests why the FTC Act itself, which does 
not provide for private rights of action, is probably an insufficient vehicle for 
enforcement of laws against unfair and deceptive trade practices. 
A final issue for empirical research related to private enforcement of 
UDAP laws in the United States is the role of consumer class actions. 
Although consumer cases is an area where the small claims class action has 
obvious potential as a mechanism of private enforcement,325 there is relatively 
little empirical research on consumer class actions. Early studies focused on a 
variety of areas other than consumer cases.326 Many consumer class actions 
deal with UDAP issues, and hence it would be a fruitful area for empirical 
research. Still, although some general studies of class actions include 
consumer class actions,327 the literature on consumer cases is thin. This is 
surprising given that consumer cases can involve some of the most 
controversial class-action issues, such as the use of coupon settlements—
where the members of the class receive relatively trivial amounts or forms of 
compensation (typically in the form of coupons for discounts on future 
purchases) while lawyers representing the class receive substantial fees. In 
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325 A RAND Corporation study found that consumer cases constitute about a 
quarter to a third of federal class actions. Deborah R. Hensler et al., Class Action 
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Class Action Settlements and Their Fee Awards, 7 J. Empirical Leg. Stud. 811, 818 (2010). 
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fact, a recent study of federal class action settlements found that 30% of 
consumer (excluding debt collection) cases involved “in-kind” relief 
including vouchers, coupons, gift cards, warranty extensions, merchandise, 
services, and extended insurance policies, the highest of any of the categories 
examined.328 Most of these appear to be cases involving truly small claims, 
which defy plausible grounding in a compensatory rationale. 
We were able to locate only one empirical study focused on consumer 
class actions. Meili looks at lawyers and lead plaintiffs, basing his analysis on 
interviews with 33 lawyers and 20 lead plaintiffs; the former were selected 
from among the membership of the National Association of Consumer 
Advocates.329 The lawyers were asked to select a case they had been involved 
in to discuss during the interviews; “approximately one half of the cases 
involved some form of misrepresentation, fraud, or breach of contract against 
mortgage companies, insurance companies, landlords and various product 
manufacturers. The other half involved abusive debt collection practices, 
credit reporting errors, or discriminatory credit terms.”330 The analysis that 
Meili presents, which focuses on the lawyers’ goals and the relationships 
between the lawyers and the lead plaintiffs, does not single out UDAP-related 
claims for specific discussion.331 Still, some of his findings are interesting, 
particularly the way that lawyers shaped lead plaintiffs’ goals to look beyond 
their individual interests and toward the interests of the class as a whole, and 
the tendency of the lawyers to conflate the client and the larger cause of 
consumer rights. 
VI. Conclusion 
We have provided a great deal of doctrinal, normative, and empirical 
information about private enforcement. Our aim has been to enhance 
understanding of the historical, cultural and political background of private 
enforcement, the reasons why legislators may choose a private enforcement 
(or a hybrid) strategy when they sincerely wish to address an unremedied 
systemic problem, and what features of both the general legal landscape and 
 
328 Fitzpatrick, supra note 325, at 824. The next highest category was antitrust at 
13%; 37% of the consumer class action settlements involved injunctive or declaratory 
relief. None of the debt collection case settlements involved in-kind relief, and only 
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329 Stephen Meili, Collective Justice or Personal Gain? An Empirical Analysis of 
Consumer Class Action Lawyers and Named Plaintiffs, 44 Akron L. Rev. 67, 78–79 (2011) 
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experience running a consumer law clinic at the University of Wisconsin Law School. 
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Movement unto Themselves, in Cause Lawyers and Social Movements 120 (Austin 
Sarat & Stuart A. Scheingold eds., 2006). 
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a particular private enforcement regime are likely to determine whether that 
regime is effective. 
If within a single legal system, regulatory policy and strategy can only 
sensibly be determined on a sectoral basis, and if the choice between public 
and private enforcement (or a hybrid approach) depends on a host of 
context-dependent variables, and if the efficacy of a private enforcement 
regime turns on a complex of both specific and general rules and incentives, 
and if traditional cultural explanations of the role that private enforcement 
plays in the United States are radically incomplete because they ignore 
institutional and political influences, then it is no surprise that, in the larger 
project on which this Article is based, we were unable to gain substantial 
comparative traction. Nor, after all, is it ground for regret. For comparative 
purposes the inquiries we have pursued, the questions we have asked, the 
perspectives we have brought to bear, and the data we have sought about 
private enforcement in the United States are more important than the data 
we have found and the answers we have secured. 
Yet, some of those data and answers are suggestive for the future of 
private enforcement in the United States, and both they and the perspectives 
we have brought to bear raise a number of questions for the future of private 
enforcement elsewhere. In concluding this Article, we offer some tentative 
thoughts about both. 
The frequency with which Congress has resorted to private enforcement 
increased dramatically starting in the late 1960s, even after controlling for the 
extent of regulatory legislation being passed.332 We noted in Part IV.D that 
there was a dramatic increase in the incidence of divided government in the 
twentieth century beginning with the Nixon administration, at about the 
same time that the ideological distance between the parties began to widen, 
and that this was associated with growing congressional reliance on private 
enforcement. There were about 48 fee shifts and damages enhancements 
(double, triple, and punitive damages provisions) attached to private rights of 
action in federal statutes in 1968, and the number had increased to 326 by 
century’s end, for an increase of 680%.333 Over the same period the rate of 
private lawsuits enforcing federal statutes increased by about 800%.334 This is 
not to say that Congress uses private enforcement regimes as the norm. On 
the contrary, as we observed in Part V.A, in highly significant regulatory 
enactments between 1947 and 2002 Congress provided for any private 
enforcement of its regulatory enactments far less often than may be 
commonly imagined (24% of the time), and exclusive reliance on private 
enforcement was rare indeed (occurring less than 5% of the time).335 
We see little reason to believe that Congress’s reliance on private 
enforcement will abate any time soon. Important variables driving this 
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legislative outcome remain highly salient today. The country persists in an era 
of divided government. Polarization between the political parties continues in 
full flower. The scarcity of revenue to fund direct bureaucratic regulation 
grows more acute. The use of counter-majoritarian legislative tactics, 
necessitating broad coalition building, is virtually normal politics in the 
modern American state, and such broad coalitions are, we believe, more 
likely to converge on private enforcement than bureaucratic state-building, 
particularly in a period when a common political slogan is that “government 
is the problem, not the solution.” 
It is much more difficult to assess the future of private enforcement of 
statutory and administrative law at the state level largely because we know so 
little about its past. While it may be reasonable conjecture to anticipate 
similar patterns governing its use and effectiveness at the state level, it is clear 
that far more work is necessary to produce an accurate picture of the current 
state of affairs. Researchers of private enforcement have very largely focused 
their attention on Congress, federal legislation, and federal litigation. The 
need for research at the state level is especially pointed in a country in which 
the vast majority of legislative policymaking comes out of state legislatures, 
and the vast majority of litigation is handled by state courts. The similarity of 
political institutions, politics, and budgetary conditions at the state and 
federal levels in the U.S. suggests that the body of research on private 
enforcement of federal statutory and administrative law provides a critical 
starting point for work on the states. At the same time, students of legislative 
regulatory policy have found that some regions of the U.S., such as the South, 
have distinctive political and institutional properties that depart from the 
federal model in important ways,336 counseling against hasty generalization 
from federal to state regulatory regimes created through legislation. A 
research agenda focused on private enforcement in the states, of course, is 
not wholly separate from federal regulation. Recent expansive 
understandings of federal preemption doctrine—curtailing private 
enforcement of state tort law—have implications for state legislative 
regulation more broadly, and thus will provide important context for the 
study of private enforcement regimes in the states.337 
Just because institutional and budgetary considerations suggest that 
private enforcement will remain an attractive regulatory strategy does not 
mean, however, that the private enforcement regimes of the future will be 
efficacious. Both Congress and the federal judiciary have taken steps to make 
one oft-found element of modern American private enforcement regimes—
class action litigation—harder to maintain. Their actions may have been 
motivated in part by the intent to administer a back-door remedy for 
inevitable instances of over-enforcement resulting from authorizing 
representative litigation on a trans-substantive basis (usually by court rule). If 
 
336 See Huber & Shipan, supra note 122, at 139–70. 
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so, however, that would be small comfort, given that the cure is often no 
more nuanced than the disease. Moreover, both Congress and the Supreme 
Court have substantially impaired the power of the states to pursue different 
visions of regulatory policy—whether more or less robust—through class 
litigation. 
We have noted the capacity of private enforcement regimes to insulate 
legislative preferences from the inroads of an ideologically distant judiciary by 
structuring incentives for potential litigants and their lawyers. We have also 
discussed the use of remedial escalation in the Civil Rights Act of 1991 as a 
response to just such inroads. Much of the power and the potential mischief 
of the class action derives from its traditional classification as procedure. 
Effective control of procedure ensures that means are available for an 
ideologically distant judiciary to frustrate legislative preferences by 
constricting access to court—refashioning doctrine so as to alter the balance 
of power in litigation and diminishing the incentives of those the legislature 
sought to recruit as private enforcers. That certainly is a plausible way of 
viewing the Supreme Court’s recent decisions on pleading that we discuss in 
Part III. Moreover, notwithstanding decades of anecdotes about American 
litigation that are not supported by systematic data, a realistic approach to the 
American litigation model requires acknowledgment that, at least in recent 
decades, the promise of access to justice has too often been broken as the 
result of political decisions to starve the courts and institutionally self-
regarding behavior by judges, some of whom have been quite content to use 
resource constraint arguments, often in tandem with attacks on lawyers, to 
disable litigants from securing rights that those judges disfavor. 
Most other countries in the world are better positioned than the United 
States to achieve a sensible regulatory regime, because they have not 
previously abdicated key elements of regulatory design and implementation 
to the bar and the judiciary, in other words, to the legal profession. As 
Professor Hadfield observes: 
The bar [in the United States] has by and large steered utterly clear of 
the idea that it is responsible—politically responsible—for the system-
wide cost and complexity of the legal system, far beyond the ethical call 
to help the poor and perform pro bono work. It requires a political 
process to shift perceptions—much as perceptions about the federal 
government’s responsibility for high gas prices or stock market failures 
are molded not in the abstract but in the crucible of political contest 
and public debate.338 
Thus, a key deficit of U.S. regulatory strategy may be the failure to 
provide adequate public alternatives to court-based litigation for private 
enforcement of statutory and administrative law. The variety of such 
alternatives in other countries339 is a sobering reminder of the baneful 
influence that tradition, ideology, and professional self-interest can have on 
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access to justice. That fact, however, should not prevent other countries from 
recognizing either the limitations of such alternatives or the social progress 
that U.S. litigation systems have enabled in the past. Nor should it prevent 
them from acknowledging the possibility of harnessing the generative power 
of American-style litigation without replicating its destructive elements. 
Ultimately, the remedy for litigation’s negative externalities is the same as in 
any other market: regulation. In the case of representative litigation, as we 
have indicated, the place to start is by avoiding trans-substantive regulatory 
strategy. 
Thinking in comparative institutional terms suggests both the limits of 
the American model of private enforcement and its potential in 
parliamentary democracies. Terry Moe has argued that parliamentary 
regimes provide a notable contrast with the American separation-of-powers 
system precisely on the issues of legislative-executive conflict and the 
stickiness of the status quo that, as we suggested in Part IV.C, incentivize 
legislative reliance on private enforcement regimes in the U.S.340 Moe 
identifies these distinctions as an explanation for the more coherent, unified, 
and centralized character of European administrative states, and the greater 
policy discretion enjoyed by their leadership, as compared to the American 
administrative state.341 He offers this explanation of the comparative structure 
of the American administrative state in response to James Q. Wilson’s noted 
lament of the weakness of American bureaucracy as compared to those in 
parliamentary democracies.342 
Moe suggests that, from the standpoint of legislators, executive 
subversion of implementation is not a problem in parliamentary regimes; 
the executive arises out of the legislature and both are controlled by the 
majority party. Thus, unlike in the United States, the executive and the 
legislature do not take distinctive approaches to issues of structure; they 
do not struggle with one another in the design and control of public 
agencies; they do not push for structures that protect against or 
compensate for the other’s political influence.343 
Likewise, in parliamentary regimes, coalition drift does not present a 
significant incentive to formalize into law rules and procedures meant to 
insulate bureaucratic power from manipulation by future coalitions. Though 
certainly stylized, the simple two-party case is illustrative. Moe writes: 
[W]hichever party gains a majority of seats in parliament gets to form a 
government and, through cohesive voting on policy issues, is in a 
position to pass its own program at will. Similarly, should the other party 
gain majority status down the road, that party would be able to pass its 
own program at will—and, if it wants, to subvert or completely destroy 
everything the first party has put in place. . . . This means that formal 
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structure does not work as a protective strategy—at least, not in the 
simple, direct way that it works in a separation-of-powers system.344 
Moe’s perspective suggests that bureaucratic drift also does not present the 
same risk in parliamentary regimes as it does in separation-of-powers regimes. 
Because a ruling coalition in a parliamentary institutional setting is much 
more able to act decisively against errant bureaucrats, it is less in need of an ex 
ante guard against bureaucratic drift. 
It is widely understood that private litigation plays an unusually large role 
in policy implementation in the U.S. as compared to a large majority of 
industrial democratic countries with predominantly parliamentary systems.345 
This disparity appears significant in relation to the institutional differences 
between separation-of-powers and parliamentary systems that we have been 
considering. The discussion here suggests the possibility that these 
institutional differences are at the root of the twin phenomena of a greater 
role for private litigation in American policy implementation (noted by 
Kagan), and a more limited and constrained American administrative state 
(noted by Wilson), as contrasted with the norm in democratic parliamentary 
systems. Focusing partly on separation-of-powers structures as an explanation 
for American “adversarial legalism,” Kagan writes, “It is only a slight 
oversimplification to say that in the United States lawyers, legal rights, judges, 
and lawsuits are the functional equivalent of the large central bureaucracies 
that dominate governance in high-tax, activist welfare states.”346 
Interestingly, similar institutional arguments have been marshaled to 
explain growing private enforcement (based on the American model, it is 
often argued) in the European Union over the past several decades. Over 
about the last decade there has been mounting scholarship demonstrating 
growing reliance in the EU on regulation though the creation of rights that 
are privately enforceable in both judicial and administrative fora.347 This body 
of work yields the following set of insights about the growth of private 
enforcement in the EU: 
It has been encouraged by decisions of the European Commission, 
the European Parliament, and the European Court of Justice. 
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It has spanned the waterfront of policy areas, embracing the 
regulatory domains of environmental, anti-trust, securities, 
intellectual property, anti-discrimination, and consumer protection 
policy, among others. 
It has encouraged reliance upon procedural devices to aggregate 
claims and upon economic damages to incentivize private 
enforcement. 
It has involved expansion of private enforcement in adjudicatory 
venues at the institutional levels of both the EU and its member 
states. 
Although there has been much talk of the “Americanization” of European 
law—with private enforcement being a characteristic frequently attributed to 
the American style of legal regulation—no one is arguing that the EU has 
converged with the U.S. in the degree of its reliance upon private 
enforcement, but only that the degree has increased materially in recent 
decades. 
There is disagreement about what has caused this development, and in 
our discussion of the relationship between political institutions and private 
enforcement, we highlight an explanation grounded in political institutions 
that has been proffered by a number of scholars.348 Putting aside other rival 
or supplementary hypotheses,349 we synthesize the political institutions 
explanation as follows: Beginning in the mid-1980s, economic liberalization 
in the EU and the push for an integrated market had the gradual effect of 
displacing regulatory policymaking from member states to the governing 
institutions of the EU. The EU governing structure is highly fragmented, 
both vertically (between the EU and member states), and horizontally 
(between the EU Council, Parliament, Commission, and Court of Justice). 
Such fragmentation hampers the ability of those who make regulatory policy 
to effectuate decisive enforcement action, with EU influence upon the distant 
and heterogeneous bureaucracies of member states presenting a particular 
challenge. The EU government does not have an enforcement bureaucracy 
that penetrates the local level, and distrust of remote “Eurocrats” limits the 
likelihood that it will develop a strong one in the near future. 
This institutional fragmentation, and the impediments that it creates for 
effective control by policymakers of an enforcement bureaucracy, may help 
to explain growing EU reliance on the alternative of private enforcement. 
The development of EU governing structures in Western Europe has 
introduced forms of state fragmentation, and public distrust of a far-off 
central government, that are familiar in the U.S. One outcome appears to 
have been growing reliance on American-style private enforcement, though 
surely in muted form. 
 
348 See Kagan, supra note 347, at 110; Kelemen, supra note 347, at 102; Kelemen & 
Sibbitt, supra note 347, at 106. 
349 For a discussion of other explanations, see Kelemen & Sibbitt, supra note 347. 
2013] PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT 719 
VII. Appendix: State Law Provisions Regarding Unfair and 
Deceptive Acts and Practices 
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Source: Carolyn L. Carter, Consumer Protection in the States: A 50-State Report 
on Unfair and Deceptive Acts and Practices Statutes, 7–10, (2009), National 
Consumer Law Center, http://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/udap/report_ 
50_states.pdf. Reprinted with permission of the National Consumer Law 
Center. 
 
